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Summary. 
The Isle of Man is a largely autonomous territory of the United Kingdom 
Crown. It entered the territories of the Crown in the fourteenth century, but remained 
under the control of a vassal monarch, the Lord, until 1765. In that year the Crown 
‘revested’ the regalities of the Lord into itself, and the British authorities exercised 
direct authority over the Island. From the mid-nineteenth century on, however, the 
Island regained an increasing level of autonomy, this time vested in the Tynwald – a 
body broadly analogous to the United Kingdom Parliament – rather than the Lord. 
Today the dominant constitutional body in the Island is Tynwald. Executive authority 
is largely exercised by a government drawn from its members, and commanding its 
support, while it exercises a plenipotentiary legislative authority over the jurisdiction. 
Tynwald, although meeting regularly as a single body, is for most purposes 
divided into two Branches – a directly elected House of Keys, and the Legislative 
Council. The Council originated in the Lord’s retinue of principal officials. Although 
the Council included ecclesiastical officers as early as 1614, it was not until after the 
Revestment of 1765 that this became established as the invariably practice. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the Council included the Lord Bishop of Sodor and 
Man, the Vicars-General, and the Archdeacon of the Diocese. In the early twentieth 
century the lesser ecclesiastical officers were removed, and the Council began to 
include a number of members elected by the Keys, as well as officials appointed by 
the Crown or the Governor. Throughout the twentieth century this element increased, 
until today the Council consists of nine members elected by the Keys, the Bishop, and 
the Attorney General who sits without a vote as a legal advisor. 
Although the Bishop’s seat and vote survived this major constitutional change, 
it was not uncontested. From 1958 on, reform of the Bishop’s role was suggested – 
often but not invariably as part of a broader constitutional change – by individual 
members of Tynwald, Commissions, and Committees. The changes of 1980 left the 
Bishop as the last unelected member of the Council with a vote, and subject to intense 
scrutiny – most notably in 1981-3, 1992-4, and 2000-1. 
A study of the work of the Bishop in Tynwald between 1961 and 2001 shows 
that his vote has been decisive on 53 occasions. Although demonstrating to some 
extent the significance of the vote, this does not properly delineate the nature of the 
Bishop’s role, which requires detailed analysis of all debates concerning or involving 
the Bishop, rather than simply those where his vote proved to be decisive. Such an 
analysis shows that the Bishop was expected to contribute to debate in two major 
areas – moral issues and technical issues concerning the Manx Church. The voice of 
the Bishop in moral issues can be seen in debates concerning gaming, sex between 
men, abortion, and Sunday trading. In relation to the Manx Church, the Bishop took a 
lead role in ecclesiastical legislation before Tynwald, but also had a role in debates 
over church property, legislative ceremony, the nature of oaths, and prison Chaplains. 
Although proposals were put forward to limit the role of the Bishop to moral issues in 
particular, Bishops were entitled to, and did, contribute on a range of other topics. It is 
in these particular topics, however, that the Bishops were seen as having a special 
role. 
As well as expectations as to subject matter, the Bishops operated within 
expectations as to their modes of contribution. The strongest of these is that the 
Bishop should not become entangled in party politics. There is also a strong 
expectation that the Bishop should represent the Manx Church and Christianity more 
generally, although this expectation does not seem to have been realised in relation to 
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non-Christian religions. There is some evidence that the Bishop is also entitled to use 
both secular and religious modes of argumentation, and that he should not expect to 
the be the only religious voice in Tynwald, or even the uncontested voice of the Manx 
Church. 
The study suggests an eleven point taxonomy for the analysis of religious 
representation in deliberate assemblies. Applying this taxonomy to the Bishop, and to 
the Lords Spiritual in Westminster, we see that religious representation in the two 
bodies is very similar, making lessons learnt from the Manx study applicable to 
consideration of reform of the House of Lords; and the broader literature on reform of 
the Lords Spiritual relevant to consideration of the Manx situation. 
Analysing this form of religious representation first in a legal sense, it seems 
likely that such representation is permissable, but not obligatory, so long as the 
interests of unrepresented religious communities are not unreasonably compromised. 
The gender bar on religious representation in both legislatures may, however, be 
problematic. If international law, most immediately under the European Convention 
on Human Rights, gives a strong emphasis to the right to non-discrimination on the 
grounds of gender over the right to religious self-determination, the gender bar on the 
Bishops may be unlawful per se. It may be, however, that the Manx and English 
Church can discriminate in relation to its leaders,  but not where this discrimination 
will be endorsed by the State in the composition of the national legislature. 
Moving away from legal restraints on the composition of the legislature, a 
range of justifications for the role of the Bishop, and the Lords Spiritual, emerge from 
debates over the future of the role in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Process arguments see the Bishop as improving the quality of the legislative and 
deliberative processes – for instance through his insulation from normal political 
processes. Public benefit arguments find a broader benefit to the Manx state or society 
– for instance safeguarding the continued existence of the Diocese of Sodor and Man. 
Community benefit arguments see benefits accruing to the Manx Church, or Manx 
Christianity more broadly – for instance through the oversight of ecclesiastical 
legislation. 
We conclude from this study that the current model of religious representation 
in Tynwald is probably the simplest involving ex officio representatives that can be 
envisaged. A focus on this form of religious representative underplays the extent to 
which other spiritual voices can be heard in the chamber. Although other legislators 
speak with a spiritual voice, the Bishop does have a distinctive role. He contributes a 
Manx Christian perspective to debates on moral issues, and functions as a technical 
expert on the Manx Church. The broader idea of the Bishop as representing religion 
generally, including non-Christian faiths, has not been fulfilled in relation to 
communities outside of interdenominational Christianity. International law provides 
few limits on the choices of Tynwald as to religious representation, although the 
gender limit on the Bishop may be problematic, and a variety of justifications for the 
role of the Bishop emerge from debate. It may be artificial, however, to seek a single 
justification for his role – his legitimacy may derive from the cumulative effect of 
several grounds, each of which could be applied to others, none of which combine in 
any other single office. 
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I: Introduction. 
I.1 The project. 
The principal purpose of this project was to explore the working of ex officio 
religious representation in a democratic legislature. By studying in detail the work of 
the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man in the Manx Tynwald we hoped to illuminate such 
representation more broadly, informing the debate on the future of such representation 
in both the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom. 
Our approach to this study is essentially tripartiate. Firstly, we seek to place 
the context of the Bishop’s role in the legislature within the broader frame of Manx 
constitutional and ecclesiastical law and history. This can be found in Chapters One 
and Two of this report. Secondly, we analysis the interplay within the legislature to 
provide insights into the way in which the Bishop fulfils, and is expected by other 
members to fulfil, his role in Tynwald. In contrast with important earlier work on the 
Lords Spiritual in Westminster, our primary focus is on in-depth, qualitative analysis 
of the debates rather than a primarily quantitative analysis of words spoken and votes 
made. This analysis can be found in Chapter Three of this report. Finally, we reflect 
on the Manx experience more broadly in terms of both law and policy. We make use 
of the earlier analysis to develop a taxonomy of religious representation, a taxonomy 
which shows the close similarities between the Manx and United Kingdom position. 
We then consider the legal limits upon Tynwald’s choices in relation to the future of 
religious representation, before concluding with a critical summary of the main 
justifications which can be put forward for the role of the Bishop. This broader 
reflection can be found in Chapter Four of this report. 
The remainder of this chapter introduces the essential Manx context for this 
study, including the development of the Manx constitution, and the changing religious 
context. 
I.2 Demographic outline1 
The Isle of Man is located in the centre of the Irish Sea, roughly equidistant 
between England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Its 227 square miles now hold a 
population of around 76,000, over a third of which lives in the capital, Douglas.  
The traditional Island industries of farming, fishing and mining gave place by 
the early twentieth century to a flourishing tourist trade, boosted by the institution of 
annual workers’ holidays in north-western England. Two World Wars cut off the 
supply of tourists, hitting the Manx economy hard despite British government 
payments in respect of enemy alien internment camps on the Island. Tourism 
recovered in the later years of the twentieth century, but it was now becoming 
practical to take holidays further afield. To rescue the economy, divergence between 
tax and financial regulation regimes on the Island and in England was exploited to 
attract to the Isle of Man first wealthy individuals seeking to minimise capital taxes, 
and more recently – with considerable success – the offshore financial services 
industry.  
Employment opportunities on the Island, coupled with low direct taxation, 
now attract a steady influx of residents from both sides of the Irish Sea as well as from 
                                           
1
 See further V. Robinson and D. McCaroll, The Isle of Man: Celebrating a Sense of 
Place, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1990). 
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the broader European Union. The current population compares with around 40,000 at 
the Island’s first census in 1821, which rose to some 55,000 in late Victorian times, 
fell to slightly over 50,000 for most of the early twentieth century, reached a nadir of 
48,000 in 1961 and has risen steadily ever since.
2
  
A work permit system has been in operation for half a century, and residence 
control legislation is in place though not yet operative. For higher education, broader 
employment opportunities or city life, it is necessary to leave the Island, which makes 
for considerable mobility especially in the younger section of the population. Slightly 
fewer than half the Island’s inhabitants are now Manx-born, English and Northern 
Irish and Irish immigrants making up the bulk of the remainder. 
The Manx tongue, related to Irish and Scots Gaelic was in common use until 
the nineteenth century by all save English incomers and a governing class centred on 
the former capital, Castletown.
3
 A rapid decline then followed, due to the need to 
communicate with visitors to the Island, the use of English in the school system and a 
sense that English was the language of social advancement. By the 1930s Manx-
speakers were rare and monoglot speakers almost unknown. Today English is the 
universal medium of communication. Awareness of the language’s significance to the 
Island heritage has caused a resurgence of interest, however; Manx-medium schooling 
is available and 2.2% of the population now claim some degree of fluency. 
I.3 The development of the Manx constitution.4 
After the conquest of the Isle of Man by Harald Haarfager, King of Norway, in 
the ninth century, the Island stood at the intersection of three spheres of influence. 
Although the Kings of Mann were almost invariably bound in service to a more 
powerful monarchy, the fluctuations of this relationship suggest an independent, 
minor, power changing allegiance for its own advantage. Until 1266 the kingdom was 
Norse in character. In that year, following the death of the Manx King, the Kings of 
Norway and Scotland agreed that the Island should pass to the Kings of Scotland. 
Between 1266 and 1399 the Manx Crown was held by a variety of English and 
Scots Kings and nobles. Although after 1346 the Scots ceased to press their claim to 
the Island. The earliest English magnates ruling the Island claimed to inherit the 
position of their Norse predecessors, so it was not until 1399 that the Kings of 
England unambiguously used the language, now controversial, of ‘conquest’.5 
                                           
2
 Population statistics are derived largely from the Isle of Man Government website, 
http://www.gov.im (1/9/2002). 
3
 Castle Rushen replaced the Island’s original capital, Peel, at the accession of King 
Magnus Olafsson circa 1252. Douglas has been considered the capital since the 
Governor’s move from Castletown in 1863. 
4
 See further P.W. Edge, Manx Public Law, (Preston: Isle of Man Law Society, 1997) 
at 121-138; D.G. Kermode, Devolution at work: A case study of the Isle of Man 
(Farnborough, 1979); D.G. Kermode, Offshore island politics: The constitutional and 
political development of the Isle of Man in the Twentieth Century, (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2001). 
5
 Henry IV’s declaration in Parliament on 30.9.1399 (James Gell, ed., An Abstract of 
the Laws, Customs and Ordinances of the Isle of Man, compiled by John Parr, Esq., 
Douglas 1867, 25-26; Tomlin’s Statutes at Large I, 519; 2 Bl Com 242) and the 
recitals in his grant of the Island to Henry Percy dated 19.10.1399 (Gell, 23) may be 
contrasted, in their ‘conquest’ terminology, from the declaration made by Edward III 
on 9.8.1333 disclaiming any royal interest in the Island ( text in J.R. Oliver, ed., 
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The conquest put an end to whatever freedom the Island had formerly enjoyed 
to determine its own external alliances. Lacking separate international personality, its 
only voice on the international plane was that of the English King. The King also 
claimed the freedom of a conqueror to change the laws of his territory, acting both 
within and apart from the English Parliament.
6
 But in virtually all respects Manx 
customary law remained intact,
7
 and separate development from England was assured 
when King Henry IV initiated the practice of granting the Island in fee to a trusted 
vassal, together with a generous package of ‘regalities’ that would allow the Manx 
King virtually exclusive dominance in Manx internal affairs. Although Thomas III 
later decided that it was more politic to style himself Lord of Man, the nature of the 
grant was not thereby changed. 
Three seigniorial houses ruled the Isle of Man from 1399 to 1765 – those of 
Percy, Stanley and Murray. This period saw the emergence from the Island’s ancient 
‘law-speaking’ assembly, Tynwald, of a legislative House of twenty-four; the 
coalescence of the Lord’s senior officers into a legislative Council; and finally the 
Lord’s acceptance that he should make new law only with the advice and consent of 
these two chambers. The name ‘Tynwald’ became attached to the new legislative 
structure, discussed at length below.
8
 
During the eighteenth century, the distinctive constitutional position became 
an inconvenience for the British government. In particular, the Isle of Man was 
actively involved in trade categorised by the British government as smuggling. The 
British Prime Minister, Grenville, opened negotiations with the Lord to purchase such 
rights as would be “expedient to vest in the Crown, for preventing the pernicious, and 
illicit trade”.9 By Act of Parliament, the regalities and custom duties of the Lord were 
“revested” in the Crown in 1765, with the remaining rights associated with the 
Lordship, such as patronages, landed property and manorial rights, similarly revested 
by 1826. It may be that this Revestment is best categorised as vesting “a legal entity - 
the Lordship of the Isle of Man - in a natural person - the then British Sovereign and 
his heirs”;10 or alternatively as the surrender of the Lord’s rights to the heir of the 
original maker of the grant, King George III. On the first interpretation, Revestment 
saw the purchase of the Lordship by the British Sovereign, who continues to hold the 
Lordship today; on the second, Revestment saw the abolition of the Lordship, and the 
removal of any barriers that it posed to the legal authority of the British Crown. 
                                                                                                                         
Monumenta de Insula Manniae, Douglas 1862, vol. II, 183). See further P.W. Edge, 
Manx Public Law, (Preston: Isle of Man Law Society, 1997) at 11-14; S. Sharpe, 
“Autonomy wrongly denied: The British Government and the Isle of Man” and “The 
Isle of Man – In the British Islands but not ruled by Britain: A modern peculiarity 
from ancient occurences” in P. Davey and D. Finlayson (eds.), Mannin revisited: 
Twelve essays on Manx culture and environment (Edinburgh: Scottish Society for 
Northern Studies, 2002). 
6
 Calvin’s Case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1a, 17b; Letters Patent of James I in 1609/10 
(Oliver, Monumenta, vol. III, 121); Campbell v. Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204, 213. See 
further P.W. Edge, Manx Public Law, op.cit., at 47-72. 
7
 Countess of Derby’s case, Kelw Mich 14 Hen VIII, Bellaway 11 Hen VIII fol. 20. 
Earl of Derby’s case, 4 Co Inst 201, Scots State Papers 27/38; Oliver, Monumenta,  
vol. III, 92-93. See further P.W. Edge, Manx Public Law, op.cit., at 79-85. 
8
 See p.18. 
9
 See P.W. Edge, Manx Public Law, op.cit., at 129-130. 
10
 P.W. Edge, Manx Public Law, op.cit., at 14. 
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Whichever of these is most accurate, the practical effect of Revestment was to place 
Manx matters more closely under the control of Great Britain. 
Part of this control was effected through mechanisms already established in 
the Isle of Man, but with King George rather than Lord Atholl fulfilling the 
Sovereign’s role. So, for instance, we see the King joining with Tynwald to pass Acts 
of Tynwald. We also see, however, mechanisms more clearly based in Great Britain 
being used in Manx affairs. So, for instance, it became much more common for the 
Crown to legislate for the Island in the Westminster Parliament. Executive and 
judicial authority was also concentrated in the Crown, acting chiefly through his 
Lieutenant-Governor
11
 in Castletown and advised on Island government from 1782 by 
the British Home Secretary. 
Nineteenth century Westminster legislation and improved communications 
both contributed to the Island becoming much more closely aligned than previously to 
English legal, social and economic developments. While the memory of its distinct 
heritage fostered a desire for local financial control and ultimately for political 
autonomy from Whitehall, popular grassroots movements inspired by England’s 
example called for a legislative organ more closely resembling the reformed House of 
Commons. In 1866 an elective House of Keys replaced the former co-opted chamber 
of twenty-four, and in return Tynwald Court (the name given to the Council and Keys 
meeting in joint session) was empowered by Parliament to determine the use of a 
residuary portion of the Island’s customs and harbour dues.12 
This was, however, far from sufficient for the newly representative Keys, who 
wished to see native institutions taking a far greater share in the Island’s government. 
There was little serious resentment of the position of the monarch, but there were 
other respects in which local autonomy could be increased.  
Firstly, Parliament could cease to legislate for the Island, repealing its existing 
provision (especially fiscal) to clear the way for Acts of Tynwald. Since the middle of 
the nineteenth century the accepted sphere of Tynwald’s legislation has increased at 
the expense of that of Parliament, which is now effectively restricted to issues with an 
external dimension.
13
 
Secondly, the Manx could gain enhanced influence over such Acts if the 
English-appointed members of the Council were removed, or at least outnumbered. 
We discuss the composition and powers of the Council at greater length in the 
following chapter.
14
 For the moment, it is worth noting that the Council was, 
particularly in the nineteenth century, seen as an important mechanism by which the 
British Government could veto undesired Manx legislation. As Vaukins noted: “[t]he 
powers of the Council were equal to those of the Keys and provided the Imperial 
Government with a simple but effective device for controlling affairs without having 
to exert its authority”.15 The Council during the nineteenth century was composed of 
officials appointed by the Crown.
16
 During the twentieth century, the Council was 
                                           
11
 Following a common insular practice, ‘Lieutenant-Governor’ will generally be 
abbreviated in this study to ‘Governor’. 
12
 House of Keys Election Act 1866 (AT); Isle of Man Customs, Harbours and Public 
Purposes Act 1866 (AP). 
13
 See P.W. Edge, Manx Public Law, op.cit., at 57-65. 
14
 See p.18. 
15
 J. Vaukins, The Manx Struggle for Reform, (M.M.A., 1984) at 15. 
16
 Except for the period before the purchase of the final rights of the Lord, as 
discussed above. 
 11 
transformed by the removal of almost all voting members appointed by the Crown or 
by Crown nominees, and the reduction of its powers relative to the Keys. The 
principal landmarks on the road to reform were 1919, when three ex officio Council 
members were removed and the first Keys’ appointees added; 1961, when the Keys 
were enabled to override a Council veto on legislation and policy; 1969, when the 
indirectly-elected Council members came to outnumber the remainder; and 1980, 
when the Governor ceased to preside over the Council’s primary legislative 
business.
17
 Today the Council comprises nine indirectly-elected members and one 
Crown appointee, the Bishop; but tensions remain over its power to swing the 
outcome of important elections and delay implementation of the wishes of the 
directly-elected Branch.  
Thirdly, influence could be similarly increased if the royal assent could be 
given on Manx advice, rather than upon the advice of English Ministers. It has not 
been unknown, even in the twentieth century, for the royal assent to be refused to 
Tynwald Bills, either because of conflict with Imperial government policy or because 
it was considered that the proposed Act would be beyond the powers of Tynwald.
18
 In 
1981 the Governor was authorised to signify the royal assent to a wide category of 
Bills, which usually follows, as a matter of course, consultation with a committee of 
insular officers and politicians.
19
 In practice, however, every Bill passing through 
Tynwald is considered at an earlier stage in Whitehall, where advice may be given, 
reservations expressed and possibly the Governor instructed to reserve the Bill for 
assent in England under the older procedure.  
Fourthly, the Crown’s executive authority could be transferred to Manx 
institutions that would be capable of acting without the involvement of English 
Ministers. The transfer of executive government to Manx institutions has been largely 
completed as regards those functions formerly exercised locally through the 
Governor. It began gradually in the nineteenth century with the creation of statutory 
local authorities and the informal setting-up of specialist Boards, assisting in the 
Governor’s functions but comprising members of Tynwald. The Boards became 
answerable to Tynwald in 1919.
20
 After the Second World War, an advisory council 
was set up to assist the Governor in policy formation. Initially appointed by him after 
consultation with Tynwald, the Executive Council’s composition became statutory 
from 1961.
21
 Financial affairs, which had been directed by the Governor under 
Westminster legislation before 1958 and under an Act of Tynwald thereafter, passed 
to an insular Finance Board in 1976.
22
 It was this last development, together with the 
vesting of most other gubernatorial executive functions in the Boards or the Executive 
Council in 1980,
23
 that largely completed the transfer of executive power to the 
Island, since local organs were not susceptible to the instructions of Whitehall in the 
same way as the Governor had been.  
                                           
17
 Isle of Man Constitution Amendment Act 1919, Isle of Man Constitution Acts 1961 
and 1969, Constitution Act 1980 (AT). 
18
 See P.W. Edge, Manx Public Law, op.cit., at 34-38. 
19
 Royal Assent to Legislation (Isle of Man) Order in Council 1981 
20
 Isle of Man Constitution Amendment Act 1919 (AT) 
21
 Isle of Man Constitution Act 1961 (AT) 
22
 Finance Act 1958, Governor’s Financial and Judicial Functions (Transfer) Act 1976 
(AT) 
23
 Governor’s General Functions (Transfer) Act 1980 (AT) 
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The principal change during the 1980s was internal. It was considered that the 
dispersion of executive government amongst specialist Boards, held together by loose 
accountability to a legislature without party whips, was not productive of a strong 
strategic stance. This decade therefore saw a Chairman of the Executive Council, 
chosen by Tynwald, converted into a Chief Minister with the right to choose his 
colleagues on that Council, from 1990 renamed the ‘Council of Ministers’. The 
Boards became incorporated Departments, holding their own lands and property, and 
Ministers became entitled to act in their name.
24
 Aside from approval of legislation 
and the budget, Tynwald’s main control over the insular executive is now the election 
of a Chief Minister after every quinquennial Keys’ election. Executive government, 
once (as in England) almost wholly an expression of the royal prerogative, has 
changed its character by the gradual encroachment of statute and then by transfer from 
the Governor to other agencies not associated directly with the Crown. Despite a 
formal appointment by Governor’s warrant, Manx Ministers do not advise the 
monarch directly and their very existence depends not on the prerogative but on an 
Act of Tynwald. Since the land used for public purposes was once almost wholly part 
of the Crown estate, Ministers would have no control over this if it had not earlier 
been transferred from the Crown – part-gift, part-purchase – to the statutory 
Government Property Trustees.
25
 
Although these goals have been largely achieved in the last century-and-a-half, 
significant reminders of the Island’s dependent status remain. 
Parliament has not entirely ceased to legislate for the Island. In 1958 its main 
fiscal legislation was repealed,
26
 and in most areas recognised as domestic to the 
Island a convention has grown up that there will be no Westminster legislation save 
by Tynwald’s request. In many uncontroversial areas, the Manx wish to adopt reforms 
made in England has led to the twin practices of passing Acts of Tynwald closely 
imitating those of Parliament,
27
 and of extending Acts of Parliament to the Island by 
Order in Council. The latter procedure, for which the Westminster Act in question 
usually gives authority,
28
 leaves slightly less freedom to Tynwald but also relieves the 
pressure on Branch agendas. Extensions (and their removal) can be negotiated directly 
between United Kingdom and Manx politicians. 
Less acceptably, the threat of invoking parliamentary legislative authority has 
enabled United Kingdom Ministers, when the policy stakes are perceived to be 
sufficiently high, to coerce Tynwald or other Manx institutions into their own 
reluctant action. In 1918 this forced the introduction of a Manx income tax; sixty 
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 13 
years on, it led to the cessation of judicial corporal punishment; and in 1990 to the 
decriminalisation of some sex between men.
29
 There is a precedent for the threat to be 
carried out if Tynwald stands firm: in 1967 the Order in Council procedure was used 
against Manx wishes to introduce new broadcasting offences into Manx law.
30
 
The statutory character of the Manx executive accounts for the fact that it has 
no competence in fields for which Tynwald does not, in practice, legislate. Any armed 
forces of the Crown on the Isle of Man take their orders not from Douglas but from 
the Defence Council in Whitehall; now that there is no regular garrison, even the 
appointment of the Governor as their local commander has ceased.  The First Lord of 
the British Treasury has advised on the appointment of the Island’s Bishop since the 
Murray family surrendered its patronage of the See in 1827. Additionally, Whitehall 
and not Douglas furnishes the monarch’s advisers in foreign affairs, and a non-
binding consultation is the most that can be expected before the Crown undertakes 
international obligations in the Island’s name. Because the enforcement of compliance 
with such obligations is among the key purposes for which the legislative authority of 
Parliament is still invoked, demands have at intervals been heard for the Isle of Man 
to represent itself on the international plane, thus completing a transition to full 
independence. But the cost and complexity of independence for such a small territory 
has hitherto held Island politicians back from pursuing this goal, and indeed a recent 
Ministerial report indicated that the optimum level of autonomy should already be 
considered achieved.
31
  
I.4 The changing religious scene. 
The arrival on the Isle of Man of Irish converts, around the start of the fourth 
century, marked the beginning of the Island’s Christian era, as revealed by the 
presence of a number of ogam inscriptions.
32
 The subsequent Norse colonisation of 
the Island, given the well-documented organisational preferences of the Norse, 
suggests propitious circumstances for the development of a unified national church 
from the mid-tenth century, a supposition supported by available archaeological 
evidence.
 33
 
Under the Norse hegemony, episcopacy became the norm, and the Isle of Man 
was in due course placed under the metropolitical oversight of Trondheim. Much of 
the jus commune of western Christendom found its way into the Island’s customary 
law. The Island was divided into seventeen parishes, an Abbey was founded at 
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Rushen, and the episcopal See was endowed with lands and tithes that made the 
Bishop an economic power in the Island. By the date of the English conquest, both 
Bishop and Abbot were considered ‘barons’, indeed the only Manx Barons, and paid 
fealty for their estates to the King’s new tenant-in-chief. 34 
The Lord’s right to appoint the Bishop meant that, from the fifteenth century 
onwards, the See was not infrequently occupied by an English absentee. The resulting 
isolation of the Manx clergy and laity meant that insular religious practice might take 
some time to reflect developments across the Irish Sea. The reformation of liturgy and 
popular religion was slow, and there was even some delay in the surrender of religious 
houses to the Crown. However, in 1541 the Imperial Parliament planted the seeds of 
future integration by transferring the Island to the ecclesiastical province of York.
35
 
Before the sixteenth century was out, more active bishops were supporting their 
clergy in the use of vernacular versions of the English liturgy, and Tynwald was also 
taking steps to do away with surviving practices held to be ‘superstitious’.36  
The spectrum of religious views on the Island in the early seventeenth century 
was less broad than in England. Catholicism was more thoroughly eradicated from the 
Manx scene, while the stricter Protestants found less reason to separate. Legislative 
tolerance, there being no extension of Westminster’s harsher recusancy laws, seems to 
have resulted in a very minimal growth of the older Dissenting traditions. There were, 
however, echoes of the English rivalry between clerical and lay authority, especially 
in the matter of appeals from the Bishop’s jurisdiction.  
Isaac Barrow, the best-known Bishop of the Restoration period, inaugurated a 
tradition of episcopal concern for the Islanders’ general well-being, encouraging 
public subscription to augment poor stipends and endowing charities for ministerial 
and general education. A century of widespread popular loyalty to the religious 
Establishment followed, and when Bishop Thomas Wilson’s high views of clerical 
authority brought rivalry with the Lord’s Officers back to crisis-point, public 
sympathies lay very largely with the Bishop. This was one of a number of factors 
which allowed the moral disciplinary jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to 
survive well into the eighteenth century, surprising visitors accustomed to its virtual 
desuetude in England. 
Religious plurality became a significant feature of Manx affairs with the first 
successful Methodist mission in 1775. As movement into and out of the Island 
increased during the nineteenth century, a variety of other Dissenting traditions gained 
footholds. But it was Methodism that caught the imagination of the grassroots 
population, rivalling and indeed overtaking conformity to Established forms of 
worship once the chapels had begun seriously to compete from the 1830s. In the latter 
part of the century it was Methodism that dominated the House of Keys,
37
 while the 
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Council retained a built-in majority of religious Conformists. The Island’s 
Conformists were of a generally ‘low-church’ stamp, imported English ritualism 
being confined to a few isolated centres. This contributed to continuing good relations 
with the Dissenting chapels, and it was not uncommon for Methodists to divide their 
Sundays between their own congregation and the parish church. Methodist and 
Conformist alike saw the Island’s religious institutions as theirs: the parish churchyard 
remained the common burial-ground, and insular indignation at English proposals to 
merge the Manx See with Carlisle in 1836
38
 was universal. When a ritualist Bishop of 
the 1870s fell into dispute with one of his own evangelical clergy, the minister found 
allies in the House of Keys while the Bishop had to look for effective support to 
Westminster.
39
  
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, following the English lead, 
an informal ‘diocesan conference’ including selected laymen was convened at 
intervals to consult with the Bishop on matters affecting the Established religious 
provision in the Island. This was integrated into the equally informal arrangements for 
English national representation of active Conformist worshippers, which were 
succeeded in 1919 by a Church Assembly at Westminster with statutory powers.
40
 By 
analogy with such powers, the insular Conference was empowered in 1925 to frame 
religious Bills for direct introduction into Tynwald.
41
  
The formal existence of the Diocesan Conference set the seal on a half-
century’s gradual division of function between the agencies of public worship, 
preaching and religious oversight on the one hand and the remaining – often novel – 
public agencies (such as marriage registrars, the High Court, the Board of Education 
and local authorities) on the other. In popular conception, and their own terminology, 
the first group of agencies had become ‘the church’ or, to distinguish it from 
Dissenting structures, ‘the Church of England’, Conformists being known as 
‘Anglicans’; while the latter group (and, by extension, Tynwald) constituted ‘the 
State’. As the twentieth century continued, the extension to or imitation on the Island 
of much English religious legislation increased the formal distance between the 
religious Establishment and the generality of Manx society. Episcopal authority was 
enhanced and the practical involvement of both Tynwald and the Governor decreased. 
Financial dependence on the pooled English ecclesiastical resources administered by 
the Church Commissioners in Westminster became acute. But as in England, Manx 
Established religion found new allies in the Dissenting religious bodies and in the 
Roman Catholicism that was now beginning to establish an insular presence. In an 
Island that had resisted the introduction of judicial divorce till 1938, ‘the churches’ 
discovered a common enemy in the decline of Christian religious practice. 
The post-war period saw a decline in such practice that followed the English 
trend. But for a number of reasons it was not so rapid: there were no industrial 
conurbations, and very little immigration by ethnic groups with non-Christian 
traditions. Thus we find an adherence to old patterns of churchgoing and to labels like 
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‘Methodist’ (although Methodism was in fact harder-hit than the Establishment and 
lost its place as the dominant protestant tradition). It is the House of Keys (not merely 
the Speaker, as in England) that appoints a Chaplain, and it is still rare for members 
not to join in the responses before daily business, or to be absent from the occasional 
service for members at St George’s Douglas or the Royal Chapel of St John. The 
debates in Tynwald discussed in Chapter III,
42
 illustrate how discussion has been 
coloured and passions raised by the Methodist witness to temperance and the Lord’s 
Day, Catholic and high Anglican conviction on the sanctity of life, and the rejection 
of sex between men associated with conservative Christianity.  
Growing nationalism and appreciation of the Manx heritage has brought with 
it a realisation that the structures of religion, physical and institutional, are actually 
part of that heritage. A conservationist lobby joins active churchgoers in seeking to 
preserve threatened ecclesiastical buildings. There was unprecedented indignation on 
the part of leading Island politicians in 1974 when an incoming Bishop announced an 
intention to dispose of the ancient episcopal residence.
43
 Revival of the 1836 plan to 
unite the episcopal See with a northern English one is regarded with abhorrence by 
Islanders who have very little record of active episcopalian worship. Few now object 
strongly to churchwardens’ management of the Island’s ancient burial grounds, or to 
the procession of beneficed clergy at the annual Tynwald ceremony. 
Suggestions of the desirability of disestablishment have been heard from time 
to time but never pursued. The Isle of Man continues to have a national church, 
episcopal in polity and committed broadly to the doctrines of the protestant 
Reformation, whose rules, organs and officers form part of the customary and statute 
law and public institutions of the land. As Bishop Jones put it recently, “we proudly 
call the Church here the Manx Church, and we done so since the 17
th
 century, so we 
are hardly newcomers”.44 On the other hand, there has been a substantial decline in 
church attendance and denominational membership. The parish churches in the north 
of the Island stand largely empty and the beneficed clergy frequently serve three or 
more units that once had a separate cure of souls. Only the fact that the Island as a 
whole has recently enjoyed record prosperity, which has found expression in the 
voluntary giving of individual churchgoers, has prevented much greater damage to the 
Establishment from the near-cessation of English subvention in the late 1990s. 
Methodism and Roman Catholicism, which possess no historic endowment at all and 
have always needed to be self-sufficient, have suffered equally or worse from 
declining adherence, and both have closed chapels. 
Although the traditionally established Christian denominations remain the 
most significant religious communities on the Isle of Man, smaller religious groups 
have a presence on the Isle of Man, sufficient to be listed in the Manx government’s 
directory of religious faiths and organisations.
45
 This directory includes contact details 
for a number of independent Christian denominations,
46
 the Salvation Army, 
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spiritualist churches,
47
 the First Church of Christian Science, the Baha’i, the Jehovah's 
Christian Witnesses, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, as well as a 
contact number for the “Jewish Community”.  
I.5 Conclusions. 
The survival of Manx autonomy into the eighteenth century, and the recovery 
of that autonomy in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is important to 
appreciate the role of the Bishop in the Manx legislature. Tynwald is a genuine 
national legislature, which has exercised its competence in areas as diverse as finance, 
capital punishment and criminal law generally, inheritance and property. The study of 
Tynwald is closer to the study of the Westminster Parliament than, say, the National 
Assembly for Wales or the Scottish Parliament. 
The exercise of a legislative function by Tynwald has taken place in a 
religious context with legal similarities to, but social differences from, England. The 
privileges and duties of the Manx Church resemble those of the Church of England, 
and the Diocese is under the ultimate ecclesiastical control of York. The Manx 
Church functions in the context of a significant Methodist presence in the Isle of Man 
in the ninteenth and twentieth centuries, and the absence of an increase in non-
Christian religions due to migration in the twentieth century. In 2000, Bishop Jones 
contrasted multifaith Britain with Christian Mann.
48
 Although this may be overstating 
the case, it is worth noting that non-Christian traditions have a smaller presence in the 
Island than in the United Kingdom. 
As mentioned earlier, the Legislative Council has experienced considerable 
change in the twentieth century. The following chapter considers the development of 
the Council since the earliest Manx records in the early fifteenth century, with a 
particular focus on the place of ecclesiastical officers in Tynwald. The chapter 
concludes with discussion of the campaigns to alter the role of the Bishop in the 
twentieth century, with especial focus on proposals during the period of this study. 
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II: Ecclesiastical officers in Tynwald. 
It is against the foregoing background of economic progress, developing 
relations with England, internal constitutional development and religious change that 
we must view the position of the Bishop in the Manx legislature. This chapter 
explores the history of the Bishop’s position, which is entwined with the Council 
presence of other ecclesiastical officers between the early seventeenth and early 
twentieth century. Chapter III will then consider how the Bishop’s rights to sit, speak 
and vote have been exercised in practice since 1961. 
II.1 The establishment of ecclesiastical officers in Tynwald. 
The two Branches of the modern Tynwald have quite distinct origins. The 
tenth- or eleventh-century institution bearing that name was a ‘law-speaking’ 
assembly: two Deemsters learned in the customary law expounded and applied that 
law with the assistance of twenty-four respected men from all parts of the kingdom. 
The Manx for ‘twenty-four’, chiare as-feed, is commonly offered as the explanation 
of the anglicised name ‘Keys’. 
An early fifteenth-century account of the gathering, prefixed to the first entry 
in the Manx statute book, indicates the addition of a second element: that of a feudal 
ceremony, at which the relations between the Lord and his barons could be publicly 
demonstrated by suit of court and the payment of fealty.
49
 These ‘barons’ were the 
lesser magnates of the Island, male landowners substantial enough to enjoy judicial 
rights of their own and to stand in a special relationship with the Lord. The magnitude 
of past religious grants had resulted in all the baronies being vested in ecclesiastical 
corporations. Alongside the Bishop, the Abbot of Rushen represented his community, 
as did the superiors of various houses across the sea. 
The assembly of barons cannot, however, be considered as the forerunners of 
the later legislative Council. The feudal court and the law-speaking assembly 
remained two quite distinct elements of the annual Tynwald gathering. Accounts of 
later Tynwalds suggest that the two elements were not regularly combined, and there 
is no evidence of the barons as such participating in law-speaking.
50
 Though the first 
entry in the statute book appears to suggest otherwise, setting out “divers Ordinances 
Statutes and Customs reputed and used for Laws in the Land of Mann, that were 
ratified approved and confirmed, as well by the [Lord] and divers other his 
predecessors, as by all Barons Deemsters Officers Tenants Inhabitants and Commons 
of the same Land”, this cannot be taken as a detailed indication of legislative 
authority. It includes several categories of people who clearly had no active part to 
play at that date, and is an attempt to set out the whole community in whose name the 
law was declared, rather than to list the active participants. The later history of the 
Manx baronage confirms this view.
51
 Thus, although the Bishop remains a baron of 
                                           
49
 Session of 18.1.1417. 
50
 This was also the opinion of Sir Spencer Walpole, a former Governor, in The Land 
of Home Rule – An Essay on the History & Constitution of the Isle of Man, London 
1893, 267. 
51
 See opinion of Deemster Heywood & Searle A.-G. on John Quayle’s claim to 
tender fealty to the King in Tynwald, 30th June 1770; Oliver, Monumenta, vol. III, 
169. 
 19 
the Isle of Man,
52
 his legislative role has no direct connection with this status. In this 
regard, it may be that the Bishop’s place in Tynwald has a different origin from that of 
the Lord’s Spiritual in Parliament. Selbourne considered that the Lord’s Spiritual sat 
as barons, so that the Bishop of Sodor and Man was excluded since before the final 
Revestment “the lands with which that See was endowed were held, not of the King 
directly, but of a subject who nominated the Bishop”.53 
The true origin of the Council is to be found in the retinue of advisors and 
officials attending the Lord, or during his frequent absences his chief officer the 
Governor, at occasions such as the assembly of Tynwald. Sixteenth-century entries in 
the Island statute-book show that the transition from law-speaking to law-making 
brought these Officers a considerably more active role. Certain Officers, with the 
Deemsters and the Abbot of Rushen, formed a commission for obtaining (in the 
Lord's absence) the Keys' views on a number of points of law in 1504. A differently-
composed body of officers, including one Deemster, was commissioned in 1532 to 
arbitrate in a dispute between clergy and people over ecclesiastical dues, the Keys 
putting the people's case.
54
 Thereafter Ordinances appear issued both by named 
commissioners, acting for the Lord, and by 'the Deputy and Council of the Isle' in the 
Court of Exchequer.
55
 It seems clear that by the end of the century the Lord was 
exercising, by himself or by deputies, a personal lawmaking power.
56
 The statute book 
offers no evidence of any ecclesiastic being at this date numbered amongst the 
Officers concerned. From 1541 the Bishop and Archdeacon had a different legislative 
role, however: the Archbishop of York’s metropolitical oversight of the Isle of Man 
brought them seats in the northern provincial convocation, whose ecclesiastical 
canons were accepted as binding by the clergy of the Island. 
The real transformation of Tynwald into a legislative body in the modern 
sense took place in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Three roughly 
contemporaneous elements in this process can be distinguished: a reform of the 
method of choosing the twenty-four Keys; the recognition that the Lord’s legislation 
required the majority consent of both bodies; and, most importantly for our study, the 
definitive identification of the Officers comprising the Council for legislative 
purposes.  
During the seventeenth century Acts in the statute book took on a more regular 
form, and from 1629 the appending of legislators’ signatures gave an indication of 
those responsible for a measure’s final form. Besides the Governor, the Deemsters 
(now treated as Lord’s Officers themselves), Attorney-General, Comptroller-General 
or Clerk of the Rolls, Receiver-General and Water-Bailiff appeared regularly in this 
capacity. In Instructions to the Governor dated 1614 and issued by Elizabeth Stanley 
on behalf of the incapacitated Lord, her husband William, it was signified “That her 
Ladyship’s pleasure is that the Lord Bishop of the Island be admitted one of the 
Council of the Island, and he to be made privy to these Instructions, & his advice 
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therein to be had touching the performance thereof.” 57 Then in the statute book for 
1637, we find for the first time two sets of Officers’ signatures distinguished. 
Alongside the ‘Officers Temporal’, a group of ‘Officers Spiritual’ comprises the 
Bishop, the Vicars-General (his delegates for judicial business) and the Archdeacon of 
the Isle of Man.
58
  
If these are indeed the first appearances of ecclesiastics as members of the 
developing legislature, their dates are easily explained by reference to events in 
England. The Stanley Lords’ dual role as Manx rulers and English nobles was a 
channel by which the fashion of government at Westminster might influence the 
institutions of the Isle of Man. In 1614 King James I was already known for his slogan 
‘No Bishop, no King’, while in 1637 his son was standing firmly behind the policies 
of Archbishop William Laud. Both Charles I and Laud were strong believers not only 
in religion as part of the business of government, but in the divine authority of 
monarchy and episcopate to discharge that business with a minimum of interference 
on the part of lay popular representatives. Nor was Laud’s advice to the King confined 
to ecclesiastical matters. James Stanley, Lord Strange, who by this time had assumed 
the administration of the Lordship for his father, was an enthusiastic supporter of the 
policies of both King and Archbishop. In the smaller polity for which he was 
responsible, it would be unsurprising if he too should feel the presence of ecclesiastics 
essential to the consideration of laws, and that his influence should be apparent in 
arrangements made for the 1637 Tynwald. Unlike the Bishop, the Vicars-General and 
the Archdeacon had no counterparts in the upper House at Westminster. But as has 
already been observed, the Council was a body of Officers rather than of barons. This 
allowed a greater flexibility in its evolution, the body’s practical roles (judicial and 
advisory as well as legislative) carrying greater weight than the claims of position 
alone. The inclusion of the Vicars-General and Archdeacon would allow the entire 
judiciary of the Island to be present at Council deliberations; and if the Bishop 
followed the Lord in spending substantial periods away from the Island, they would 
be in a position to represent clerical interests and to report back on proceedings. All 
the ecclesiastics were, in any event, officers of the Island. They took oaths of office 
which included an undertaking “with his best advice & counsel to be aiding to the 
Captain of this Isle or Governor for the time being for the furtherance of the 
government and benefit of the said Isle”, though this was qualified in the case of the 
merely judicial officers by the words “as often as they shall be called upon or required 
thereunto”.59  
During the Fairfax administration, in the wake of the English Civil War, the 
episcopal See had been vacant, and other officers of the episcopalian polity took an 
understandably low profile. Even after the Restoration the signature of Acts by 
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ecclesiastics was sporadic,
60
 and the contention characteristic of the episcopate of 
Thomas Wilson did not inspire Governors to invite the Bishop to join the Council on 
a regular basis. There was, consequently, some doubt as to the spiritual officers’ 
entitlement following the Revestment of 1765. Additionally, it will be recalled that in 
our review of Manx constitutional history, we suggested that Revestment could be 
read as either a substitution of the holder of the continuing Lordship, or the abolition 
of the Lordship as the rights of which it was constituted were surrendered to the King. 
At the time, it was asserted that 1765 had made no constitutional change save that of 
substituting King George for the Murrays,
61
 but if we favour the latter reading, 
arguments for involvement in Tynwald as of right would be seriously weakened. On 
this reading, Henry IV’s grant of the Island as a fief, from which the inference was 
immediately drawn that the Island’s ‘barons’ owed fealty to the Lord, had introduced 
a feudal pyramid at the heart of Manx society and with it a series of legal concepts 
that were Anglo-Norman in origin, rather than Celto-Norse. Judicial rulings that the 
descent of the Lordship must follow English rules of inheritance
62
 served to confirm 
this. Judged by common law principles, the regalities had been a parcel of the estate 
held of the Crown by the Percy, Stanley and Murray families. The surrender of any 
inferior feudal estate to the superior lord, whether or not consideration was paid, left 
the lord holding not his vassal’s estate but his own, freed from the encumbrance of the 
inferior estate which thus terminated. The concession of the Council’s and Keys’ right 
to concur in legislation had not been made by the King, and it was far from clear that 
the King was bound by it. Whether future legislation for the Island would involve 
Tynwald, and if so how the Council should be constituted, was by this reasoning a 
matter for royal policy decision rather than a matter of law. 
The first royal Governors in Castletown (Smith and Dawson), convening their 
fellow-Officers for executive business, sent no invitation to the ecclesiastics. In 1776 
the decision was taken to hold a legislative session of Tynwald, and again the Bishop, 
Vicars-General and Archdeacon were not summoned.  In 1784 Claudius Crigan was 
appointed to the See, and protested to the Home Department against the continued 
lack of any invitation to Council. The Secretary of State deferred any response 
pending the report of a Commission on the insular constitution, but in the meantime a 
new Governor (Shaw) reversed his predecessors’ policy, giving as his reason the view 
that the summoning of ecclesiastics to Council had become an established practice 
that it was not for a Governor to alter without royal instructions.
63
 
Legal submissions for and against the ecclesiastics’ claim were made to the 
Commission, the Clerk of the Rolls supporting the claim and the Attorney-General 
opposing. The oaths of office mentioned above were advanced in favour of the claim, 
though it could be argued that the advice referred to applied only to executive 
business. Apart from the conflicting evidence of precedent, the Attorney, Wadsworth-
Busk, deployed one new argument. This was the fact that since the Murrays’ 
patronage of the episcopal See and the Archdeaconry had not been surrendered to the 
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Crown in 1765, their incumbents could now be considered as appointed ‘by a subject’. 
They were therefore no longer qualified to advise in what had to be considered the 
King’s Council.  
Behind this argument lay both a contemporary theory of government and a 
consideration of insular power politics. The practical consideration is simply 
expressed: the Murrays, who remained feudal superiors of the Island and now 
exploited significant economic interests without any longer having a ruler’s concern 
for the islanders’ welfare, were widely disliked and there were those who welcomed 
any opportunity of diminishing their influence – for example by reducing the standing 
of the clergy whom they appointed. The theoretical issue is slightly more complicated. 
Across eighteenth-century Europe it was reasoned that state authority could have only 
one channel, usually the monarchy. This was typified in the ‘absolutist’ regimes of 
France and Prussia, rejecting alternative authority such as the rights of free cities or 
the proprio vigore claims of ecclesiastical hierarchies.  The same reasoning had 
adherents in England, particularly in relation to Crown rights in the colonies; but it 
conflicted with the older English traditions of authority derived from the law, and the 
partnership of prince and people in lawmaking. If ‘the law’, written or unwritten, was 
to be seen as the product of the joint action of sovereign and subject,
64
 and the 
monarch’s executive and judicial roles were in reality derived from it, then there was 
no reason why it should not bestow such roles directly upon others, even upon those 
whose position did not derive directly from the King. 
The Isle of Man Commissioners avoided these issues. Their Report submitted 
in 1792 simply repeated the arguments as to the spiritual officers’ presence in the 
Council and declined to give a legal opinion. Nor is there any extant definitive ruling 
of the Home Department, which simply stood by its provisional approval in October 
1791 of the Governor’s action in restoring the Bishop.65 One must conclude, then, that 
the continued summons of ecclesiastics to Council was treated principally as a matter 
of policy, rather than as one of legal obligation. 
So regarded, the decision to summon ecclesiasticals to the legislature, and 
indeed to continue to put business to Tynwald, is explicable in the light of colonial 
experience elsewhere. The Isle of Man was, after all, not the only Crown possession 
to have been governed under a feudal grant to an individual with ‘regalities’. Henry 
IV’s expedient had been copied by later monarchs in relation to two of the Norman 
islands and several possessions in the Americas.
66
 All of these (save Sark) had later 
been surrendered to the Crown and thereafter administered directly through a 
Governor; but wherever representative assemblies had come into being by concession 
of the Lord Proprietor, Crown policy had been to retain such assemblies as a useful 
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part of the mechanism of colonial government.
67
 If the balance between Governor and 
assembly were held correctly, this compromise could produce contented inhabitants 
without seriously jeopardising the royal prerogative. By 1765 the Governor-Council-
Assembly pattern was tried and trusted, and there was no reason to suppose that 
comparable institutions would not be allowed to operate in the Isle of Man. 
By 1791, however, opinion had changed in Whitehall as to the value of a 
colonial episcopate. The lost colonies in southern North America had existed (like the 
Isle of Man) with few restrictions on alternative religion, but also without episcopal 
oversight of public religious provision, the King’s ecclesiastical supremacy being 
exercised directly through his governors. With hindsight this was seen as misguided; a 
Crown-appointed bishop would have encouraged more wholehearted conformity to 
the public religion, and with religious conformity would have come political loyalty. 
The erection of the Sees of Nova Scotia and Quebec in 1787 and 1793 was a mark of 
determination not to repeat the error; but it was of course central to the new policy 
that these bishops should take a prominent part in government, and the first 
incumbents of the new Sees were active members of their respective colonial 
Councils.
68
 
The Isle of Man was an overseas possession of the Crown, claimed to have 
been acquired by conquest, royal authority over which was exercised by the advice of 
the Privy Council, and which was from 1782 among the responsibilities of the new 
Home Department. Each of these statements was equally applicable in the 1790s to 
the Canadian colonies; it was not until 1801 that responsibility for the remoter 
colonies was transferred from the Home Department to the Secretary of State for War. 
It is therefore possible that when the constitutional Commissioners’ Report was 
received, Whitehall may have made the same link between loyalty and an episcopally-
led conformity in the Manx context (where no new See was necessary, but only the 
confirmation of the Bishop’s place in Council) as it was making in relation to Crown 
possessions further afield.  
II.4 The removal of the inferior Spiritual Officers. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the Bishop, Vicars-General and 
Archdeacon remained relatively secure in their Council positions. An attempt to 
exclude the Vicars-General in 1816 was seen by Bishop Murray, who defeated it, as 
part of a general plan to lessen the Duke of Atholl’s influence, as it was assumed that 
clerical members of the Council would naturally support him.
69
 Accordingly, the 
positions of the Bishop and Archdeacon were strengthened in 1826 when the last 
Murray Lord surrendered his patronage of the See and Archdeaconry to the Crown 
(again for a substantial consideration). The argument could no longer be advanced 
that these were the ‘delegates of a subject’; though the Vicars-General, whom the 
Bishop appointed, remained precisely that. 
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The passing at Westminster of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners Act 1836, 
authorising the union of the Sees of the Isle of Man and Carlisle by Order in Council, 
appears to have taken minimal account of the implications of the proposed change for 
Tynwald. In strict law, there would have been no necessary change: the Bishop of 
Carlisle would also have been Bishop of the Isle of Man, and entitled as such to sit in 
both the Council and the Lords. In earlier centuries there had been pluralist Manx 
bishops residing in the area of their English preferments, even though those 
preferments had not been episcopal Sees. In reality, however, the proposal would have 
confined the Bishop to Cumbria, with its greater numbers of clergy and people, for 
most of the year. Bishop Ward, a vehement opponent of the scheme, wrote to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury: “For above half a century, two-thirds of the people at least 
have been left without churches or chapels, and the clergy suffered to slumber. 
Consequently the busy Methodists of England, finding the coast clear, … have 
covered the Island with Methodist chapels. … [They are] now working with double 
diligence against the Church and striving to retain the children in their meeting-
houses. … Remove the Bishop, and the Isle of Man will instantly become the hotbed 
of Dissent.” 70 
The legislative role of the Bishop was not central to the central argument 
against union,
71
 as can be seen from the six principal reasons the Bishop put forward 
for retention of the Diocese: antiquity; geographical position; the entitlement of the 
Manx as a distinct people to their ancient privileges; “the constant presence of the 
Bishop is necessary as head of the Council, the principal branch of the legislature of 
the Island, and as leading trustee of all insular charities; these are duties which cannot 
be exercised by an Archdeacon, or any other deputy”;72 the Bishop knows the Manx 
but can move in powerful English circles: and, finally, a resident Bishop is a great 
moral influence and maintainer of religious interests. It was, however, a concern of 
Archdeacon Philpot, who noted that Tynwald “can pass laws (without perhaps 
exciting the attention of the King in Council) materially affecting the welfare of the 
insular Church. Over those laws the Bishop exercises a very considerable check, and 
in this respect his removal to Carlisle might, I think, be attended with some danger.” 
The Archdeacon conceded, however, that he could himself, in some measure, exert 
the same restraining influence in Council as the Bishop.
73
 
With powerful English allies, opposition to the union scheme succeeded in 
procuring the repeal of the enabling provision before it could be acted upon.
74
 The 
success of the union movement to the point where positive legislation was required to 
avert union made a powerful impact, however, and the 1836 debate was referred to 
later in the century, when the future of the Diocese was again under discussion.
75
 To 
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depart briefly from our chronological account, it may be useful to briefly discuss later 
moves to abolish the separate Diocese, none of which were so successful. 
In 1875, the Governor considered that since the 1836 legislation, “the question 
of amalgamating this with an English diocese has more or less smouldered”.76 In 
contrast to the earlier debates, in 1875 the primary concerns were fiscal - how could 
the financial position of the Manx church best be safeguarded. While prepared to 
accept union with Liverpool, one of the Governor’s essentials in any negotiation was 
for “the Bishop to remain a member of the Council and to reside for not less than a 
certain fixed period annually in the Isle of Man”. This seems to have arisen from a 
desire to retain their legislative role. Although a slight contrast with the balance of 
arguments in 1836, this does not mark a permanent emphasis on the legislative role of 
the Bishop when discussing the future of the Diocese. This attempt, too, failed, 
despite the persistent support of the Bishop for such amalgamation, primarily due to 
opposition in Tynwald.
77
 A quickly terminated attempt to open up the future of the 
Diocese in 1937 provoked a vigorous response by the Vicar General, R.G. Johnson. 
The Vicar General discussed at length the impact of abolition of the Diocese, and at 
the end of the piece, which was concerned primarily with financial issues, he listed 
seven objections, including broader issues such as the loss of an ancient See, and a 
shift in the role of the Archdeacon.
78
 The impact on Tynwald was not mentioned. The 
link between the future of the Diocese and the legislative role of the Bishop has, 
however, been a recurring theme in the legislative debates since 1961. 
Returning to our chronological account, the spread of Dissent was not halted 
by the rejection of Union and as the century progressed, an increasingly Methodist 
House of Keys, directly-elected from 1866, succeeded in procuring reforms separating 
the public institutions of the Island from what they regarded as sectional institutions 
of the Established Church. The pace of such legislation was only slightly slower than 
that in England. One such reform concerned the historic jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical courts, which had been unaffected by the 1857 English re-allocation of 
testamentary and matrimonial business. It was not until 1874 that the jurisdiction of 
the Archdeacon’s Court in these respects was merged with that of the Bishop, and 
only ten years after that that the Manx High Court took over probate, matrimonial 
remedies and guardianship.
79
 These reforms left the post of the Archdeacon’s Official 
(who had occasionally assisted at executive business of the Council) a virtual 
sinecure, and reduced considerably the workload of the Vicar-General. It had already 
been agreed to appoint only one Vicar-General instead of two; in common with other 
judges, the former payment by fees had been commuted for a salary from the public 
revenues of £400
80
 (later raised to £500 but reduced in 1884 to £230). But the 
Dissenting population had come to question any public contribution, and by the turn 
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of the century the Vicar-General’s salary had become a matter of contention 
inextricable from the question of his legislative seat.
81
 
Although the Island’s religious plurality was one factor behind the Council 
reform proposals of the early 1900s, the driving impetus was the desire to reduce the 
‘official’ and hence Whitehall-oriented character of the upper Branch of Tynwald. 
The Council could not only veto any legislation but also, by its votes in the joint 
session known as Tynwald Court, sway the outcome of any executive policy decision 
within Tynwald’s power (such as the budgetary control enjoyed since 1866). Recent 
Governors such as Henry Loch had argued strongly, gaining a modicum of Whitehall 
support, for the obligation of Council members to support gubernatorial policy with 
their votes, and indeed it had been extremely rare for this not to happen.
82
 
In 1903 the Keys resolved to seek the removal of both Vicar-General and 
Archdeacon from the Council.
83
 This demand was repeated in October 1905
84
 coupled 
with the cessation of the former’s public salary. Bishop Norman Straton appealed to 
the Governor, Lord Raglan, to advise against any change, and the Home Secretary 
(Gladstone) duly indicated that the Keys’ plan was unacceptable.85 The Bishop’s 
arguments were expanded following a more wide-ranging Keys’ reform petition in 
1907.
86
  
According to Straton, there were a number of practical reasons for retention of 
the lesser ecclesiastics in the Council, and for continuing a financial arrangement that 
would encourage advocates of high calibre to accept the Vicar-Generalship. The 
Vicar-General was in the Bishop’s view uniquely qualified to watch legislation 
affecting the religious Establishment and ecclesiastical patronage (most of which was 
vested in the Crown and so a matter of legitimate Whitehall interest). The 
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Archdeacon’s contribution was different from the Bishop’s, in that the latter needed 
experience gained from “larger and more active spheres of ecclesiastical life and work 
in England”, while the Archdeacon should be trained “in close connection with the 
life and customs of the Manx Church” and be always in a position to brief an 
incoming Bishop on insular laws, needs and feelings. The Archdeaconry, with its 
Council seat, was “the one prize to which the Manx clergy attain”. The current 
Archdeacon had given good service as a member of Tynwald on the still relatively 
new Council of Education. Both officers benefited from their independence of the 
electorate: “the Secretary of State might feel that Island interests are better-served by 
a Council free from undue outside pressure”. If both were removed, the Bishop 
‘would be left alone to grapple with Bills injurious to the Church’. He referred with 
approval to the eight rectors sitting in the States of Guernsey and twelve in Jersey.
87
 
The Keys’ petition, Straton concluded, appeared in reality to be aimed at reducing the 
representation of the clergy,
88
 and “dictated by a desire to humiliate the Established 
Church and to cripple it in the discharge of its work and administration”.  
A personal approach to Home Secretary Churchill resulted in the Keys’ 1907 
petition being referred four years later to a departmental Committee under Lord 
MacDonnell. Evidence was taken from Bishop Thomas Drury, who was – contrary to 
Straton’s expectations – a Manxman, and whose support for the status quo was 
expressed in less denominationally defensive terms than that of his predecessor: “I 
quite agree, as far as the Church of England is concerned, that the Bishop is a 
sufficient representative. It is not the vote of the Archdeacon that I care for; it is the 
value of the Archdeacon as a man on the legislative Council.” 89 According to Drury, 
it had never been suggested that other Christian bodies were disadvantaged by the 
ecclesiastics’ Council presence.90 The Archdeacon represented the Manx clergy in a 
way that the Bishop did not; no Manxman had occupied the See for centuries until 
Drury’s appointment. The Archdeacon should continue to perform this role if the 
clergy were to be represented at all; it was not advisable to allow them to stand for the 
Keys. While Drury was not prepared to defend in abstract the Vicar-General’s ex 
officio seat, he considered “mere constitutional theory” insufficient to justify changing 
an established fact. 
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The Committee concluded that the case for the inferior ecclesiastics had not 
been made out. The Bishop himself should remain, however, on account of “his 
traditional place, the ecclesiastical interests committed to his charge, and his respected 
and authoritative personality”.91 Home Office instructions to the Governor indicated 
approval of the MacDonnell recommendations in this area, and the Council therefore 
co-operated in the passage, immediately after the War, of an Act removing the inferior 
ecclesiastics from ex officio membership, and prohibiting the Governor from 
including the recipients of Crown salaries, hence the Vicar-General, amongst his 
Council nominees.
92
 In 1921, upon relinquishing bastardy suits to the High Court, the 
Vicar-General reverted to payment by fees for his judicial work
93
, and for some time 
thereafter holders of that office retained a connection with the Legislature through 
concurrent appointment as its Clerk.
94
  
II.5 Changes in the role, and the reform of Tynwald, 1921-1961. 
The year of the MacDonnell Council reforms was also that in which 
Parliament approved the constitution of the English Church Assembly and facilitated 
religious lawmaking by a streamlined procedure allowing the Houses’ consent to 
enactments framed by the Assembly to be expressed in simple resolutions.
95
 The 
vernacular that referred to the clerical convocations as ‘the church’ was extended to 
encompass the Assembly, while Parliament itself became increasingly thought of as a 
‘secular’ legislature. The decline in active churchgoing, faster in England than on the 
Isle of Man, lent urgency to the drive for reconciliation amongst Christian 
denominations. Free Churches, which had vigorously opposed the idea that bishops 
should, as of right, personify the nation’s Christianity in the Legislature, found 
themselves more willing to consider that the bishops’ seats might (perhaps alongside 
others) express a ‘national recognition of religion’, and have a practical value in 
defending their threatened common interests.    
Even in defending the common Christian interest, though, a new note was 
being struck in episcopal utterances. Divorce law reform provided the best example: 
alongside conservative bishops who believed that Christian principle forbade divorce 
and therefore the law should do the same, and liberal bishops who believed that the 
law could permit divorce because Christian principle did so, a third group was gaining 
strength in favour of a dual morality. These considered that while a rigid line could be 
taken amongst active churchgoers, Christians in public life could properly witness to a 
lesser standard applicable to believer and unbeliever alike, which religion would 
inform without labelling it ‘religious’.96 The ability to argue for this standard was, for 
this group, among the chief contributions that the lords spiritual could make in 
Parliament. 
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This approach to public debate can also be found in the Isle of Man. Bishop 
William Jones, for instance, reflected this dual morality during the Council’s Second 
Reading debate on the Bill that was finally to permit judicial divorce on the Isle of 
Man: “I am bound to consider [the Bill] from the Christian point of view; but I can’t 
take that hard and rigid ecclesiastical view that some people take. … [The Church of 
England] can and does make the highest claim upon its own members; but I think we 
are bound to have in mind those people who don’t accept the Christian standard.” 97 
While the nature of the episcopal contribution to general legislative debate 
altered subtly in line with this shift, the Church Assembly – and on the Island, the 
Diocesan Conference – became a forum for more specifically ecclesiastical concerns. 
Diocesan conferences of ministers and lay people had come into being informally 
during the 1880s, the Manx one supplementing an insular clerical convocation that 
had met regularly since 1703. But parliament’s 1919 approval of the provincial 
convocations’ rules for election to the Church Assembly gave these conferences legal 
status.  
After the Crown’s rejection of Tynwald’s attempt to make a variant provision 
for such elections, a Manx Act of 1925 supplemented the Imperial structures and 
allowed for the automatic introduction into Tynwald of religious Bills framed in the 
Island’s Conference. A Tynwald Ecclesiastical Committee was created to examine 
and report on such Bills before introduction, with the intention of reducing to a 
minimum the time spent in religious debate by the increasingly reluctant Branches.
98
 
Bishop Straton’s fears that Tynwald would spend its time meddling with the 
Crown’s ecclesiastical patronage if the Vicar-General were not there to guard the 
royal interest proved unfounded. On occasion members’ enthusiasms concerning 
aspects of the life of the religious Establishment did still come to light on the floor of 
the Branches or of Tynwald Court; but as a rule the Diocesan Conference now 
became the forum for detailed debate of ‘the ecclesiastical interests committed to [the 
Bishop’s] charge’ while the Branch consideration of ‘Church Bills’ grew steadily 
more perfunctory. Elections to the Ecclesiastical Committee were seldom contested, 
the genuinely interested sitting alongside those who accepted membership as one of 
the burdens inseparable from legislative office. One of the Bishop’s chief concerns 
was to secure at least one member on the Committee competent to steer Bills through 
the Keys. 
The fact that the Bishop was now unsupported by other ecclesiastics in the 
Legislature meant that there was no prospect of emulating the English bishops’ 
reduced attendance in the House of Lords. Standing orders and universal expectation 
continued to demand the presence of all members in the Branches and in Tynwald 
Court, unless they excused themselves for good cause. Tynwald Court standing orders 
(though not those of the Council) also required that all members present at a division 
record their votes for or against the motion; withdrawal from the chamber before the 
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division was accepted as a method of abstention, but was expected to be sparingly 
invoked. 
It was recognised that the Bishop might have unavoidable commitments 
elsewhere rather more often than other members. As well as the York convocation 
and bishops’ meetings, this now included the Church Assembly and certain of its 
committees. The Manx bishop served on fewer of these than most of his brethren, and 
was not (unlike them) an English Church Commissioner. There were, of course 
insular church bodies demanding his time which had no English diocesan counterpart 
(like the Manx Church Commissioners established in 1880), but local distances were 
shorter and he did have a very much lighter workload in terms of parishes and clergy. 
This was fortunate, because as the importance of Boards of Tynwald grew, so 
did the expectation that all members would take their share of Board work. The 
Deemsters were an exception, but the Bishop was not; by the later part of the 
twentieth century there were two Boards (Social Services and Education) on which he 
served with some regularity. It was of course not difficult to see the relevance of these 
areas to individual bishops’ past and present ministry and vice versa, and these 
provided additional subject areas in which an episcopal contribution to legislative 
debate might be expected. 
One incumbent of the See seemed nevertheless keen to take on additional 
public responsibilities. John Taylor was consecrated Bishop in 1943, and fifteen 
months later the Sunday Times carried a learned correspondence on the question of his 
eligibility for a seat in the House of Lords at Westminster.
99
 Research revealed a past 
courtesy of allowing the Manx Bishop to sit, but not vote, in the Lords’ Chamber, 
together with isolated seventeenth and eighteenth century opinions that he was 
entitled to a vote, or would be if his barony were held of the King, rather than of the 
Stanley or Murray Lord. The Lords’ Committee of Privileges had apparently planned 
to consider the question in relation to the family’s last appointee, George Murray, but 
not pursued the matter. In 1951 Taylor became the senior bishop of England and the 
Isle of Man outside the Lords, and enquired of the Crown Office whether a writ of 
summons should not be issued to him. The advice tendered to the Lord Chancellor, 
however, took it as conclusive that the Isle of Man was not ‘a See in England’, which 
the statutes now regulating the summons of lords spiritual required.
100
 The Bishop 
declining the offer of a Committee of Privileges hearing, the issue was once more 
allowed to drop.
101
    
Taylor was by then running against a trend – or perhaps seeking a larger arena 
for the Manx Bishop’s contribution in case the insular one should be closed to his 
successors. Samuel Norris, the campaigner claiming much of the credit for past 
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constitutional reform, had inaugurated in 1942 a drive for further change, achieving 
the establishment of a Keys’ reform committee and making no secret of his personal 
desire to see the ‘official’ dominance of the Council ended and the Deemsters 
removed.
102
 In Guernsey, where very similar wishes prevailed, the 1948 removal of 
the Jurats from the States of Deliberation was accompanied by that of the parish 
Rectors whose legislative role Bishop Straton had once used as a parallel.
103
  
Though Council reform (despite Norris’s views) had for some time taken 
second place to the adjustment of relations with Westminster and Whitehall, in 1958 it 
joined the subject of executive government at the centre of the Keys’ agenda, which 
formally resolved to remove the Bishop from the Council, although he could be 
appointed by the Governor as one of four appointees. Norris’ views were now taken 
up in submissions to a new constitutional Commission, whose appointment had been 
secured on the proposal of a new member of the Keys, Clifford Irving. The Keys’ 
proposal entailed the abolition of ex officio seats other than the Governor’s; the 
Governor should appoint four Council members rather than two, which might include 
the Bishop and Attorney-General (though not the Deemsters). The total number of 
unelected members being reduced by two, indirect election by the Keys should 
account for six of the Council instead of four.
104
 This would swing the balance of 
Council voting strength towards the elected members and ensure (it was hoped) a 
greater willingness to allow the Keys’ wishes to prevail. 
The Commission, chaired by Lord MacDermott, Chief Justice of Northern 
Ireland, adopted the MacDonnell reasoning for retaining the Bishop’s ex officio seat. 
Denominational resentments were less than they had been in 1911,
 105
 and occasional 
invidious situations could be avoided by allowing the Bishop to abstain in 
divisions.
106
 Removals from the upper Branch should be confined to the Governor 
(lessening his workload and allowing a more impartial presidency of Tynwald Court) 
and one of the Deemsters (again in the interest of impartiality, in case a constitutional 
confrontation should occasion litigation). The legal expertise of the other Deemster 
should be retained, but his voting capacity modified by placing him in the chair. The 
only change as regards the Bishop should be to relieve him of the standing order 
obligation to vote on every issue in Tynwald Court. This proposal perhaps reflected 
the view of some witnesses that it was primarily on “moral issues” that he had a 
useful contribution to make, and that entanglement in other politically controversial 
topics could only damage his standing.
107
  
 The Council did not accept the Commission’s arguments for these removals, 
and the only initial change to its composition was the addition of one extra Keys’ 
appointee.
108
 In the debate on the first post-MacDermott Constitution Bill, the Keys 
accepted this, but only in order to secure a reform that would ultimately give them 
everything else they wanted – the power to override a Council legislative veto. 
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Having won this trump card, the repeated threat of its use over the next two decades 
enabled them to ensure the removal of both Deemsters, the Governor’s nominees, the 
Attorney-General as a voting member and finally the Governor himself.
109
 Ten years 
after the Governor ceased to preside in Council, a President of Tynwald in whose 
election both Keys and Council participated also replaced him in Tynwald Court.
110
 
The result was to convert the unelected membership of the Council from a 7:4 
majority in 1961 to a 1:9 minority by 1990. The surviving unelected member was the 
Bishop. 
II.6 Consideration of the Bishop’s role after 1961. 
The Bishop was an ‘official’, but an official with a difference. The Crown 
made his appointment not on the basis of advice from the Privy Council or Home 
Secretary but from the First Lord of the Treasury. Though this was still an ‘English’ 
appointment, it was free from the connotations of the normal Imperial channels; and 
throughout the twentieth century it had been accepted that very different criteria 
prevailed. Consultation with the Archbishops first supplemented and then replaced the 
political considerations colouring other Crown appointments. When in 1976 James 
Callaghan, as First Lord, announced an intention to co-operate with a new 
recommendatory mechanism set up by the English General Synod,
111
 the procedures 
were tacitly extended to vacancies in the Manx See, with the result that Diocesan 
Synod representatives from the Island could take a significant share in the definition 
of diocesan needs and consideration of possible names.  
Once appointed, the Bishop’s freehold made him resistant to political pressure 
both from within the Island and from the United Kingdom; though most incumbents 
sought to allay suspicion that their votes would be cast either capriciously or – far 
more controversially – in automatic support of the executive. It nevertheless remained 
rare for bishops to be Manx-born. The Island produced few ordinands and many of its 
parishes were coming to be served by Englishmen. The increasing scope for active 
laymen to share in church government meant that the knowledge of local conditions, 
for which Bishops Straton and Drury had expected to look to the Archdeacon, could 
be gained from the laity; and it became not uncommon for Archdeacons also to be 
Englishmen, albeit with long Manx parish experience. The difficulty of new bishops 
appearing as outsiders in Tynwald could not, therefore, be wholly surmounted, 
however earnestly they might seek to identify with the Island after arrival. Like 
Governors, they came from the United Kingdom, might potentially be translated back 
again, and would – in most cases – move away upon retirement. The best that could 
be done in reply was to make a virtue of this fact, stressing the breadth of experience 
that many bishops and Governors brought to the direction of Island affairs. It was 
partly as ‘Englishmen’, therefore, but still primarily as non-elected legislators that the 
presence of Bishops in the Council was a matter of debate in the later twentieth 
century. The other factor raised in evidence to MacDonnell, religious equality, also 
remained an issue, but denominational rivalries were to some extent overshadowed by 
the larger question whether the Isle of Man remained a Christian country in whose 
government any Christian religious office-bearer should properly share.  
The first post-1961 Bill to remove the Second Deemster from the Council was 
rejected by that Branch in June 1963. When its architect Spencer Kelly moved for a 
                                           
109
 Isle of Man Constitution Acts 1961, 1965, 1969, 1971, 1975 and 1980 (AT) 
110
 Constitution Act 1990 (AT) 
111
 [1976] 909 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)  cols. 940-1036 
 33 
fuller study of the Council’s composition, another Labour MHK, Albert Corkish, 
asked if there were any constraint to retain the Bishop or the Attorney. The Speaker 
explained that the motion would allow all Council membership to be scrutinised.
112
 At 
the second reading of the re-introduced Bill, Callister looked forward to a day when 
the whole Council save the Governor would be elected by the Keys.
113
 After the 
Branches had reached an impasse over Council amendments, Kelly remarked that 
Pollard ‘might well be the last [Bishop] to sit’, and Callister observed that ‘he is 
merely there because he was a baron in some dark and distant past’.114 When 
introduced the third time, the Bill to remove the Second Deemster was carried in the 
Council by a casting vote. As Callister pressed ahead with another Bill to remove the 
Governor, Kelly repeated his wish to see the Bishop removed; but Callister’s tactics 
were to take one change at a time. In any event, this particular Bill was defeated 
before it left the Keys.
115
 
Late in 1965, two more MHKs spoke in favour of the Bishop’s removal. For 
J.H. Quirk the Bishop was a remnant of the ‘feudalistic methods’ in the government 
of the Island that he sought to extirpate. While Victor Kneale, a member since 1962 
who was destined to become the bishops’ most dogged challenger, agreed, he felt (as 
did others) that there were still items higher on the constitutional agenda.
 116
 
Before the General Election of 1966, the Constitutional Committee of the 
House of Keys issued a report which included recommendations on the future of the 
Legislative Council.
117
 They recommended that the Bishop should remain as an ex 
officio member of the Council, but without a right to vote. They considered the 
example of the Dean of Jersey, who although not subject to any statutory restriction 
on his right to speak, “is expected to intervene only when a debate touches matters 
with which the Church is concerned”. Drawing on this, they considered: “In the past, 
the Bishops of Sodor and Man have, on the whole, in legislative matters, displayed a 
spirit of independence and impartiality; and we feel sure that Bishop Gordon, as a 
member of the Legislative Council, will wish to restrict his intervention in debate to 
those debates which touch ‘matters with which the Church is concerned’ – giving that 
expression a wide interpretation. We recommend that the Lord Bishop should remain 
as an ex officio member of the Council, but without the right to vote”. 
Eric Gordon arrived as Bishop in 1966 almost simultaneously with a new 
Governor, Sir Peter Stallard. Welcoming him, Stallard suggested that attacks on the 
non-elected element in the Council were confusing ex officio and hereditary 
principles. Gordon responded that he stood for “he good traditions of our land” and 
that the “ancient link between church and state” could be of value to the whole 
community.
118
 Eight months on, Robert Creer recognised that “for the first time in a 
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good number of years, we have a good man in the Bishop”; but thought it was still 
time for him to go.
119
 
The Keys’ reformers nonetheless stuck to the Callister policy of one target at a 
time. When removal of the Governor’s nominees was under debate in 1969, H.D.C. 
MacLeod expressed the hope that the Bishop would soon follow.
120
 In 1970 the 
Attorney-General’s voting rights were the topic, and it was Clifford Irving (a later 
executive council Chairman) who recalled the Council “stranglehold” that had existed 
before 1961, adding “No doubt we shall see the removal of the Bishop and the First 
Deemster too”.121  
The Keys’ long-serving Speaker, Charles Kerruish, was not always even-
handed over such prognostications for the future. When the Bill to remove the First 
Deemster was read in 1974, it was apparently legitimate to refer to it as “one of many 
matters still wanting attention”, including the Bishop’s position; but another speaker, 
seeking to support a slippery slope argument by giving reasons why the Bishop’s seat 
should not go, was directed to keep to the point.
122
 
The uncontroversial episcopate of Bishop Gordon, respected for the high 
standard of his legislative contribution until the illness of his later years, was followed 
by an incumbent who was controversial even before his arrival on the Island. Vernon 
Nicholls, who had accepted his appointment before seeing the ancient episcopal 
residence, announced in mid-1974 that it was not a building in which he or his wife 
could live, and the Manx Church Commissioners sought Tynwald’s leave for a sale 
(the condition of a 1948 enabling statute). Kerruish responded firmly that the Island’s 
Bishop was expected to live at Bishopscourt, had known this when appointed, and if 
unwilling to do so “can go back whence he came”.123 The Speaker’s repetition of this 
remark to the Bishop’s face a year later124 was bound to place future episcopal 
participation in the joint session (Tynwald Court) under strain. 
In 1977 Edward Kermeen, a former Clerk of Tynwald now himself elected to 
the Keys, moved for the reduction of the Council’s delaying power over Bills from the 
two years allowed in 1961 to one year. Kermeen was a sophisticated constitutional 
theorist as well as an active conformist to the Established religion, but a high 
churchman in the Tractarian mould for whom ecclesiastical and civil government 
were naturally distinct.
125
 During the third reading of his Bill he expressed his support 
for the Bishop’s place in the Legislature, but also floated the idea that this might be a 
non-voting place comparable to that of the Attorney-General.
126
 
A further constitutional change was also heavily indebted to Kermeen’s 
energy and expertise. This was a procedure under which religious legislation framed 
for the Island in the Diocesan Synod (the former Conference), which under a modified 
re-enactment of the Church Assembly Act 1925
127
 might be considered by the 
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Ecclesiastical Committee and, if approved in principle by a Tynwald Court resolution, 
entitled to automatic introduction into the Branches, could instead go forward on the 
strength of the approving resolution for immediate royal assent. The so-called ‘Manx 
Measures’, though not to be called Acts, and exempted from the need for 
promulgation, would still be enactments of the monarch by Tynwald’s advice and 
consent. They would have the same force as, and be able to repeal, other Acts that had 
passed through the traditional Branch reading procedure. But in practice it was 
inevitable that the attention they received on the floor of Tynwald Court would be 
cursory, and their status reduced in the perception of all but specialists. The scope 
(and arguably the need) for the Bishop to influence “the ecclesiastical interests 
committed to his charge”, per the McDonnell Report, would be significantly reduced 
as a result of the Kermeen Bill. Recognising this in 1976, the Home Office had 
counselled the restriction of the new procedure to the most routine cases – where the 
Diocesan Synod framed legislation in identical terms to those of a General Synod 
Measure already law in England. Amendments following this advice
128
 were 
incorporated before the Kermeen Bill became law in 1979. But Kermeen’s procedure 
would be extended in 1993 to all matters affecting the Island’s religious 
Establishment.
129
 
The removal of the Governor from the chair of the Council in 1980 left the 
Bishop as its last unelected voting member. It was inevitable that his position would 
come under scrutiny once more, even if the controversies of his episcopate had not 
already subjected him to an unusual degree of Tynwald attention. Two members took 
initiatives that sought to affect his legislative vote, most of these explicable by the 
general drive for election to all places in Tynwald, though one possibly by the tense 
relationship between Nicholls and the Speaker of the Keys. 
In June 1981 Victor Kneale failed to secure passage through Tynwald Court of 
a declaratory motion calling for direct election to the Council and the end of the 
episcopal vote.
130
 A general election, however, opened the way to a fresh attempt, and 
the following May he gained a second reading for his Constitution (Legislative 
Council) Bill. Kneale (and several of his colleagues) had reached the conviction that 
direct election was the key to democratic legitimacy, and he had himself recently 
resigned from the Council to seek a fresh mandate in the Keys. His Bill divided the 
Island into broader constituencies for direct elections to the Council, and placed the 
Bishop on the same non-voting footing as the Attorney-General: “Over the years, 
there have been many moves to remove the Bishop, and some members still think this 
is right. But I am strongly against. I believe, if we do that, it will encourage those in 
the Anglican Church who have been trying for generations to get rid of the Diocese of 
Sodor and Man to press more strongly.” It was, however, “quite wrong” that the 
Bishop should sometimes have what amounted to a casting vote.
131
 
Kneale’s second reading speech typified two aspects of the later discussion of 
the episcopal legislative role. First, the Bishop was no longer attacked chiefly as an 
official government supporter, nor as an Englishman, nor as a representative of 
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denominational privilege (as in the Free Church evidence to MacDonnell), nor for his 
personal actions (Nicholls) nor his politics (Pollard). His vote was simply a casualty 
of the widespread thinking linking legislative legitimacy to popular election, and at 
least in some eyes this did not necessitate depriving him of the right to sit and speak. 
Secondly, the voice of caution invoked the reappearing spectre of diocesan union, and 
assumed general concurrence that this would be an undesirable outcome. As we have 
noted above, since 1836 there had indeed been several proposals to unite oversight of 
the Island with some part of northern England, commonly with north Merseyside 
since this was most readily accessible and, as a recent urban ecclesiastical unit, would 
complement the ancient rural churches of the Isle of Man. Proposals in the 1870s and 
1930s had in fact won support from voices within the Island, recognising that the 
financial position of the Manx Church was precarious and that greater English 
integration would almost certainly bring material improvements. More recently, 
influential voices (such as that of Bishop Gordon
132
) had begun to link the 
continuance of the diocese directly to the Bishop’s legislative role. By the 1980s the 
initiative on this came again firmly from the United Kingdom – rational deployment 
of scarce clergy and resources was the watchword in Westminster, and the Dioceses 
Measure 1978 (an Imperial enactment extending to the Island) had recently provided a 
procedure whereby mergers could be achieved without involving Parliament. The 
consent of the bishops and diocesan synods affected was nevertheless a requirement, 
even under this Measure, and a real threat would only exist if Westminster felt 
strongly enough to coerce the insular organs through financial and moral pressure, or 
to resort to separate Imperial legislation.  
The fate of Kneale’s 1982 Bill and its sequels owed at least as much to the 
general constitutional context as to the single issue of the Bishop’s vote. As originally 
introduced, the Bill would have created a second chamber with strong claims to 
demand the restoration of full parity in legislation. The Keys would be under pressure 
to relinquish their cherished final control, and to many this prospect was unappealing. 
Surviving by one vote at second reading in May, the Bill went to a select committee 
from which it emerged unrecognisable in June. It now provided for what might be 
called ‘the Norwegian solution’: that Tynwald Court, like the Storting in Oslo, should 
be elected as one body, and should subsequently divide itself into drafting and 
revising chambers. The redrawing of the Bill did not affect its implications for Bishop 
and Attorney-General, both of whom were still to be accorded non-voting seats in the 
revising chamber.
133
 
The Keys were less hostile to the committee’s version of Kneale’s Bill than to 
the original. It appeared that, to them at least, the general constitutional objections to 
this June version were not fatal. At this point the threat to the Bishop’s vote began to 
seem real, and this issue assumed a steadily higher profile as the Bills progressed.  
The infrequent meeting of the Diocesan Synod meant that despite urging from 
Kneale for an early submission, the 1982 Bill’s implications were not considered in 
the Synod until December, when opposition was registered and a paper on the issue 
commissioned from a Synod committee led by former Deemster Eason and Tom 
Kermeen.
134
 Kermeen had already given evidence to the Keys’ committee on the Bill, 
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stating that with reference to the remainder of the Bill it would be difficult to defend 
the voting right of the Bishop.
135
 A week later, Speaker Kerruish focussed attention on 
the issue by calling, quite independently of the Kneale proposals, for legislation to 
replace the Bishop by one more indirectly-elected seat. Following Callister, Kerruish 
argued that the bishop sat merely as a baron, and that the threat to the separate diocese 
(invoked this time by executive council Chairman Percy Radcliffe, in rejecting the 
call) was probably a myth – a point on which Kermeen agreed.136   
In January 1983 the Synod committee’s paper appeared.137 After an historical 
introduction, this asserted that the Manx “were and continue to be deeply religious, 
especially in the practical sense”. While admitting that this might be seen exemplified 
primarily in the growth of Methodism, the paper drew the teeth of such an admission 
by praising the Island’s lack of religious intolerance in contrast with Ireland. A 
consistent episcopal record of service to Manx popular interests was claimed, Barrow 
and Wilson mentioned by name. Such service in the legislature was aided by the 
security that allowed bishops “to gather experience and exercise foresight” without 
fearing possible loss of their seat.  
Having stressed the contentious nature of Kneale’s proposals and the threat to 
the separate See, the paper went on to the offensive against the notion that direct 
election was the only basis upon which public officers could be representative. It 
praised the “obvious advantages of what may be described as a meritocracy” in the 
Westminster House of Lords, in particular the contribution of the Lords Spiritual; and 
referred to the need for continuity and stability in the membership of Tynwald. Rather 
than make no proposal for change at all, the paper concluded by endorsing the 
MacDermott suggestion of a standing order amendment allowing the Bishop to 
abstain. 
This paper was circulated to members of the Keys, where the Bishop’s vote 
now took a much higher profile in consideration of the 1982 Bill’s revised proposals. 
Edgar Mann, a Synod member also in the Keys, while sympathetic to the democratic 
principle and so wanting the size of the Keys increased, opposed the self-splitting 
Tynwald and advocated a Council enriched by the contribution of able non-
politicians: a basis on which the Bishop’s voting presence – as representative of the 
Island’s Christian community, not merely of the Establishment – was much easier to 
justify.  
Charles Cain did not find it necessary to ascribe the same interdenominational 
role to the Bishop as did Mann, nor to distinguish a finite Christian community from 
the rest of the population. For him the Bishop stood in Tynwald for the Christianity: 
“so deeply interwoven in the fabric of our community that we do not notice it is 
there”. The Bishop was the appropriate person to do this, so long as Manx law 
established a hierarchically-ordered church. David Cannan took up this last point, 
suggesting that the Bishop represented not only the generality of the Christian 
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community, but more specifically the clerical interest, in view of the beneficed 
clergy’s exclusion from the House of Keys. To the Roman Catholic Dominic Delaney, 
however, a pastor’s standing was jeopardised in the political arena: “he should be left 
on a heavenly plane so he can give us his views on the Christian aspect of legislation, 
and not vote”. The principle of the Kneale reforms was approved by over two-thirds 
of the House.
138
 
Vernon Nicholls retired in May 1983 and the Island See remained vacant 
throughout the summer. In September 1983 the Diocesan newsletter identified a 
change in the Bishop’s position in the legislature with the eventual demise of the 
Diocese, and called upon readers to “fight for our heritage, our right to have a Bishop 
in Tynwald”.139 By the introduction in the autumn of a new Bill which combined 
Kneale’s Council proposals with Keys constituency alterations, some 2700 signatures 
were obtained by Roger Harper, an accountant converted to the Established Church 
from a nonconformist background and increasingly involved with the diocesan 
finances, to a petition against the removal of the Bishop’s vote, and a lively debate 
took place in the insular press. The petition was circulated to ministers of all 
denominations and left out in churches for signature, on the basis that a Christian 
presence in the legislature was valuable, and that its removal would endanger the 
separate See.  
In November 1983 supporters in the Keys also stressed the first argument, 
where the episcopal role was described as “interdenominational”, “non-political”, “a 
part of the Manx heritage”.140  As well as the petition, the Keys in November had a 
Memorial before them from the Diocesan Synod Standing Committee. Eason and 
Kermeen had carried another resolution through the Synod in July, to the effect that 
“the retention of the Lord Bishop’s vote in Tynwald is in the best religious and public 
interests of the Island”. The Memorial had the paper of January 1983 annexed and 
broadly restated its arguments.
141
 Kneale pointed out that the petition’s 2724 
signatures (which included 1646 declared conformists, 355 declared nonconformists 
and 723 of undeclared allegiance) represented far from overwhelming support from 
those on church electoral rolls, much less from the public at large. They compared 
with 7628 on a petition against a chairlift to Douglas Head and 30,479 on another in 
support of the birch. They comprised, according to Kneale, United Kingdom 
signatures, repeated signatures, proxy signatures and those of an eight-year-old and a 
five-year-old. The petition failed to sway the Keys, where the clause admitting Bishop 
and Attorney to Tynwald on a non-voting basis was carried 15-9, as was (with a larger 
majority) another restoring the right of clergy to stand for the House.
142
 These 
decisions were virtually simultaneous with the arrival of Arthur Attwell as Nicholls’ 
successor
143, the Governor noting in Tynwald Court how the Bishop “touched his seat 
somewhat gingerly before taking it”.144 
Interestingly, though, Kneale himself admitted at third reading the next month 
that the episcopal vote was a minor matter, and he would not fight over it if the result 
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would be to put the higher principles of his Bill at risk.
145
 But the Council’s decision 
to excise all references to itself from the Bill, leaving it as a simple revision of Keys 
constituencies
146
, freed him from any such dilemma. He decided against reintroducing 
this Bill the next year, feeling he would still not have, even in the Keys, quite the 
support that would ultimately be necessary to override the Council veto.
147
 
When Victor Kneale returned to the fray once more in 1985, his proposal was 
a much more modest one. It was targeted solely at the Bishop, but instead of removing 
his vote it permitted him to abstain and stipulated that his vote should be disregarded 
if it created a tie. This would have meant that the Bishop’s vote could not rescue an 
otherwise failing Bill by allowing the Council President to cast his vote in favour. It 
would not have stopped the Bishop’s vote from being decisive, though, where other 
Council members were equally divided. This was not appreciated by certain members, 
who thought it was allowing the vote to count only where it made no real difference. 
The steam appeared to have gone out of the campaign, however, and the 1985 Bill 
failed to obtain a second reading.
148
 Kneale’s proposal to allow beneficed clergy to 
stand for the Keys was never revived. 
The debates on the Kneale Bills in the first part of Arthur Attwell’s episcopate 
could be seen (like the ending of the Castletown Church saga) as the ripples of 
something started under Nicholls. Though the new Bishop surprised some members 
early on, when he supported the permanence of the Douglas Casino concession, 
saying “no moral theologian or philosopher of any standing” would hold gambling 
sinful in itself 
149
, there was no attack on the episcopal role in Tynwald that could 
really be attributed to his person. Further Kneale Bills for a directly elected Council 
affected the Bishop only consequentially, and failed on other grounds to get beyond 
the Keys.
150
 
By August 1989 the Island’s second Bishop Jones of the century had been 
enthroned in St German’s Cathedral. He arrived as a new area of controversy was 
opening in the Island, following the decision that the Northern Irish law criminalizing 
sex between adult men infringed human rights guaranteed by the European 
Convention of 1950. Miles Walker, the recently-elected Chief Minister, had already 
indicated his intention to use a pending Sexual Offences Bill to amend the law of the 
Isle of Man,
151
 and a lobby hostile to change was gathering strength amongst 
islanders. 
Seeking to pre-empt a legislative proposal by Ministers, Edgar Quine called in 
April 1990 for a referendum. The Bishop’s maiden speech in Tynwald Court 
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supported the idea of legalisation, despite the view of many Christians including 
himself that same-sex activity was sinful. It was, Jones suggested, counter-productive 
to treat all sin as crime: driving activity underground would not cure it. He joined the 
majority against a referendum.
152
 
In April 1991 the Bill received a second reading in the Keys, but only after a 
14-8 majority had voted to delete the legalisation clauses.
153
 In May the Bishop 
supported (without speaking) Clifford Irving’s attempt to restore the clauses in the 
Council; but this attempt still failed by one vote.
154
 Other amendments, however, 
required the Bill to return to the Keys, and at this point a general election intervened.  
The controversy featured largely in election campaigning. Six of those re-
elected made legalisation a part of their campaign platform, without apparently 
suffering for it. When the Sexual Offences Bill was again considered, a Keys’ 
majority was now found for restoration of the contentious clauses. In May 1992 the 
Bill returned to the Council where feelings still ran high; though the electorate had 
shown itself less hostile to legalisation than expected, sympathy amongst Council 
members was minimal. The majority was swayed only by consideration of the 
Island’s European Convention obligations and by the clear threat of possibly more 
liberal Imperial legislation if Tynwald failed to act.
155
 
Jones now spoke in debate. He deplored the polarisation of language in the 
Island-wide discussion, but restated his conviction that same-sex activity was not to 
be seen as a legitimate alternative sexuality. While his feelings remained unchanged 
since 1990, though, his voting intentions were different: “A cross-section of 
Christians of all denominations has reminded me that in our deliberations here the 
Bishop represents as wide a range of Christian opinion as possible … I would neglect 
my duty if I did not draw attention to the deep feeling from the majority of Christians 
that this change is unwelcome.” On this basis, Jones supported the proposal of Ian 
Anderson that the Council reject the clauses re-inserted by the Keys and seek a 
conference; and when this failed, he voted against acceptance of the Keys’ 
amendments. In both divisions, however, he now found himself in a 3-6 minority; and 
the decriminalisation of sex between men over 21 eventually became law. 
Despite the Council’s acceptance of the Keys’ amendments, the fact that it was 
so clearly out of step with the directly-elected House – and arguably with modern 
Island opinion – on this issue was bound to fuel demands for a fresh look at its 
composition and powers. This compounded the fact that the Constitution Act 1990, in 
ending the Governor’s presidency of Tynwald Court, had left the Bishop even more 
obviously the only unelected voting member of the Legislature. Thirdly, the advent of 
the ministerial system in the 1980s had transferred considerable political power to the 
executive, and there was a school of thought that held the time was ripe for redressing 
the balance by improving the democratic credentials of the legislative wing of 
government. A final development had been Bishop Jones’s 1990 decision to resign 
from the Department of Education, in which he had served – at the request, perhaps 
ironically, of Minister Victor Kneale – but found the multiplication of meetings 
difficult to reconcile with his other commitments. So ended the long tradition of 
ecclesiastics involvement in executive government, and the argument (pressed in 
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debate by Miles Walker) that the Department would be disadvantaged in presenting 
policy to Tynwald if its episcopal member had no vote. 
James Cain, the new Speaker of the Keys, had campaigned for re-election in 
1991 with a pledge to seek a directly-elected second chamber. In October 1992 he 
secured Tynwald Court’s appointment of a Select Committee to consider the 
Council’s functions and election mechanism.156 Bishop Jones gave both written and 
oral evidence to the committee, and in July 1994 summed up his views on his own 
position in a major speech. The committee proposals were less drastic than those of 
the Kneale Bills ten years earlier: the Bishop was to lose his vote in Tynwald Court 
but not in the Council, where it was preferable for his vote to resolve deadlock, rather 
than that of the President of Tynwald. Together with the Attorney-General, though, he 
should also lose his right to move motions. Cain’s platform of direct election had been 
abandoned to avoid re-awakening Branch rivalry; instead, a further reduction on the 
Council’s delaying and elective powers was proposed.157 
Jones described his Tynwald presence as “representative, not advisory”, and 
repudiated any analogy with the non-voting Attorney. He was a representative, 
however, not of an English church but “because of his involvement in the Established 
Church of this Island”. The first role of government was “to advance the Kingdom of 
God in a Christian country”, and the Manx public was already concerned at the 
erosion of Christian principles. No debate lay outside his interest as Bishop, and the 
security of his position enabled him to participate with an open mind. His contact with 
a wide cross-section of society enabled his vote to reflect something of their concern. 
Keys members voted narrowly in favour of the Cain proposals, but the motion 
was lost, with all but one of the Council voting against. A further debate was called 
for under the 1961 Constitution Act, but when this took place in November only 
twelve members of the joint session supported Cain and the first challenge to Jones’s 
legislative role came to an end.
158
 
In 1997, another general election over, it was the turn of Transport Minister 
Tony Brown to move (this time in the Keys) for a select committee on the Council’s 
role and constitution. Brown himself said little about the Bishop’s vote, except to 
point out that the Church Legislation Procedure Act 1993 had extended the 1979 
Kermeen procedure to all ecclesiastical legislation.
159
 Though it did not follow, as 
Brown alleged, that Tynwald no longer legislated for the religious Establishment, it 
was quite true that in practice the Branches’ input in the regulation of public religion 
would be further reduced. 
Eighteen months passed, however, and the committee produced no proposals 
to reform the Council’s composition. Geoffrey Cannell, who had included such 
reform among his manifesto pledges, moved in October 1998 to request Ministers to 
introduce reforming legislation. Cannell suggested a novel approach to the bishop’s 
democratic legitimacy: at each Tynwald election, the electorate should be asked as a 
whole whether or not to accord the bishop voting rights; 51% support would 
suffice.
160
 
Edgar Quine, however, successfully secured the adjournment of Cannell’s 
debate in October 1998 and again the following April. As Chairman of the Keys’ 
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committee still considering the role of the Council, he felt that discussion of its 
membership was logically premature. His committee reported in October 1999, 
offering two alternatives: a further restriction in the existing Council’s role (the 
Bishop losing his vote), or a change to direct election (in which any role at all for the 
Bishop would need to be added in subsequently). A large majority now supported the 
second option, and Ministers were asked to prepare legislation. 
At this point an initiative from within the Council itself sought to pre-empt 
both Cannell’s adjourned motion and any Bill that might result from the Quine 
Report. Edmund Lowey introduced legislation to provide for direct elections to the 
Council, while keeping a separate voting role for the Bishop. Though frequently 
opposed to the episcopal position on issues in the past, Lowey now argued on grounds 
of history, the valuable episcopal contribution addressing members’ minds “to social 
and spiritual things”, and the lack of significant popular opposition to his role, that the 
Bishop should stay.
161
 
The Keys, however, did not appreciate the Council’s intervention. Lowey’s 
Bill received its first reading at 10 a.m. on 16th November. Shortly before lunchtime 
the Branches met in Tynwald Court and Cannell was told by the President (Kerruish) 
that his adjourned policy motion could still not be considered, since it now covered 
the subject-matter of pending legislation. Submitting under protest to Kerruish’s 
ruling, the Keys lost no time in discharging the Lowey Bill when it came before them 
for second reading at the start of February.
162
 The insular press supported them in this 
attitude, staging a campaign that Kerruish later alleged was aimed at “destroying the 
Council’s image by manipulation of the truth, disregard of facts and biased satirical 
reference”.163 
The debate for which Cannell had been pressing for seventeen months finally 
took place in March 2000, and he now had no difficulty in carrying his motion for the 
direct election principle. Bishop Jones himself supported the call, though without 
prejudice to his own voting rights, for which he claimed to “have rather more 
constituents than perhaps others up here”. 
It was now nearly eighteen months since the Quine Report had been approved 
by the Keys and Ministers asked to prepare legislation. Soon after the ministerial 
committee had set to work, Victor Kneale (retired from Tynwald since 1991 but still 
keenly interested in constitutional issues) had offered Chief Minister Gelling the draft 
of a Bill for his colleagues to consider. Gelling had been sympathetic to the thrust of 
Kneale’s Bill, but found it difficult to convince colleagues, and had finally suggested 
that Kneale might have more success in persuading a private member to take his 
proposals forward.
164
 It was an open secret that the Constitution Bill that Geoffrey 
Cannell introduced into the Keys in May 2000, following his Tynwald Court success 
in March, was largely of Kneale’s drafting.  
The new Bill followed the ‘self-splitting Tynwald’ principle approved by the 
Keys in November 1983. 33 members of Tynwald were to be chosen by the 
electorate, and would then select nine of themselves to be the President of Tynwald 
and voting members of a revising chamber. Bishop and Attorney would join this 
chamber with rights to speak but not vote.  
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The first serious debate of the Cannell Bill was at second reading in the Keys 
in June 2000. Once again it was clear that the episcopal vote would be an issue in its 
own right, but at the same time intimately bound up with the wider question of 
Tynwald’s future shape. ‘Modernising’ and ‘democratising’ arguments were answered 
by former Chief Minister Walker’s warning against tampering with an historic and 
workable system and jeopardising the Island’s independent See. A new champion of 
religious representation, broadly understood, came forward in the person of Leonard 
Singer, one of the Island’s small Jewish community, who believed it right that the 
Island should hear religious views and that a member without a vote would have no 
real incentive to attend Tynwald at all.
165
 
Despite Singer’s arguments the Bill received a second reading, and once again 
the episcopal vote appeared under serious threat. Extra-parliamentary resistance fell 
once more to Richard Harper, who since 1983 had become Chairman of the Diocesan 
Board of Finance and also been ordained. But he now had as valuable colleagues his 
sister Clare Faulds, the Island’s Vicar-General, who had spoken strongly in favour of 
the Bishop’s vote at a Diocesan Synod debate in May, and her husband Ian Faulds, a 
newspaper proprietor who published inter alia the organ of the religious 
Establishment, the Isle of Man Church Leader.  
Since 1983 churchgoing in the Island had dropped significantly, perhaps 1000 
fewer adults attending the parish churches. Another Island-wide petition was thought 
likely to be counter-productive, in the event that fewer signatures were obtained in 
2000 than previously. Instead it was resolved to rely on a campaign in the Leader, 
individual lobbying of members of the Keys and the circulation of a reasoned 
argument (in two versions tailored to their anticipated readership). The Leader 
campaign got under way in July, eagerly answered by the prolific pen of Victor 
Kneale; while preparation of the reasoned paper was entrusted chiefly to Vicar-
General Faulds.
166
  
The introduction of Cannell’s Bill did not, at least officially, relieve Ministers 
of their own obligation to consider the Council’s future. At the end of July the Chief 
Minister called for the views of all members of Tynwald, Bishop Jones included, on 
the Quine Committee’s recommendations.167 The Bishop offered an oral contribution, 
but placed his main reliance upon the Vicar-General’s paper, which appeared in its 
final form in September and was copied to the Ministerial committee.
168
 The paper 
made a number of substantial points. The Bishop was historically entitled to sit in 
Tynwald as a baron. The Bishop’s vote had not hindered the evolution of Manx 
government into its modern form. The relationship between the Island and its national 
church, expressed in the Bishop’s Tynwald presence, was a longstanding and 
inextricable one. As a non-voting member the Bishop would have less incentive to 
take his seat, and the value of his contributions would be reduced. Appointed after 
wide consultation, with a representative rather than advisory role, and with no salary 
from general public funds, no analogy could be drawn between the Bishop and the 
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Attorney-General. Freedom from the political pressures of regular re-election enabled 
the Bishop to “be a voice for religious belief, … articulate the philosophical, moral 
and spiritual viewpoint, … bring an independent and permanent view … give a 
spiritual perspective to government that would otherwise be lost”. Though others 
would also bring their convictions to bear, the Bishop represented ‘a continuity of 
moral and spiritual tradition … of immense importance in a rapidly changing secular 
society’. The specific proposals of the Cannell Bill had never been put to the 
electorate in a general election. Evidence to the Quine Committee had shown no 
significant majority of witnesses in favour of reform. The Bishop’s ecumenical 
contacts enabled him to represent the wider Christian community. The Bishop’s 
position assured Tynwald of a highly-educated, trained and experienced member 
“with proven management ability”. With a reduced public function attaching to the 
episcopal office, future candidates for the See might be of reduced calibre. The same 
argument might jeopardise the future of the Island as a separate diocese altogether, 
with adverse effects on access to the Bishop, synodical representation of Manx 
interests, numbers of churches and clergy. 
In October, in response to a letter from Kneale, Lambeth Palace entered the 
debate by referring to the Bishop’s role as witnessing to the importance of spiritual 
values in the life of the Island; and noting that downgrading this role seemed curious 
in the context of UK reforms which recommended continuing religious 
representation.
169
 The Archbishop of Canterbury did not wish to speculate about the 
response of the Church of England if the role were changed, but noted that the 
legislative role had been important in deciding to appoint Bishop Jones, and “[l]ike 
any other organisation, the Church would be bound to look carefully at the 
implications of any diminuition of the Bishop’s public role and to weigh their 
consequences for future ecclesiastical arrangements in the Island”. 
In the same month, more time was given to the island-wide debate by the 
Keys’ reference of Cannell’s Bill to a committee of five chaired by David Cretney.170 
The committee did not consider its function to include comment on the policy of the 
Bill, but merely drafted a list of amendments to meet technical points and minor 
concerns raised in debate. Its report was received in December, which cleared the way 
for the all-important clauses stage to be taken on 23rd January 2001. 
Clause 2 of the Bill dealt with the composition of Tynwald, the first sub-clause 
containing the fundamental principle of direct election. Sub-clause (2) then added the 
Bishop and Attorney to the revising chamber as non-voting members. An amendment 
tabled by Leonard Singer to sub-clause (2) would permit the Bishop to vote in this 
chamber as hitherto. Cannell voiced surprise that “one relatively minor provision 
appears to have attracted more attention than all other clauses put together”. He 
assured the House that under his proposals the Bishop would remain welcome to 
contribute to debate, and that the religious Establishment in the Island would not be 
affected. Church influence did not, however, demand the automatic right to vote in a 
democratic legislature, and Christianity could be expressed as well by other members. 
The Bishop’s appointment process could not be compared to a choice by the Manx 
electorate; nor was it any use “pretending that the Christian congregations of the Isle 
of Man represent the majority of the people of the Island any more”. Singer supported 
his amendment by reference to the “many attempts to remove religious guidance from 
our lives”, and the erosion of previously accepted standards of behaviour and the 
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importance of family. His information suggested a higher level of interdenominational 
confidence in the Bishop than Cannell’s, and a greater likelihood than Cannell 
anticipated that a merger of oversight would follow any diminution in the Bishop’s 
Tynwald role. 
Cannell’s closing remarks indicated pessimism about the future of his own 
proposals. Not only was sub-clause (2) on the Bishop’s vote under attack; but also the 
‘self-splitting’ Tynwald of sub-clause (1) still did not appear to command the support 
in the House for which he had hoped. In this he was proved correct. The Singer 
amendment was carried 18-5, and clause 2 as a whole was then defeated 8-15. At the 
Speaker’s invitation, Cannell withdrew his Bill. 
Contributions to the debate, and the views expressed at other times by those 
who voted for the Singer amendment, nevertheless suggest that other factors than 
support for the Bishop played their part in this outcome. Allan Bell and Walter 
Gilbey, for example, were concerned to see the Constitution Bill off the Keys’ agenda 
so that more urgent legislation could be progressed before the dissolution of the Keys 
that autumn. The wish for Cannell to withdraw the Bill may explain their support for 
an amendment striking at the root of his campaign. Miles Walker and Peter Karran, on 
the other hand, not objecting to the Bishop’s vote, opposed the amendment through 
hostility to Cannell’s entire project – Walker believing in the status quo, Karran in 
unicameralism – presumably hoping the provision on the Bishop would taint the Bill 
as a whole and cause its failure at a later stage. 
 
II.7 Developments since 2001. 
The qualitative fieldwork forming the core of this project ends in May 2001. 
Where debates to June 2003 are relevant to the earlier discussion we have referred to 
them, generally in the footnotes. Three events merit specific discussion here. 
Firstly, the role of the Ecclesiastical Committee came under review. Following 
the general elections to the Keys, Tynwald Court needed to elect seven members to 
form the Committee. In introducing the ballot Bishop Jones observed that this was an 
excessive number, and asked for it to be looked at for the future.
171
 Singer, a Jewish 
member of Tynwald, was proposed for the Committee. He saw this as “revolution 
rather than evolution”, but Crowe thought it would be “very sensible for ecumenical 
relationships”. He was not elected. Later in 2002 a Select Committee recommended 
that the Ecclesiastical Committee should be reduced to three members, and that it 
confer with the Bishop and Government in order to report on its future existence and 
remit. The principal reason given for change was the development in ecclesiastical 
legislation in the preceding decade.
172
 This is yet to be implemented. 
Secondly, in June 2002 Edgar Quine received leave to introduce a Bill to the 
Keys.
173
 It provided for a Legislative Council consisting of the President of Tynwald, 
the Bishop, the Attorney General, and eight directly elected members. Neither the 
Bishop nor the Attorney were to have a vote, or count towards a quorum. At the time 
of writing, the Bill is still under consideration. On 1 April 2003 a Select Committee 
was formed to report on the Bill, with a remit focussing on election to the Council. 
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The Committee will report before April 2004, and is currently taking evidence from 
the public. 
Thirdly, on 30 April 2003 Bishop Noel Jones retired from the See. His 
successor, the Very Reverend Graeme Knowles, Dean of Carlisle, has yet to be 
consecrated and take his seat in the Council. The Lord Bishop-designate stated that 
his voting role in Tynwald would be very important – “It’s a rich inheritance to have 
representing both the Church of England and other Christians. I put a great deal of 
stress on my time commitment in Tynwald. The Church must be involved in politics 
and the way we live – because the voice of the Christian community needs to be 
heard”.174 
II.8 Conclusions. 
Although unquestioned ecclesiastical representation in the Council came late 
to the Isle of Man, during the nineteenth century a significant proportion of the 
Branch were officers of the Manx Church sitting ex officio. Most of these officers 
were removed at the start of the twentieth century, as the Council began to become 
less a body of officials due to the introduction of indirectly elected and appointed 
members. As the Manx constitution developed in the twentieth century, the Bishop 
became more unusual, finally being left as the only voting member of the Council 
who sat ex officio. 
Debates over the role of the Bishop have, inevitably, occurred primarily as a 
result of broader constitutional controversy. The Bishop was uncontroversial in a 
branch of English officers – but attempts to discard an English Council in opposition 
to a Manx Keys, an official Council in opposition to a directly elected Keys, 
inevitably threatened his position. 
As the Bishop survived these reforms, however, the debate changed. He could 
be – and often was – seen as unfinished business from both these reforms; or as an 
anomaly that should not be allowed to detract from a vision of democracy based on 
direct or indirect election by the Manx. Most contributions to the debates after 1980, 
however, accept that the Bishop had a distinctive place in the Council. His removal 
might be seen as the eradication of the last vestiges of feudalism, or as a threat to the 
survival of the Diocese, or the silencing of a vital spiritual voice. In any of these 
examples, however, it was assumed that the Bishop mattered  - this his legislative role 
was special. 
In the following chapter we discuss at length how successive Bishops 
performed and represented this role, and detail how other members of Tynwald saw 
the Bishop’s legislative role. 
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III: The debates of Tynwald, 1961-2001. 
This chapter focuses on how the Bishop functioned in Tynwald during the 
period under study. As this discussion is based upon a qualitative analysis of the 
debates of Tynwald, a necessary preliminary is a discussion of our methodological 
choices. We then move to consider those debates where the vote of the Bishop was 
decisive, and the problems with a focus on those debates. A better approach is to 
analyse all debates where the Bishop took part, or his role was alluded to. Our 
analysis of these debates indicates two different types of issues. Firstly, subjects 
where Bishops have, or were expected to have, made a substantial contribution. In this 
section we also include a narrative of the key debates which are referred to later. 
Secondly, modes of contribution expected of the Bishops – that is, expectations of 
appropriate conduct by this legislator. The chapter concludes by unpacking “the 
Bishop” into the five men who held this office during the period in question. 
III.1. Methodology. 
In analysing the role of the Bishop, we draw only upon reports of Tynwald 
debates since March 1961. This date marks a significant change in the powers of the 
Council, with the loss of the absolute veto over legislation.
175
 Due to time constraints, 
not all Tynwald debates within this period are analysed. We have considered every 
debate where the Bishop was legally entitled to exercise a role. Thus, all debates of 
the Council and Tynwald Court are analysed. In relation to the other Branch of 
Tynwald, the Keys, once we have identified a measure involving explicit discussion 
of the Bishop’s constitutional position relevant debates have been analysed. We have 
not, however, examined debates on unrelated topics in the Keys in search of 
discussion of the Bishop’s role. The use of Tynwald debates to understand the role of 
the Bishop may be subject to two fundamental criticisms - firstly, the political actors 
whose views are identified; secondly, the mode of expression which is drawn upon. 
On the first point, our analysis is based upon the assumption that the views of 
members of Tynwald are especially significant. This significance can be found in the 
formal, and informal, power of these actors in relation to the exercise of the Bishop’s 
legislative role. In formal terms, a coercive change to the role would require the 
agreement of sufficient members to proceed with an Act of Tynwald. More 
informally, members of Tynwald act as opinion formers, particularly on constitutional 
matters concerning the composition of Tynwald, making their expressions of opinion 
particularly significant. As well as this national role, the views of those legislators 
involved in legislative debate with the Bishop - that is, fellow members of the Council 
or of Tynwald Court - are an immediate, and intimate, source of influence upon the 
Bishop in his constitutional functions. To take a hypothetical, if we found members of 
the Council repeatedly and consistently deferring to the Bishop on matters of religious 
education, but asserting that he had no role in broader matters of scientific and artistic 
education, this would be significant whether the Bishop acquiesced in this 
construction of his role or rejected the views of the other members of the Council. 
Similarly, if the Bishop indicated explicitly, or implicitly through a number of 
interventions, that he had a particular expertise or interest in a specific area, this could 
be significant. 
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While the significance of these constitutional actors may be relatively 
unproblematic, by taking legislative debates as our source for their opinions, we are 
limiting the range of our data. Although we have supplemented our analysis with 
interviews with current and former constitutional actors, and with extra-legislative 
sources, we could not, given our period, have done so exhaustively. Instead, we have 
taken the contributions to the debates of Tynwald as our central resource. This 
decision has three advantages for our study. Firstly, given that the study seeks to 
explore developments since 1961, use of these sources allows us to accommodate 
constitutional actors who are now deceased, and discussion of legislative patterns that 
may, in an interview narrative, be overlaid by more recent developments. Secondly, 
our interest is less in the bare opinion of these constitutional actors than in the 
influence they may exercise upon the collective expectations of the legislature. It may 
be interesting to learn that a particular legislator, for instance, privately opposed the 
involvement of any professional clerics in the legislative process. If this opinion was 
never expressed in the public forum of the legislature, however, that in itself may 
indicate that it fell outside the collective expectations of the legislature as to 
acceptable differences of opinion. Thus, we look to the individual contributions to put 
together a multifaceted, often conflicted, collective view of the role of the Bishop. 
Finally, by focusing on Tynwald debates, we deal with a source that our constitutional 
actors will have known was a matter of public record. As well as avoiding ethical 
issues arising from the use of other forms of data, by using a source where our actors 
were speaking for the record we might expect to find a degree of development of their 
ideas, and a level of gravitas which might be absent from less formal fora. 
There are, nonetheless, three important restrictions inherent in basing this 
study on the use of Tynwald debates, which may be usefully summarised here.  
Firstly, individual personalities are of considerable significance, particularly in 
a legislature such as Tynwald, which consists of less than forty members. As will 
become apparent in the discussion that follows, particular personalities play an 
important role in the debates. So, for instance, it is possible to trace consistent 
approaches by Eddie Lowey and by Sir Charles Kerruish. The personality of 
individual Bishops is also of considerable significance. As mentioned above, 
however, we seek to draw out that part of Tynwald’s civic philosophy that deals with 
the Bishop. Although this must emerge from the contributions of individual members, 
the views of the individuals are of secondary importance. Nonetheless, it can become 
seriously misleading to refer to “the Bishop” or “members of Tynwald”. This concern 
is partly addressed by reference to contributors by name throughout this chapter, 
sometimes at the expense of elegance and brevity; and our consideration of each 
Bishop in a section near the end of the chapter. Nonetheless, our conclusions must be 
tentative, as we seek to draw broader generalisations from particular social 
interactions between particular legislators.  
Secondly, there are developments and changes over time. To some extent we 
have approached the period 1961-2001 as a single unit, looking for patterns across the 
available data. Not only do the individual personalities change as the composition of 
Tynwald fluctuates, however, but broader social and political changes in the Isle of 
Man since 1961 must have had some impact. Where we find common themes, for 
instance the involvement of a number of Bishops over a number of decades with 
Sunday trading laws, their significance is strengthened by this proviso. It may also be, 
however, that particular generalisations we make about the role of the Bishop were 
not evidenced for the entire period by a number of instances, but only for the period in 
which those instances occur. This is particularly the case where debates do not show a 
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consistent approach towards the role - rather than seeing evidence of different views 
of “the” approach by different legislators, we may actually be seeing views of 
different, because chronologically distinct, approaches. This concern is partly 
addressed by reference to all debates by date throughout this paper. 
Thirdly, the coverage of issues and topics emerges as a result of pressures 
upon the legislative agenda. In the discussion that follows, we suggest that some 
Bishops have played a particularly prominent role in some subject areas. Although the 
Bishop has the power to introduce topics to Tynwald, this will not necessarily be used 
simply because he has an interest in that topic. Rather, an active involvement by the 
Bishop would seem to require a coincidence between a topic before Tynwald because 
of the pressure of events, or as part of a broader legislative programme, and the 
willingness of the Bishop to participate. A Bishop may choose not to make an 
intervention not only because he considers it would be inappropriate, but also because 
he feels that the points he considers important have already been made. This is an 
important limitation on our data, and to some extent justifies our decision to look for 
patterns across the entire period, rather than engage in a chronologically sensitive 
study of the debates. 
Within the confines of our sources, as discussed above, we approached the 
task of analysis by a comprehensive analysis of the voting record of Tynwald to 
determine motions where the vote of the Bishop was decisive. As discussed below, 
this would never have given an accurate view of the interactions in Tynwald. It 
provided a relatively small number of debates for us to develop working practices 
with before exploring all debates. Each debate was summarised, and tabulated for key 
work or speaker searches. Analysis was by a quasi-judicial method, with recursive 
sorting and resorting of the data to identify common themes across multiple 
episcopacies. 
III.2. The decisive votes. 
A survey of the voting records of Tynwald Court and of the Council during 
our period makes it possible to identify instances when the vote of the Bishop was 
decisive. As we will see from the discussion of the debates that follows, the business 
of Tynwald was not narrowly legislative, particularly before the development of the 
Council of Ministers as the central executive body of the Island. Much of this non-
legislative business was resolved in Tynwald Court, which included members of both 
Branches of Tynwald. In the legislative role, the Bishop’s most important function 
was as a member, with full voting rights, of the smaller Council. Given the Manx 
legislative process, which allows the Keys to dispense with the consent of the Council 
to legislation, but not vice versa, it is arguable that the vote of the Bishop, and indeed 
the rest of the Council, has never been decisive – if the Keys are insistent on passing a 
Bill then, in most cases, they can do so. Nonetheless, the extra effort needed to do so, 
and the failure of every Bill rejected by the Council to become law regardless, 
suggests that it is appropriate to view the Bishop’s contribution to a majority of one in 
the Council, or to a tie requiring a casting vote, as decisive. 
Within the Council, we can identify a number of instances where the Bishop’s 
vote led to a tie requiring the casting vote of the President. In a number of these, the 
casting vote was exercised against the Bishop, leading to the same result as if he had 
not voted.
176
 In 1977, however, a Bill to remove wide ranging powers intended to 
encourage new industry reached the Council, where a 4:4 tie at the First Reading led 
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to the Governor casting his vote in favour of the Bill, and in line with Bishop 
Nicholls, in order to keep the debate moving and keep in line with the Keys.
177
 
Additionally, there have been a number of instances where the Bishop’s vote 
led to a majority of one, avoiding a tie.
178
 In 1979 Bishop Nicholls defeated an 
amendment to a jury Bill that would have allowed women without children to be 
excused as of right.
179
 In the same year he defeated the central clause of a Bill to 
allow more Sunday opening by licensed premises,
180
 although it became law the 
following year by the consent of the Keys alone. In 1981 an amendment to limit sales 
of the national lottery to the summer season was carried by his vote.
181
 In 1982 he was 
a substantial force behind the drive to establish a Manx Heritage Foundation, and his 
vote was decisive in the passing of the Bill to do so through the Keys.
182
 In 1985 an 
amendment to reduce the notice period for an extension to an alcohol license was 
defeated by Bishop Attwell,
183
 a decision that was later accepted by the Keys.
184
 In 
the same year, at the instance of the Finance Committee of the relevant Board, he 
moved and carried an amendment to make the provision of school meals optional;
185
 
and carried an amendment allowing children over 16 to be served wine with a meal in 
a restaurant.
186
 In 1990 Bishop Jones carried an amendment to allow voters to make 
their marks in Manx as well as in English.
187
 In 1991, he defeated an amendment to 
place the Manx Water Authority under the control of the Highways Department, 
rather than the Department of Industry.
188
 In 1993 he defeated an amendment to allow 
extra review of minister’s refusals to provide licenses for services competing with the 
Manx Post Office.
189
 In 2001 he proposed an amendment to an education provision 
requiring religious education to be “wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian 
character”, seeking to delete “broadly”. The amendment was carried by his vote,190 
but was rejected by the Keys, and after a conference between the Branches the 
Council agreed to withdraw the amendment.
191
  
Turning to Tynwald Court, the making of a casting vote against the Bishop has 
on a number of occasions led to his vote being irrelevant to the final outcome.
192
 On a 
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substantial number of occasions, however, the Bishop’s vote has been decisive in 
causing the Council to support the Keys:
193
 Bishop Pollard exempting public transport 
undertakings from the removal of fuel subsidies (1963),
194
 extending British food 
hygiene standards (1964),
195
 and delaying development of redundancy payment 
legislation (1965);
196
 Bishop Gordon limiting the opening hours of betting shops 
(1970),
197
 restricting the terms of an inquiry into development leases (1970),
198
 
authorising the appointment of a senior marketing officer to the Tourist Board 
(1970),
199
 and authorising the creation of a panel to review the working of the 
residence control scheme (1973);
200
 Bishop Nicholls giving a landowner time to seek 
legal advice before authorising compulsory purchase (1978),
201
 making support for 
the Central Abattoir dependent upon it reaching European standards (1979),
202
 
creating a single Board of Consumer Affairs (1979),
203
 endorsing the principle of 
equal representation for all inhabitants of the Island in Manx elections (1979), 
204
 
allowing borrowing by Peel Town Commissioners to fund a housing project (1980),
205
 
establishing fifteen-yearly reviews of boundaries for electoral purposes (1980),
206
 and 
authorizing an emergency debate on British Telecom officers, rather than Manx 
officials, operating against CB radio possessors in the Island (1980),
207
 authorising 
expenditure on building a shop and annexed house in Jurby (1981),
208
 authorising 
expenditure on extra beds at Ballamona Hospital (1981);
209
 and supporting action to 
change the constitutional position of the Island in the wake of a decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights prohibiting judicial corporal punishment, and 
affirming the desire of the Island to retain this sanction (1981);
 210
 Bishop Attwell 
merging all government telecommunications into a single authority (1984),
211
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establishing the procedure for election to the Home Affairs Board (1984),
212
 
authorizing reconsideration of fishing regulations (1985),
213
 and forming a Select 
Committee to consider trade union regulation (1985);
214
 and Bishop Jones 
commissioning an official investigation into the collapse of the Savings and 
Investment Bank (1990),
215
  giving the relevant Department the choice as to the form 
of the school year (1993),
216
 receiving the government report on local government 
(1994),
217
 directed the Select Committee on Standing Orders to take account of issues 
raised in debate (1995),
218
 setting up a Select Committee to consider a Tynwald Day 
grievance concerning battery hens (1998),
219
 expressing a belief in consensus 
government with collective responsibility and confidence in the current Ministers 
(1998),
220
 discussing transfer of responsibility for medicines and poisons between 
Departments (1999),
221
 rejecting exceptions to the principal of collective 
responsibility within the Council of Ministers (2000),
222
 welcoming a government 
commitment on CO2 emissions (2000),
223
 criticising the Tynwald Management 
Committee’s filling of a vacancy in the Deputy Clerkship of Tynwald (2001),224 and 
changing a commitment to buy and staff a piece of medical equipment to a 
commitment to consult on such a purchase (2001).
225
 
Although the effect of the Bishop’s decisive votes in Tynwald Court have 
generally been to support the Keys, there are important exceptions. On a number of 
occasions, the Council voted against the Keys because of his vote: a motion to explore 
the advantages of terminating the Common Purse Agreement was lost (Pollard in 
1965),
226
 as was a proposal to increase the Manx rebate on UK fuel taxes (Gordon in 
1968).
227
  The Bishop’s vote was decisive in retaining a proposed constitution for the 
Isle of Man Arts Council (Jones in 1991).
228
 In 1993 the question arose as to whether 
Tynwald should appoint a new Select Committee on Advocate’s fees, the former 
Committee having served its term, even though a new Bill was likely to eliminate the 
need for the Committee. The Keys were in favour of making the new appointments in 
any case, but Bishop Jones disagreed, resulting in a tie in the Council that – 
exceptionally – the President resolved by casting his vote against the Keys.229 Bishop 
Jones opposed approval of an order to increase Sunday trading by sports and clothing 
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shops, eventually requiring the Keys to bypass the Council (1995).
230
 He was crucial 
in supporting an original timetable for tree-planting (1993),
231
 and in rejecting a 
proposal of the Keys to introduce a 3 year evaluation programme for a national speed 
limit, in order to bring the limit into effect immediately, although he failed in this aim 
(1998).
232
 In the same year he voted in favour of an amendment mentioning 
compensation in response to a Tynwald Day petition.
233
 In 2000 an amendment 
calling for immediate coastal defences at Kirk Michael passed in the Council because 
of Bishop Jones, but was defeated in the Keys.
234
 In 2000 a motion was under 
discussion that would ask the Council of Ministers to discuss means of making ex 
gratia payments to Islanders who had been prisoners of war in Japanese hands. A 
motion to change this to a consideration of whether such payments should be made in 
principle commanded the support of the Keys, although it was lost in the Council 
because of Bishop Jones, leading to the original motion passing without a division.
235
 
 
 Decisions in 
Council. 
In Tynwald (with 
Keys). 
In Tynwald (against 
Keys). 
Pollard - 3 1 
Gordon - 4 1 
Nicholls 5 10 - 
Attwell 3 4 - 
Jones 4 11 7 
 
It is possible, as above, to show these decisive votes in numeric form. Even 
with the added detail of the text. the list of subjects and dates where the Bishop’s vote 
was decisive is of limited value. The primary importance of this data is to show that 
the vote of the Bishop in the legislature has had an identifiable impact upon particular 
items of business before Tynwald. It may be possible to argue the relative importance 
of these items in the agenda as a whole, with Sir Miles Walker for instance arguing in 
2001 that in his twenty four years in the legislature the Bishop’s vote had never 
decided an important issue,
236
 but it is clear that some motions were passed only 
because of the Bishop’s vote, while others failed for the same reason. This gives at 
least an indication of the practical importance of the Bishop’s role, which is necessary 
for his vote, in the legislature. 
One supporter of the Bishop’s vote has argued that their legislative records 
suggest support for the directly elected Keys.
237
 The decisive votes of the Bishops in 
Tynwald Court would seem to provide some support for this, particularly for Bishops 
Nicholls and Attwell. Ultimately, however, consideration of the decisive votes 
provides us with little guidance on more profound issues. This is because of two 
problems that arise from a focus on the voting, rather than the proceedings, of 
Tynwald. 
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Firstly, the Bishop can never bring about a decisive vote by himself. If other 
members of the relevant body choose to vote with him in sufficient numbers, then his 
vote will not be decisive; and similar for the situation where the Bishop is in a clear 
minority. A focus on decisive votes limits us to closely contested votes, which are 
unlikely to be a representative sample of debates as a whole. 
Secondly, an emphasis on his vote may distract from the Bishop’s voice in the 
legislature. As we have seen in the previous chapter, a substantial number of 
legislators have seriously considered removing the Bishop’s vote while allowing him 
to retain his seat in the Council and Tynwald Court. This suggests that, to these 
legislators at least, his impact and role can go beyond his vote. The work of Tynwald 
follows a form common to deliberative bodies, where individuals are invited to debate 
the point to be decided before moving to a vote. In mechanistic terms, a persuasive (or 
even alienating) Bishop may convert what would otherwise be a close vote to a clear 
one – removing it from the category of votes we have considered so far. More 
significantly, it is in this interplay, in this debate within a deliberative body, that we 
are most likely to find evidence of what the role of the Bishop is, and is seen to be.  In 
this emphasis on the deliberative process as requiring detailed analysis we depart from 
the primarily quantitative approach of Brown, who in his useful study of the Lords 
Spiritual agrees that “‘influence’ cannot be assessed simply on the broad quantitative 
basis” of decisive votes.238 
Accordingly, having briefly shown that the Bishop’s vote has in some 
instances been decisive, in the next sections we move to consider in detail the debates 
of the Council, and of Tynwald Court, in order to explore more fully his role. There is 
a useful distinction between substance and style – that is between the subjects where 
Bishops have been particularly active contributors to debate, and their modes of 
argumentation. 
III.3. Subjects discussed. 
The matters upon which an individual Bishop makes a contribution to debates 
should not be regarded as, on an individual basis, indicative of the appropriate field of 
operation of the Bishop. It would be misleading to see the Bishop simply as a 
specialist member of the legislature, even as one with a varying specialism depending 
upon the background and interests of the holder of the office. Bishops have sometimes 
been drawn into extended discussion on issues unrelated to their office, role, or 
aptitudes. A vivid example is the debate on the Public Lavatories (Turnstiles) Bill,
239
 
where Bishop Pollard became involved in a detailed discussion on the timetable for 
removal of turnstiles, a comparison with the position in Blackpool and, as the 
Attorney-General put it, whether removal of turnstiles would leave the public toilets 
places which ladies would care to frequent. Similarly, Bishops may speak on a topic 
they see as far away from their normal field. Bishop Gordon provides a concrete 
example. When discussing the development of the Manx airport,
240
 he analysed the 
proper length of the runway, noting that “this is not my usual field of speaking”.241 
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Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a number of subjects where the 
contribution of the Bishops was very substantial, called upon by other members, or a 
recurring theme across a number of episcopacies.  
(i) Constitutional reforms involving the role of the Bishop. 
The first subject grouping we will discuss is unusual, as its significant to the 
study is comparatively less in the interplay between members than in the content of 
their contributions. Some of the most explicit discussion of the role of the Bishop has 
emerged from debates on constitutional reform. We have already discussed the 
substance of proposals to change the role of the Bishop in Tynwald.
242
 These 
proposals generally formed part of a broader project of constitutional reform so that, 
even when individual members of Tynwald thought reforms to the Bishop’s role 
would be premature, it is not unusual to find a reference to the position of the Bishop 
even when no change is being considered. In particular, we see this in relation to the 
change in composition of the Council, and the demise of the official members.  
In 1963, following a vacancy in the post,
 243
 Tynwald discussed a proposal to 
remove the Second Deemster from the Council. During discussion in the Council 
Nivison briefly touched on the role of the Bishop. Responding to a comment by 
Attorney-General Moore, Nivison recalled, incorrectly, that one recommendation of 
the MacDonnell Report had been for the Bishop to vote only on moral issues.
244
 
Current Standing Orders required the Bishop to vote, and Nivison suggested that both 
the Bishop and Attorney-General might be relieved of the general duty to vote.
245
 The 
Council rejected the Bill, and as a result the Keys directed a Committee to look into 
the constitution of the Council. During the debates, Corkish asked whether there was 
any constraint to keep Attorney-General Moore and Bishop Pollard in the Council,
246
 
and Callister looked forward to a position where the Keys appointed the entire 
Council, except for the Lieutenant-Governor.
247
 Later, Kelly suggested that there had 
been a revolution in the way in which people thought, and that Bishop Pollard might 
be the last to sit in the Council,
248
 a view endorsed more firmly by Callister who 
repeated his aspirations for a purely appointed Council. In particular, the position of 
the Bishop was seen as part of the “feudalistic and archaic set-up which we call the 
Council”, with him sitting merely because his office had “been a baron in some dark 
and distant past”.249 The Bill continued to fail to find approval on its merits in the 
Council,
250
 but was eventually accepted in 1965 in order to avoid the exercise of the 
1961 Act.
251
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During the passage of this Bill, it had been suggested that the Lieutenant-
Governor should be removed from the Council, and in 1965 a Bill was introduced into 
the Keys by Callister to do this.
252
 The proposal was criticized in the Keys as not 
going far enough. In particular, Kelly thought the Council should be reformed more 
broadly, with the Bishop leaving the Council, perhaps becoming Chaplain to Tynwald 
Court.
253
 Callister felt it was dangerous to combine discussion of the Bishop’s place 
with that of the Lieutenant-Governor, but the Bill was defeated in any case. Also in 
1965, a measure to reduce the delaying powers of the Council was reintroduced into 
the Keys.
254
 Kneale looked forward to the eventual removal of all officials from the 
Council, while Quirk described the ultimate goal of the constitutional reforms as 
giving power to the people, entailing the removal of “feudalistic methods” from the 
government of the Isle of Man - the role of the Bishop being a remnant of this 
feudalism.
255
 
In 1969, the Keys adopted a report by the Constitutional Development 
Committee on the Council. Although the position of Bishop Gordon was not to be 
affected, a number of MHKs indicated that the removal of the Bishop should come in 
time.
256
 In particular, in the second reading of a Bill intended to implement these 
recommendations, Irving saw them as part of a process of eliminating officials from 
the Council, including the Bishop, Deemster, and Lieutenant-Governor.
257
 In 1970, 
with the introduction of a Bill to remove the right of the Attorney-General to vote in 
Tynwald, Irving anticipated the eventual removal of the Bishop and the First 
Deemster too.
258
 
In 1974 the removal of the First Deemster from the Council was proposed in 
the Keys.
259
 At the Second Reading, the reform of the Council, including the role of 
the Bishop, was again identified by Crellin as unfinished business.
260
 Cowin 
disagreed, seeing rather the need to conserve traditions. In particular, if the role of the 
Bishop was reduced, there was a danger that Manx affairs would then fall to the 
Archbishop of York, and so to the United Kingdom.
261
 Thornton-Duesbury suggested 
that removal of the Bishop could well lead to the end of the ancient diocese as a 
separate entity, although the Speaker, Kerruish, and Kneale stressed to her that this 
was not something currently before the Keys.
262
 In the Council not only was it argued 
that the legislative process would lose out by the removal of the Deemster, but also 
that the process of constitutional reform was a continuous pressure,
263
 and was taking 
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away all that made the Manx legislature unique.
264
 The measure failed in the Council, 
but was reintroduced in the Keys.
265
 Although opposition to the principle continued, 
notably with the reforms being seen as an expression of the desire of the Keys to 
dominate the Council,
266
 the Bill was finally accepted in the Council.
267
 
In 1977, during passage through the Keys of a Bill to alter the term of office 
for members of the Council, Kermeen was eager to stress that it would not affect 
Bishop Nicholls, although controversy continued over whether he should sit in 
Tynwald, as the Island had little say in nominating to a vacancy in the See.
268
 Delaney 
took the opportunity to advocate removal of the Bishop’s right to vote, although 
allowing him to sit as representative of the Established Church. Delaney was 
particularly concerned that the Bishop could vote as soon as he took up office, 
although he would not have Island interests at heart, or sufficient experience of the 
Island. In the same year, Kermeen noted that he was not in favour of the removal of 
Bishop Gordon, but considered whether he should be in the same position as the 
Attorney-General, able to speak but not vote.
269
 
We have already discussed the progress, since the 1980s, of specific proposals 
for reform of the position of the Bishop in the Council.
270
 The previous discussion 
primarily focused upon the history of the proposals. It is useful to re-examine the 
debates of those proposals specifically to assess the visions of the Bishops role that 
emerge. 
In 1982, during the second reading of a Bill to reform the Council,
271
 Kneale 
argued that the Council needed to be elected, if Manx claims to be a democracy were 
to be vindicated. Although he thought the Bishop should not have a vote on an 
otherwise directly elected Council, he did not agree with those who wished to remove 
the Bishop, as it would encourage those within the Church of England who had been 
seeking the abolition of the Diocese “for generations”. Anderson disagreed, partly 
because of fears over a clash between the Keys and a newly legitimate Council, but 
also because he valued the contribution of appointed and ex officio members who did 
not have to worry about the reaction of an electorate to their decisions.  
Also in 1982, the Speaker, Sir Charles Kerruish, tabled a question for the 
Executive Council on whether a Bill would be introduced to replace the Bishop with 
an additional House of Keys nominee.
272
 Sir Charles argued that the Bishop had, until 
the statutory reform of the Council in 1919, sat in the Council not in his spiritual 
capacity but as a Baron. His continued contribution to the legislative process was 
incompatible with democratic principles. Radcliffe stressed the value of the Bishop’s 
contributions to debates “on matters where the Christian churches’ voice should be 
heard”, and noted that in the previous 5 years, the Bishop had voted with the majority 
of the Keys 92% of the time. He feared that removal of the Bishop could lead to the 
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abolition of the Diocese, on financial grounds, and thought that those committed to 
greater Manx independence would not wish to see the loss of the Isle of Man Council 
of Churches and the Diocesan Synod, removal of budgetary and property control, and 
a possible drop in the number of Manx clergy from 22 to 5-6. Sir Charles dismissed 
the link between the legislative role of the Bishop and the survival of the Diocese as 
“the 1907 arguments”, and groundless. Delaney thought that freedom from electoral 
control was as true of dictatorships, and that the Bishop should act as a guide on 
matters of conscience and religion. 
In early 1983 a report on constitutional reform was debated in the Keys.
273
 
Kneale introduced the report with a description of the process by which public 
observations had been received, and the reaction of the Diocesan Synod to the 
proposals to alter the role of the Bishop. Mann was unconvinced by arguments for a 
directly elected Council, and spoke in support of the Bishop’s role. He favoured 
retaining the Bishop, not only for his ancient rights, but also as a representative of all 
denominations as “a leader of the Christian community”. Cain also spoke in support. 
He saw a problem in trying to reconcile a democratic Tynwald with a hierarchical 
Church. He felt that, because the Isle of Man was a Christian nation, the Church must 
be represented in the supreme legislature. As the Established Church, the Manx 
Church needed to be represented, which because of its hierarchical structures meant 
the Bishop should sit. If this were no longer considered appropriate, an alternative 
would be to allow churches on the Island to appoint a non-voting representative in 
rotation. To some extent, he saw this representation as a quid pro quo for the 
exclusion of some clergy from elected places in Tynwald. Delaney spoke as “a not 
very good Christian”, and argued that the role of the clergy was to comment on what 
was proper, decent, and Christian; not to vote on it. If the Bishop entered the political 
arena, he would be dealt with accordingly - his place was “on a heavenly plane so he 
can give us his views on the Christian aspects of legislation and not vote”. Removal of 
the vote would not effect the unique, Established, position of the Manx Church. Quirk 
saw the Bishop as the only independent member of the Council, who therefore would 
approach issues without bias. Callin argued that the Bishop should retain his place, 
and feared that the publicity also arising from the proposals might have endangered 
the continued existence of the Diocese. Cannan brought up Mann’s reference to the 
disenfranchised clergy, and argued that either the Bishop should be seen as 
representative of all Christian people, and particular those clergy; or those clergy 
should be given full political rights. Radcliffe repeated the position of the Bishop as 
speaking for all Christian denominations. Quinney referred to the early figures on the 
Bishop’s agreement with the Keys, and noted that this was a good record; while Ward 
stressed that the Bishop’s record depended on the individual’s personality. Delaney 
stressed his objections to the Bishop in a way that brings out the differences between 
the Lord Bishop and the Lords Spiritual in Parliament. Delaney considered that: “to 
be elected by someone else outside of the Isle of Man and then have 1/33 of the power 
over the Island is something that went out with the druids”. 274 
In 1994, reform of the Council was debated in Tynwald Court.
275
 As part of a 
proposal to reduce the power of the Council, it was suggested that the Bishop should 
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lose his right to move motions, and to vote in Tynwald - although he would retain his 
vote in the Council itself. Lowey criticized the proposals for neutering the Bishop 
politically - he was the Bishop of everyone on the Island, regardless of their faith. He 
also feared that the change would endanger the future of the Diocese. Downie too 
supported the role of the Bishop, praising his in-depth knowledge of the community. 
Bishop Jones himself made the most important speech. The Bishop distinguished his 
role from that of the Attorney General, who was a non-voting member. The Attorney 
General acted in an advisory capacity; the Bishop in a representative one. The Bishop 
was not representative of the Church of England, nor appointed by it. Instead, the 
Lord of Mann appointed the Bishop to serve her people in that part of the Church that 
is in the Isle of Man, and to represent that Church to the Church of England in, for 
instance, General Synod. Given that the concept of a Christian voice had been 
accepted, why should it be weakened by removing the vote? He met and ministered to 
a considerable cross-section of society, and so was able to portray their concerns 
through his voting. Unlike other members, he had no constituents expecting him to 
contribute on every subject, and so he could avoid adding to the debate repetitively. 
The Bishop, in his own view, showed what a democratic parliamentary system stood 
for - he had mind open to debate, no whip, and no axe to grind. He had now been on 
the Island for long enough to know its people well. Finally, he saw the proposal as an 
unnecessary unravelling of the Church/State relationship, which would benefit 
neither, especially when the public were concerned over the erosion of Christian 
principles. Gilbey noted that the Bishop represented all Christian denominations. 
Delaney welcomed the Bishop’s speech, but reiterated that Tynwald should be a 
parliament of elected persons. This was also the principle concern of Corkill. 
Although Corkill welcomed the Bishop’s moral guidance, for instance in the abortion 
debate, the vote was unacceptable in an elected legislature. The implications to the 
Manx position within the Church of England were something that he felt should be 
accepted in the interests of democracy. 
In 1999 the House of Keys endorsed the principle of direct election to the 
Council, and the removal of the vote of the Bishop.
276
 At the first reading of the 
resulting Constitution Bill, Lowey moved the Bill noting that it retained the 
independent status of the Attorney General and the historic role and position of the 
Bishop.
277
 At the second reading in the Council, he stressed that the Bishop was 
detached from political motives, and helped the Council to address social and spiritual 
matters. The Bishop said that, since the matter had been raised in 1998, he had 
received more positive comments than criticisms on his role. Although there were 
some suggestions that he sat simply as a Baron, those he spoke to saw him much more 
as acting as a Christian representative of the people of the Island. He stressed that he 
did not act simply as a Church representative, and that his interdenominational view 
was an important element in “what is, after all, a Christian council; and until we lose 
that element I think we would do well to say that there is a place for that here”. Lowey 
supported the Bishop’s view, and noted that he rarely came across anti-clericalism.  
In 2000, during the continued progress of the proposals to reform the Council, 
direct reference was made to the proposals for reform of the House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom.
278
 Karran observed that Parliament had much greater democratic 
problems that Tynwald; while the Bishop indicated that the proposals recognized the 
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value of the Lords Spiritual. The second reading of the Bill to replace Tynwald with a 
wholly elected body 
279
 began with Cannell relying upon the need to remove votes of 
unelected persons from a democratic body to justify change. Singer thought the 
position of the Bishop was important. He was not analogous to the Attorney General, 
as he was not an adviser to the government; nor was he intended to act as a spiritual 
leader. Instead, he was appointed on behalf of the people, by a democratic process, to 
speak for all Christian denominations on the Island and to give the wider Church 
view. A Bishop, when appointed, understood he was to exercise a role in Tynwald, 
particularly on matters of conscience. He consulted with other denominations before 
he did so. Weakening the position of the Bishop could endanger the future of the 
Diocese, which would be contrary to broader developments in Manx autonomy.  
This drive for reform came to an end in an important debate in 2001.
280
 
Cannell moved the clause dealing with the position of Bishop with the observation 
that it was strange that one relatively minor clause in the Bill had attracted more 
attention than the rest of the Bill. There was no intention to deprive the Island of the 
other functions performed by the Bishop, and he would continue to take part in 
legislative debates; more broadly, the importance of the spiritual work of the Bishop 
and the Established Church was clear. But this did not mean that the Bishop should 
have an automatic right to vote in a democratic government. The Bishop’s 
appointment had little do with any genuine Manx electorate. There was no more 
reason for the Bishop to vote than the leader of any other religious faction, and the 
notion that other churches were content to abide by the Bishop’s leadership was wide 
of the mark. Cannell thought that removal of the Bishop’s vote might have no impact 
on the future of the Diocese, and that removal of the vote would increase Manx 
autonomy in any case. Quine recognized the value of an advocate of a broadly 
Christian viewpoint in Tynwald, but could not accept the compromise of democratic 
principles involved in accompanying this with voting powers, and doubted whether 
removal of the vote would affect the survival of the Diocese. Singer spoke in 
opposition to Cannell - he thought that there had been considerable public support for 
retention of the Bishop’s vote, and that most denominations of the Island wanted the 
Bishop to speak for them, especially in relation to moral issues. Singer thought it 
impractical to limit the Bishop’s power to vote to moral issues and ones directly 
affecting the Church, since only the Bishop could make that judgment at the time of 
the debate. He also referred to an “authoritative source” who had indicated that 
removal of the vote would lead to a reduction in the influence of the Bishop, and 
endanger the survival of the Diocese. An amalgamation with an English Diocese 
would remove the Manx ability to influence the appointment. He also saw the 
removal as an example of a broader trend of secularisation, which would ultimately 
damage Manx culture. Sir Miles Walker thought that removal of the Bishop’s vote 
would lead to the end of the Diocese; and that in 24 years the Bishop’s vote had not 
decided an important issue.
281
 He also reported that, when Bishop Attwell had been 
due to retire, representatives of the Church had visited him to discuss what sort of 
person should be appointed to the vacancy. Hannan disagreed with Sir Miles Walker 
that the Bishop had never had a decisive impact on voting. She also saw the Bishop as 
a force for conservatism, and criticized his failure to give a lead on the abolition of 
hanging and birching. Brown argued that the Bishop represented those ministers who 
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could not be elected to Tynwald. As a closing contribution to the debate, Cannell 
remained unconvinced that the Bishop was not analogous to the Attorney General, 
and rejected arguments based on Baronial status as outmoded. Everyone needed to be 
accountable. He also thought that the Christian congregations of the Island no longer 
represented the majority of the Manx people; and that legislators had not been morally 
swayed by the Bishop in debates. He noted that Christianity was not the exclusive 
preserve of the Lord Bishop, and that members were just as Christian in their 
approach, albeit without a “purple frock and dog collar”. 
The debates on constitutional reform implicating the Bishop provide important 
evidence on how both the Bishops, and their fellow legislators construct the role of 
the Bishop. A number of points may usefully be stressed here, as they recur 
throughout the discussion that follows. Firstly, the importance, and uncertainty, of a 
theoretical basis for the place of the Bishop. Does he sit as a Baron, and so a remnant 
of a largely defunct feudal system; or as a technical expert on matters religious and 
spiritual; or as a representative of a Church, a faith community, or religion generally? 
Secondly, the perceived interconnectedness between his legislative and ecclesiastical 
role, with repeated suggestions that abolition of the legislative role could endanger the 
very future of the diocese. We see this also during discussion of a Church Bill in 
1968, where Bishop Gordon indicated that the same jurisdiction in both England and 
the Island would be desirable, because of movement of clergy between the Island and 
England.
282
 The Lieutenant-Governor sought reassurance that this was not, as 
suggested in a recent newspaper report, the first steps to abolish the Diocese. The 
Bishop said that the Isle of Man might have to watch its interest in relation to some 
other Church legislation, but not in this instance. Thirdly, the continuation of concerns 
over how the Bishop is appointed, particularly by those members who sought to 
remodel Tynwald into an exclusively directly elected body on the basis that this is 
more truly democratic. Fourthly the recognition, even by some members otherwise 
committed to the removal of official members of the Council, that there is something 
distinctive about the Bishop which may justify his retention, perhaps as non-voting 
member. 
(ii) Church legislation. 
Debates on church legislation are significant both because of the way in which 
this legislation is seen as belonging primarily to the Bishop, and for the broader 
reflections on Church/State relations which emerge from the aversion of many 
members of Tynwald for such legislative business. 
In 1968, Bishop Gordon introduced debate on a Church Bill by explaining its 
clauses.
283
 Bolton thought that for himself, and for many others, “the internal 
government of the Church of England has nothing whatever to do with us people who 
belong to other Churches”. Accordingly, if the representatives of the Church were 
themselves happy with the measure, time should not be spent debating its details in 
the Council.  The Attorney-General agreed, pointing out that the measure had been 
very well drafted and querying “who am I to say what the Church should or shouldn’t 
do. It’s really almost like the rules of a club”. Stevenson thought that neither the 
Council nor the Keys had any real knowledge of the area, and should leave the 
measure as it was. Bishop Gordon, who had been sworn in at the end of 1966, sought 
the guidance of the Lieutenant-Governor: “I had acted on the assumption that the 
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Council would want to be treated as thoughtful and responsible people who would 
have this thing explained to them before passing it. Am I wrong in assuming that 
Church legislation is dealt with in this manner? Is it customary for a committee to deal 
with it and then for us to be rubberstamps at this point”? Bolton explained that this 
was peculiar to the Church of England. Similar questions affecting the Methodist 
Church would be of no concern to the Council. The Lieutenant-Governor suggested, 
jocularly, that as a good Methodist Bolton had a duty to ensure that the Church of 
England did not get away with anything. After the second reading and clauses of the 
measure had been passed, the Lieutenant-Governor suggested suspension of Standing 
Orders so that “we can get on with this and never see it again”. Bishop Gordon was 
not, however, alone in seeing a role for the Council. Nivison thought it was very 
necessary to have proper Church law. The Church had always taken a prominent part 
in the life of the community, so that it was important to have courts whereby they may 
discipline themselves. It was quite wrong for the Council to say that they were 
satisfied simply because the committee was satisfied - rather, “we should pass it 
because we think it is good law”. 
In 1970, in relation to two different Church measures presented together, the 
Keys too initially expressed reservations at the role of Tynwald in Church 
legislation.
284
 Callister was utterly opposed to the Bills - the Church of England could 
manage its own affairs like any other Church, and the discussion was a complete 
waste of time. Irving thought the discussion anachronistic and, although a member of 
the Church of England, hoped that it would soon deal with domestic affairs like any 
other denomination. He could, however, understand the need for laws if the Church of 
England was to be given extra privileges or responsibilities to the community. Despite 
these reservations, there was some debate on the content, and a number of votes, 
including one that caused a clause of one Bill to be lost. 
The first measure debated, concerning Synodical government, was passed 
without a division.
285
 Sugden presented the measure as giving the legislature a 
complete say in how the Church in the Island was to be governed. This disturbed 
Irving, who thought freedom for a religious denomination to run its own affairs 
outside of the political arena was very important. MacDonald agreed with the 
importance of avoiding political interference with the Church, but saw much room for 
reform. Sugden also agreed with Irving, but thought that the issues were best resolved 
by the Ecclesiastical Committee. Bell agreed too, but felt that since the Keys had been 
“invited to pass comment on this” there were two matters that were “quite contrary to 
the principles we would wish to have embodied in legislation”. Simcocks, however, 
saw the role of Tynwald in Church measures as flowing from a broader Church/State 
relationship: “So long as the Sovereign is Defender of the Faith and that faith is that 
of the Established Church of England, she is bound to take the advice of Tynwald on 
how that church conducts its affairs.” 
The second measure debated had a much more turbulent passage through the 
Keys.
286
 The drafting was criticized by the Speaker, Kerruish, who indicated that 
public Bills needed to be properly, and consistently, drafted if they were to proceed. 
MacDonald queried the composition of the Diocesan Synod, which included members 
appointed by the Bishop, as anachronistic. He also characterised the Church of 
                                           
284
 Church (Synod Government) Bill and Church (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, HK 
14.4.70. 
285
 Church (Synod Government) Bill, HK 5.5.70. 
286
 Church (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, HK 5.5.70. 
 63 
England as “very much a minority Church”. Callister criticized much that the Church 
had done in the Isle of Man, and suggested that Sugden was more willing to follow 
English models in relation to Church matters that other areas of policy. The generally 
contentious parts of the Measure, however, concerned the interaction of the Church 
with Tynwald. Clause 20 of the Bill gave a power to withdraw a Bill from Tynwald. 
Spittal observed that there were 24 Christian members in the Keys (prompting Bell to 
interject that he should not libel the Keys), but that if there were 24 atheists, a Church 
bill could be so badly mangled that the promoter should have the opportunity to 
withdraw it. The clause was lost. 
In the Council, the Synod measure was passed after amendments suggested by 
the Home Office and discussed fully by the Attorney-General, Bishop Gordon, and 
the original draftsman.
287
 Once again, the other measure was more controversial. 
Bishop Gordon hoped that the deleted Clause 20 would be restored, as he believed 
(wrongly) that a similar provision existed in relation to Acts of Parliament.
288
 McFee, 
on the other hand, believed the Keys had taken the right approach: “[s]o long as the 
Church is a State Church it has got to conform to the unpleasant as well as the 
pleasant side”. At the second reading in the Council there was some disagreement as 
the proper place of the State legislature in relation to Church measures.
289
 The Bishop 
indicated that he was worried that the State might wish to control every detail of how 
the Church conducted its affairs. He put forward an unusual view of why Tynwald 
was involved in Church measures: “[the] Church of England like other private bodies 
is of such importance that the State wishes to keep a very large eye on it and that is 
why all our legislation has to come before the State”. The Council accepted without 
division the reintroduction of Clause 20, with an amendment limiting its exercise to 
where the Bill had been amended in the Keys or Council.
290
  
The Keys rejected the amended clause. Irving said that the Church had to trust 
the Keys: “if the Church does not like us as sole authority in passage of legislation 
through this House, it is time it thought about disestablishment”. Kneale suggested 
that in the Isle of Man, unlike England, the Church of England was not an established 
Church. Thornton-Duesbury said that the Church was endangered if the right to 
withdraw was not conceded. Simcocks made perhaps the clearest contribution: “From 
whom does the right protect the Church? From the legislature of the Island? As a 
churchwarden of some standing, I say if the Church of England is the established 
Church it must be prepared to take the horn with the hide. The right of withdrawal 
suggest the established Church of this Island is not really an established Church at all, 
but only a semi-established Church”. 
The measure returned to the Council.
291
 Bishop Gordon defended the clause as 
serving as a protection against malicious distortion of a measure. The Church did not 
commence legislation unless the measure was much desired, so would not withdraw a 
measure capriciously. In the Isle of Man, the legislature had no authority over matters 
of doctrine, worship, or reunion, but was more concerned with measures concerning 
finance and organisation. Here the task of the legislature was to ensure that the 
welfare of the nation as a whole was not impaired by what the Church did. Thus, 
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Tynwald had a veto, but was not really concerned with details. Church Bills had a 
democratic process behind them, and were discussed with Tynwald’s Ecclesiastical 
Committee. Bishop Gordon also reflected on the broader relationship between the 
Church and State, including his legislative role. Society and the Church were not as 
similar in membership as in the past. Many leaders of the Roman Catholic and Free 
Churches saw the established position of the Church of England as a national 
recognition of religion rather than of one particular denomination. In particular, 
“[f]rom my contacts with other church leaders, when the Bishop speaks in Tynwald 
he is thought of as speaking for Christians as a whole rather than for Anglicans”. 
In 1976, Tynwald Court approved a report from the Ecclesiastical Committee 
to allow Tynwald to approve by resolution only the extension of General Synod 
measures that had been passed by Diocesan Synod without amendment.
292
 The second 
report of the Ecclesiastical Committee on the Bill came before Tynwald in 1977.
293
 In 
Tynwald Court Kermeen sympathized with the reservations of MacDonald and 
Anderson, both Methodists, who were embarrassed to discuss the internal government 
of the Church of England. As a high Anglican, he would feel the same if faced with 
Methodist internal government, but given the history of the Island and the Diocese, 
such consideration was inevitable. The report was approved without division. The 
measure was raised in the Keys again in 1979.
294
 Although passed by the Keys 
without division, some members were concerned at the reduction in scrutiny of 
Church measures by Tynwald. Cringle saw the current procedure as conducive to 
openness, felt Tynwald had not had to deal with an excess of Church legislation in the 
preceding four years, and was concerned that, as the Church of England was the 
established Church, the move might weaken that establishment. Quayle also saw the 
matter in establishment terms - she wondered whether “[i]t is honest still to have an 
Established Church? Many belong to other persuasions or have no church connection 
at all”. Mann saw the measure explicitly in terms of the independence of Manx 
institutions. He noted that the sponsor of the measure. Kermeen had been working 
hard to prevent United Kingdom legislation being applied to the Island, but that this 
measure would do just the opposite. It was in the area of ecclesiastical legislation that 
the rights of the Island were probably at their strongest. He also noted the importance 
of the Church in a small community, and the subsequent need for elected members to 
have a chance to have a say about automatic approval of United Kingdom legislation. 
Kermeen responded that the new procedure would apply only to measures that had 
been scrutinized at the top level in the United Kingdom, that Tynwald was under 
pressure because of ecclesiastical legislation, and that other mechanisms existed to 
ensure that members of Tynwald who wished could be involved in the formulation of 
ecclesiastical law.
295
 
More specific church legislation was debated in 1978. During the passage of 
the Church Bill through the Keys,
296
 although a number of points of detail were made, 
and some changes made to the Bill itself, a number of members indicated that they 
were not appropriate persons to change this type of legislation. Anderson saw such 
legislation as a matter for the Church, rather than something that should take up 
legislative time, and in particular objected to scrutiny at a detailed level. Kermeen, 
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although he accepted the merits of one proposed change to the Bill, thought the Synod 
rather than Tynwald should make it. Radcliffe thought it was wrong to amend what 
Church officials had put before Tynwald. Irving looked forward to “the day when the 
Church of England like any other church established in the Isle of Man will be able to 
go about its internal business without requiring approval of political bodies”. He 
particularly disliked the idea of changing church legislation put before Tynwald, 
unless it conflicted with “certain principles we are sent here to uphold”. In Tynwald 
Court, Kermeen indicated that the Church authorities had no objections to the changes 
to the Bill, and it passed without a division.
297
 
In 1979 the Council discussed a Bill to amend the law relating to glebe 
lands.
298
 After a discussion of the merits of the measure, Bishop Nicholls thanked the 
Council for its generous dealing with church legislation, adding that he thought a 
period was coming when Tynwald would not be worried with church legislation. The 
Governor indicated that the Council shared this hope, to general laughter.
299
 In 1980, 
during as debate on a Manx Cathedral,
300
 Lowey expressed the view, as a dissenter, 
that too much ecclesiastical legislation was coming before Tynwald - in particular, he 
was concerned that this measure had been debated before a Bill to address the needs 
of disabled persons. In his view, disestablishment was the solution, although Kermeen 
thought that a Bill to disestablish the Manx Church was as practical as a Bill to 
unscramble an omelette. In 1981, Lowey repeated his concerns, in particular he 
worried about who paid for the introduction of Church legislation, and suggested that 
legislative time was better spent on the “real problems of the world”, rather than 
“putting the church to rights”.301  
In 1991 Bishop Jones was steering a Bill dealing with a variety of issues, 
including Church financial structures.
302
 Irving reiterated his regret that Tynwald had 
to deal with such matters, although he recognized that the Established Church was in a 
special position compared with other Christian denominations, with responsibilities 
towards the community in general. Barton and Callin suggested that a simple approval 
procedure could be substituted for the current detailed discussion. Quirk stressed that 
the public, who were all possible members of the Church of England, would feel 
something was wrong if the Church was not subject to scrutiny the same as everyone 
else. This Bill could affect non-Church members, for instance contributors to 
charitable funds. The Attorney General saw the Bill as a major step towards removing 
the “enormous burden” of Tynwald legislation from the Church of England, and noted 
that other non-governmental bodies were subject to Tynwald legislation, giving the 
Acts passed dealing with Methodism as an example. The Bishop thought that the 
Church had a tremendous legal system, with strong checks and balances. He was not 
averse to everybody knowing what the workings of the Church were. 
Reform to the procedure for ecclesiastical legislation was carried out without 
much substantive debate in 1992.
303
 In 1995, WA Gilbey was nominated for 
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membership of the Ecclesiastical Committee.
304
 He thought that this must be a joke, 
as he belonged to another denomination, and thought a member of the Church of 
England should be nominated. Barton reassured him that all denominations were 
present on the Committee. In 1997, during debate on reform of the Legislative 
Council, Brown noted that ecclesiastical legislation had recently been removed from 
Tynwald, becoming a matter for the Church themselves to legislate for themselves.
305
 
A number of interesting themes emerge from the debates over Church 
legislation. Firstly, and most importantly, is the construction of the Bishop as the 
specialist on Church legislation who would be in a position to guide, or perhaps even 
direct, an ignorant legislature. Secondly, we again see the concern over Manx 
autonomy, this time presented primarily as Church autonomy impacting on national 
autonomy, rather than vice versa. Thirdly, we see the importance of “Establishment”, 
as a cohesive relationship with both burdens and privileges, to some members of the 
legislature.  
(iii) State ceremonials. 306 
In 1967 Tynwald Court accepted a report by the Standing Committee on 
Tynwald Day, the annual, formal gathering of Tynwald at Tynwald Hill.
307
 Bishop 
Gordon generally approved of the Report. He saw every reason to keep a good 
relationship between the Church and State, and saw any disagreements as best 
resolved by friendship, consideration and courtesy, rather than argument over rights, 
privileges and traditions. He had some reservations about moving the Archdeacon and 
Vicar-General from their position in the procession with the members of the Council 
to the body of the clergy. Although their position had not changed with their removal 
from the Council, he approved of keeping any changes to a minimum. Given his view 
of Tynwald Day as an occasion for both the Church and the State, he found an 
emphasis on Tynwald Day as essentially a State occasion as unhelpful - rather, it was 
a national occasion when all taking part in the life of the Island were naturally invited. 
Callister had a radically different view. He saw the ceremony as “a pantomime and a 
farcical show”, reflecting a historical position where Tynwald Court was the Lord’s 
executive, in which the Church had great power. Today’s legislative body was not 
Tynwald Court, although it was useful to keep the ceremony as a remembrance of 
“the barbaric days in which this legislature commenced. As the march of time goes 
on, one by one these high-ups, the upper-deck who dominated the Island for so long 
… will be disposed of, until the Council will be a body of experienced politicians and 
legislators, elected to reconsider and examine legislation passed here. The First 
Deemster will be out, and the Bishop”.308 Later, Tynwald Court officially described 
Tynwald Day as a national occasion, rather than a state or legislative occasion.
309
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Tynwald Day was also the subject of discussion in 2000. Tynwald Court was 
debating a proposal to invite the Chairmen of the Village Commissioners to be invited 
to sit on Tynwald Hill during the ceremony.
310
 Gilbey noted that he could not see why 
members of the clergy from the parishes, along with the Bishop and the Archdeacon, 
should attend when the Church of England represented only a small proportion of the 
population. Parish representatives truly represented the people of their area. Bishop 
Jones felt he had to respond to this “mispresentation”, and insisted that the clergy 
were there as members of the national Church. There was an ancient tradition that 
they be called because, as educated people, they could then return to their parishes to 
disseminate the law.  
In 1972 Bishop Gordon briefly hijacked a Litter Bill to raise a ceremonial 
point.
311
 He described as “litter” the duplicated copy of “Prayers for the Opening of 
the Council” which had been provided him: “[w]e usually have beautifully printed 
ones … Someone seems to be economising in a rather unwise way … When you 
consider the extraordinary things that this government does put into print” they could 
at least print the prayers. The Lieutenant-Governor promised to look into the matter. 
The discussion of state ceremonials again stresses the position of the Manx 
Church as having a unique relationship with the Manx State, the different meanings 
that “representative” can bear in a legislative or constitutional context, and the 
implications of identifying the Bishop’s place in Tynwald as primarily a function of 
ancient structures of governance. 
(iv) Church property. 
On a number of occasions, important interventions have arisen in debates on 
Church property, most notably on the traditional official residence of the Bishop, 
Bishopscourt. In 1963, a Bill to allocate part of the income of the See to the 
maintenance of Bishopscourt was uncontentious in the Council, but Nivison 
suggested that Bishop Pollard needed to be controlled, as his outbursts in Tynwald 
Court and during discharge of other public functions raised the question of whether 
Manx money should go to pay for “such a partisan Bishop”.312 A more substantial, 
and sustained, discussion of Bishopscourt began in 1974.  
In that year, Bishop Nicholls had been appointed as successor to Bishop 
Gordon. Before he had taken up office, the Isle of Man Church Commissioners 
reported on retention and maintenance of Bishopscourt. The Ecclesiastical Committee 
was directed by Tynwald Court to consider the report.
313
 The Speaker stressed that the 
occupation of Bishopscourt raised strong feelings, that the new Bishop knew he would 
be expected to live at Bishopscourt, and that if he did not wish to do so “he can back 
when he came”. 
By July 1975 Deemster Easton described the Bishopscourt controversy as 
becoming critical.
314
 The Deemster reviewed the recent history of Bishopscourt, and 
made some interesting points concerning the future of the Diocese. He noted that a 
1948 Act allowed the Bishop to sell Bishopscourt with the consent of the Lieutenant-
Governor, and that the Diocesan Synod and the Church Commissioners Synod had 
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decided that Bishopscourt should be sold in 1974, although consent had not been 
given for the sale. The Deemster thought that the Church Commissioners for England 
(CCE) were already making substantial contributions to the finances of the Manx 
Church (including between £20,000 and £25,000 towards clergy stipends, half the 
cost of new vicarages, and extensive support to the Bishops stipend), and would be 
very happy if there were no Diocese. He feared that if the CCE were not happy with 
any Bishopscourt proposal it could have an impact on the future of the Diocese, and 
reported Bishop Pollard as having told him that there would be no question of a 
Bishopric with 17 parishes and 50,000 people were it not the oldest in the United 
Kingdom.
315
 The Speaker, a Church Commissioner ex officio, thought that 
Bishopscourt needed to be developed so that it became self-sufficient. The CCE 
would not always support the Isle of Man, and a failure to deal with the financial 
issues raised by Bishopscourt would “destroy the Bishopric”. Bishop Nicholls 
discussed his own experience at some length, concluding that even if Tynwald were 
prepared to provide financial support for him to live in Bishopscourt, he would be 
concerned that the Bishop would have to come to Tynwald every year for financial 
support, and would be “as I see it, for ever under the control of Tynwald”.  
Accordingly, he could not accept government money to live at Bishopscourt, as it 
would tie him and successors to an impossible site. MacDonald stressed that he was a 
Methodist rather than an Anglican, but was horrified that Bishop Nicholls had been 
treated with such discourtesy, and was concerned that Tynwald appeared to be 
heading towards a State/Church clash. He supported the view of the Bishop that 
financial support from the government contingent upon his living at Bishopscourt 
could damage the relationship between Church and State, and that if Tynwald wished 
to support the upkeep of Bishopscourt as part of the Manx heritage, it should do so 
whether or not the Bishop choose to live there. The amendment was carried, and the 
report received but not accepted. 
Alternate uses for Bishopscourt were then considered,
316
 and in 1976 Tynwald 
Court was asked to approve the sale of Bishopscourt to the Board of Social Security 
for £70,000.
317
 Bishop Nicholls withdrew before the debate, the resolution being put 
by Nivison, the Chairman of the Board.
318
 Anderson stressed that the Bishop should 
not be burdened with Bishopscourt, and that given the undesirable mixing of Church 
and State, it was for Tynwald to decide what should be done with it. Quayle saw the 
Bishopscourt, with its Pro-Cathedral, as an important focus for Manx spiritual life, 
and thought it important that the Bishop had a suitable residence. This was so not only 
for Anglicans, but also for Christians generally: “People think of our Bishop as the 
Bishop of the whole Isle of Man, not just the Anglican Church. Nicholls especially 
has disregarded ecumenical barriers, and embraced the whole Christian spectrum in 
his ministry”. Cringle, speaking as a Methodist, also saw Bishopscourt as connected 
to people by its connection with the Church. MacDonald, on the other hand, thought 
that the State should not get deeply involved with religion, and if this section of 
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Christianity were to be supported all others would be equally entitled. Following the 
debate, Bishopscourt was purchased, and a committee established to decide how to 
develop it in the interests of the Manx nation, although eventually it was simply sold.
 
319
 
The position of Church property also arose in relation to the Cathedral at Peel. 
In 1966 the Speaker, Kerruish, criticized a number of members for issuing a statement 
that any elevation of the parish church at Peel would require legislative authority, and 
that any cathedral should be in Douglas. The Speaker was concerned that the authority 
of the Keys may appear to have been claimed for a stance that had not yet been 
debated in the House.
320
 During discussion of government estimates in 1967 Kelly 
paid tribute to Deemster Kneale as an authority on land ownership, who had provided 
that Peel Cathedral belonged to the people of the Isle of Man.
321
 More generally, 
during debate of a burials bill Bishop Pollard supported the measure, commenting that 
many English churchyards were a disgrace;
322
 while Bishop Jones queried the 
distinction between new churches and repairs to existing churches for the purposes of 
VAT.
323
 Bishop Jones also led debate on a Bill dealing with a Church charity.
324
 
These discussions of church property have a number of interesting features. 
Firstly, we can see that where the Bishop’s non-legislative interests are too directly 
affected by legislative business, it may be considered appropriate for the Bishop to 
avoid contributing. Secondly, we again see members asserting the significance of the 
Bishop to the Manx community as a whole, not simply to members of the Manx 
Church. Finally, we see some members concerns at excessive entanglement between 
the State and a Church, even when that Church has a special, “established” status in 
the jurisdiction. 
(v) Gaming. 
One of the subjects which has consistently engaged the attentions of the 
Bishops is that of gaming. It may be that this concern has arisen partly from the 
concern of the Bishops to deal with matters of concern to deal with Manx Christians 
generally, including the historically very significant Methodist community. The most 
significant feature of the gaming debates, however, arises from the construction of 
gaming as a moral question. 
In 1962, during discussion of a Bill to establish a casino in the Island, a 
number of members of the Council indicated the role of a religious input into the 
process.
325
 Nicholls argued that there was considerable popular opposition to the 
casino, citing Bishop Pollard as saying that the “majority of people of churches here 
have with one voice condemned the project”. Farrant, although he did not consider 
gambling sinful by those who could afford it, defended the right of any spiritual leader 
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to express a view on something he considered inimical to the welfare of the people, 
whether political or not, and condemned the hustings comments of Kelly, a member 
of the Keys. Moore deplored a suggestion by Kelly that the Church should not enter 
into politics. He saw all the reforms over the past century as having coming from the 
influence of the churches. He took the Christian view and, as a Christian, aimed as 
high as he could: “[a]nyone who professes to be a Christian can bring his religion into 
politics or business or anything else”. A heated exchange then followed between 
Moore and Nivison as to the relevance of his Christianity to the debate. Bishop 
Pollard did not condemn gambling as intrinsically sinful, but said that the casino was 
“a moral issue and we have the right quite definitely to enter into and deal with any 
form of moral issue that is before the public of the country and particularly in a place 
where we are chosen as leaders to serve that country”.326 
His successor, Bishop Gordon, was also involved in controversy in relation to 
gambling. During a resolution concerning betting-shop legislation,
327
 the Bishop 
thought the present Bill should be rejected. He thought that moral and social issues 
could not be avoided, and that it was the duty of a legislative body to concern itself 
with moral issues. Up to a certain point, the law should have nothing to do with wrong 
moral choices, but at a certain point moral decisions concerned the whole social 
health of the community. McLeod responded that he had never heard such rubbish in 
the Council, and quoted a Scots poem condemning a “holier-than-thou” approach. 
Bishop Gordon continued to oppose betting measures, 
328
 and in 1972 this again led to 
the Bishop enunciating the role of the Church, and being criticised for his stance. A 
call to extend betting office hours was before Tynwald Court.
329
 Bishop Gordon 
argued that people varied in the strength and quality of their conscience, and that 
legislation could help the general populace to be their best.
330
 Afternoon opening 
would increase the adverse impact of betting shops, and the independence of the Isle 
of Man gave them a chance to create and maintain a society more wholesome than 
“that over the water”. He stressed that this was a point of conscience, and a moral 
point of considerable importance. Irving, replying for the Tourist Board, indicated that 
the Board was not a missionary society, nor organising Sunday School picnics, and 
needed to respond to visitor’s wishes. 
Afternoon opening for betting shops remained a contentious issue in 1978, 
when Tynwald Court considered an order extending opening hours.
331
 Kermeen 
argued that Tynwald could not legislate for morals and ethics, nor correct individual 
faults, but only control them through legislation. Bishop Nicholls disagreed. He feared 
that the Church had been criticized for speaking out “against” society, but it could 
equally be criticized for failing in its responsibility to speak. Tynwald had to give 
moral judgment and leadership to the people of the Island.  
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Bishop Attwell, too, engaged with gambling and betting. In 1983 he made 
explicit an approach towards gambling that was in sharp contrast to, most notably, 
Bishop Gordon. During discussion of the Manx casino,
332
 Bishop Attwell noted that 
he saw excesses of gambling as causing harm, but that he followed mainstream 
theology in finding that gambling itself was not wrong. He was more concerned with 
ensuring that the young were protected, and the casino’s neighbours were not 
subjected to a nuisance. Radcliffe, who saw a strong difference between finding 
something morally wrong and an appropriate subject for prohibition, congratulated the 
Bishop on his approach. Payne, too, congratulated the Bishop for his “very 
enlightened remarks”. Later, however, Bishop Attwell supported, “on moral grounds”, 
an amendment to a casino bill, which would have allowed up to 2 casinos to be 
established, reducing the authorization to a single institution.
333
 
The moral role of legislators was raised in relation to the national Manx 
lottery, established to celebrate the Millennium of Tynwald.
334
 Bishop Nicholls was 
glad that money had been raised for the old and infirm, but was distressed that it had 
been raised through gambling. He feared that children had been given a “lust” for 
gambling, that the poor were spending more than they could afford, and that voluntary 
giving had fallen as a result of the lottery. He noted that the Isle of Man Council of 
Churches had passed a resolution against lotteries, and feared that old standards were 
being abandoned. Moore suggested that the Bishop needed to recognize a fact of life - 
that people needed incentives to give money, while Kermeen made a more direct 
attack on the Bishops mode of argumentation. While he agreed that Tynwald should 
not become involved in running lotteries, he argued that their role was as legislators 
rather than moralists - civilized states tolerated socially undesirable activities.  
In 1981, during discussion of a Bill to allow a regular government lottery,
335
 
Bishop Nicholls opposed the measure. Crellin noted that this was a matter of great 
importance, over which he had no wish to confront the Keys. The Bishop agreed that 
he did not wish confrontation, but stressed that members of the Council had the right 
to express their own moral views and moral beliefs. In particular “some of us come 
here with Christian viewpoints, we have moral viewpoints, and I am not prepared to 
accept we have got to sacrifice these to prevent a confrontation with the other House”. 
Bishop Nicholls’ successor, Bishop Attwell, indicated that he was not keen to support 
the lottery, and would prefer charitable aid to come from direct donations, but was 
prepared to accept it.
336
  
In the gaming debate, we see a number of Bishops developing a consistent 
opposition to the extension of gaming, while at the same time defending their right to 
speak on moral issues, even to provide moral leadership. This role has not been 
uncontested, nor has it been seen as limited only to the Bishops.  
(vi) Sunday trading. 
During the gaming debates, we have already seen a number of Bishops raise 
particular concerns over Sunday opening for betting shops. Sunday trading more 
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broadly has been an ongoing concern, one with both moral and specifically Christian 
aspects. 
During discussion of Sunday trading in 1970,
337
 Bishop Gordon argued that 
the proposed Bill would further secularise Sunday, and that society as a whole could 
not afford to have it more secularised than it was already. The Church did not want to 
be an awkward body preventing enjoyment by others who did not observe Sunday in 
the Church’s way, but the quietness of Sunday benefited the whole community, and 
provided protection for family life. In a later debate on the measure,
338
 he recognised 
that Sunday trading affected churchgoing “but this is not my concern, and I think I am 
here with the rest of us to conserve the good of society as a whole”. He stressed again 
that the measure would deprive the whole Island of the peace of Sunday, simply for 
“filthy lucre, as the Bible calls it”. 
Sunday trading also posed concerns for Bishop Atwell. During the passage of 
a Shops Bill through the Council in 1985,
339
 he noted that, although he would not 
oppose the Bill, he was worried that it was the thin end of the wedge. He thought the 
Sabbath commandment was very wise, but there were sociological as well as religious 
reasons not to make Sunday just another day. In 1987, during consideration of an 
order to extend Sunday opening,
340
 he considered that these fears had been justified. 
He argued that, in a nominally Christian country, Sunday was special. Allowing 
Sunday opening would make it more difficult for Christians to meet their religious 
obligations through Sunday worship. He supported these, predominantly religious, 
arguments with broader arguments based on the importance to family life of a time for 
families to get together; the need for a day of rest and repose; and the place in British 
tradition of Sunday meals. He also referred to a day of rest as not being a Christian 
peculiarity, referring to “Jewish, Muslim, indeed all other cultures”. Other members 
of Tynwald Court contributed to this debate. Kermode suggested that the Bishop’s 
arguments were quite emotive, and, jokingly, that he had an interest. He then moved 
on to argue that although the Bishop would like to see people in church, Jesus had 
preached on hillsides and streets, and that it was not necessary to go to church to 
believe in God. Kermode concluded that it was inappropriate to impose their will on 
those who chose to worship God in other ways. Karran, on the other hand, applauded 
the Bishop’s speech as an example of his voicing the fears of the Christian community 
of which he was a leader. 
Bishop Jones, too, was involved in a number of debates over Sunday trading. 
His initial contribution to the debate in 1992 took a novel approach to the claims of 
the Churches to a Christian Sabbath. During a debate on a Shops Act Order,
341
 he 
argued that Tynwald helped almost all other market-traders on the Island, but never 
the churches, which were in the marketplace for people. Attracting people to go 
elsewhere on Sunday mornings took away possible income from the churches, which 
were already experiencing a drain of young people due to sporting activities and the 
like. Duggan responded that it was entirely appropriate for the Bishop to worry about 
the churches, but that Tynwald Court needed to consider shopkeepers. It was left to 
Gilbey to raise the more traditional argument, based on social need, for a day of rest. 
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In early 1993,
342
 Bishop Jones returned to Sunday trading in terms that suggest 
his novel contribution to the debate was tactical, rather than indicating a difference of 
opinion to his predecessors. Bishop Jones noted that there was something to be said 
for members rereading old arguments in Hansard each year instead of getting up to 
speak, but he had further arguments this year. Firstly, recent crime figures suggested 
the breakdown of society, and so the importance of family time. Secondly, recent 
unemployment figures suggested that workers would be under greater than ever 
pressure to comply with requests to work on Sundays. Duggan reiterated his earlier 
point, but rather more bluntly, noting that the Bishop “has got do his little piece, we 
know. He is worried about his flock, but we have got to consider the visitors”.  
In 1994, Bishop Jones expressly referred to the views of Bishop Attwell, who 
saw the 1985 Act as the beginning of erosion of the Sabbath. He dismissed arguments 
from tourism, noting that tourists came to the Isle of Man for reasons unconnected 
with the mainstream retail trade. More broadly, he was worried at decadence in 
society more generally, looking in dismay at leading citizens of neighbouring islands 
with their low personal morality. These citizens called for the Church to take a lead on 
morality and standards, but then undermined it by deregulating Sunday.  He finished 
with an appeal to those who had some regard for, and connection with, the Church in 
the Island. Groves supported the comments of the Bishop, particularly on the broader 
issue of standards. He argued that the rest of the Council were elected to provide 
leadership within society, not just to improve the moral welfare and benefit of the 
people, but also to guide them. Kermode, after a snide comment on one of the 
Bishop’s more colourful rhetorical devices, argued that it was a matter of choice - if 
an individual opened their shop on a Sunday it did not make them any less of a 
Christian person.
343
 
By 1996, Bishop Jones had shifted his arguments slightly. When discussing 
extension of licensing, he was prepared to argue that a particular period was 
“especially sacred”,344 but in a debate the following day on Sunday opening, he 
argued that “Our concern must be for the retailers themselves - it is nothing to do with 
Sundays or the Church”.345 In 1998,346 his principal argument was based on quality of 
life, but his approach to religious views is interesting - he noted that some were 
inclined to ignore the feelings of churchgoers because they were a small group, but 
argued that true politics was concerned with the care of citizens, and this includes 
members of minorities. Crowe argued that Sunday trading would not prevent those 
who wished to go to Church from doing so. 
In 1999, during debate of the Bill to repeal regulation of Sunday opening but 
prohibit Christmas day opening,
347
 Bishop Jones acknowledged that there had been 
different views on Sunday observance within the Christian Church. He argued, 
however, that most people claimed to try to live by the Ten Commandments, and that 
little in the Bill met the Fourth Commandment. In a later debate on the Bill,
348
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Kniveton supported individual choice, although he identified as a regular churchgoer 
with the Church of England. Bishop Jones argued that the churches wished to ensure 
that the future was fair, and queried how churches were to compete when seven days 
were to be given up to retail. He also sought assurances about fairness to those 
employees who sought to observe the Sabbath, and introduce a number of - 
unsuccessful - amendments to make the measure slightly more restrictive. At the third 
reading of the Bill in the Council,
349
 Bishop Jones opposed the measure strongly. 
Kniveton had argued that the vast majority of the Island wanted the reform, and that 
the very small minority of churchgoers should not be able to determine what everyone 
did on a Sunday. The Bishop said that this was a very unhealthy argument: the 
majority view was not necessarily right, as the Biblical example of the crowd’s choice 
between Jesus and Barabbas illustrated. In the millennium of Christ’s birth the 
proposal would torpedo “one of the main gifts which he gave to mankind”. Those who 
made a firm stand on Sabbath observance would fail to get employed, or would lose 
pay. He thought the legislature would regret not properly exploring biblical, 
economic, social and medical arguments for preserving Sunday observance. He felt he 
would be remiss if he did not conclude with a specifically Christian reference, but 
“because you might accuse me of being churchy at this point”, he chose to cite a 
report from the Salvation Army, “if any group showed a down-to-earth no-nonsense 
approach to religion it is them”. 
A number of interesting issues arise from these debates, as we discuss below. 
Of particular note is the tension between the Bishop and other Christians, a fear that 
the Church could appear as sanctimonious in seeking to inform the legislative agenda 
with Christian teaching and traditional practice, and the willingness of Bishops to 
bring a variety of argumentative modes - not exclusively religious modes - to bear on 
the question. 
(vii) Criminal law and human rights issues. 
In the preceding sections we have seen how the Bishops have been willing to 
speak, indeed to give a lead, on what were categorized as moral issues. The same role 
can be seen in relation to a small cluster of criminal law and human rights issues, most 
notably sex between men. 
In 1977, Tynwald Court discussed the report of the European Commission of 
Human Rights on corporal punishment in the Isle of Man.
350
 Bishop Nicholls thought 
that “the great majority of us are practicing Christians”, but also tried to be 
responsible citizens. He spoke in the debate personally, and not for the Isle of Man 
Council of Churches which he chaired. He spoke in support of retention of the birch 
for violent crimes by young offenders. Callin cited an election visit where a voter had 
opted to support him because he backed the birch and respected the Sabbath. Nivison 
violently disagreed with the retention of the birch, not as a member of the Manx 
Labour Party but as a practicing Christian based on his own reading of the New 
Testament. He was “disappointed in the Bishop”, as he thought that a church leader 
should give a lead on this. Later, the issue came again before Tynwald Court 
following a Tynwald day petition for a referendum on corporal punishment.
351
 The 
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Bishop felt that he “must say something as a very privileged member in not having to 
submit myself to the electorate”. He had supported the birch some months earlier, but 
could not as a Christian bring himself to vote for a referendum which could involve 
dissociating the Island from the ECHR. In 2000, during debate on the Bill which 
formally abolished birching, Bishop Jones supported getting criminals to face their 
victims and carry out community service, which he saw as more useful than “standing 
around being thwacked around the buttocks”.352 
In 1993, the Council discussed a Bill to formally abolish the death penalty,
353
 
although it had been defunct for some time. Radcliffe opposed abolition, sure that he 
was representing the views of majority of the Island, who believed in justice and 
retribution. Bishop Jones strongly dissociated himself from Radcliffe’s comments. In 
particular, he challenged the view that the Radcliffe spoke for the majority of the 
Manx people - “in this Christian country there would be a lot of challenge to that 
comment”. By a later point in the process, the Bishop was stressing that the Bill was 
intended to remove an unenforceable law from the statute books, and that nobody was 
voting for lawlessness or immorality or the loosening of standards. 
354
 
One of the first substantial debates facing Bishop Jones concerned the 
legalisation of sexual acts between men. During a debate on a referendum on whether 
the law should be changed,
355
 Bishop Jones sought to speak more philosophically than 
politically. He valued the voices of the people and of the legislators, but in matters 
concerning personal sexual morality it was important to remember that there was a 
higher court and a more significant voice. The issues were between a man and God, 
and the Church was called to declare God’s law and work and to reconcile men with 
God. He considered that the Church could not hope to counsel a group who were 
driven underground, although the Churches position on homosexual acts, based on 
scripture, was clear. He had consulted with other Christian churches on this question, 
and they were all agreed that homosexual acts were sinful, although they differed on 
how the sinner should be treated. Although he personally found active and corrupting 
homosexual lifestyles to be abhorrent,
356
 he did not wish to close the door on the 
reclamation of sinners. In relation to the specific question, if there was to be a 
referendum it should cover all factors harming society - such as adultery, divorce, 
drugs and pornography - rather than single out one handicapped group. Lowey did not 
wish to argue with the Bishop on morals or religion, but he thought many devout 
Christians were against a change in the law. Even if members of Tynwald were 
seeking to be Christian, it was important to keep religion and politics apart - 
homosexual crimes were a political issue just like theft, drugs, and murder. Quine, 
too, criticized the Bishop’s speech. He accused the Bishop of clearly following the 
line of “the Synod across the water”, and was concerned with what the Manx people 
thought. 
It was clear that if Tynwald did not effect some change, the United Kingdom 
government would do so, and so a Bill was introduced which would legalise some 
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sexual acts between men. During discussion of the Bill in the Council,
357
 a number of 
the members conceded that, on constitutional grounds rather than the merits of 
reform, the Bill should be accepted. Barton felt that an imposed Act of Parliament 
would be worse than legalizing such acts, but felt that in saying this he let down many 
sincere Christian people who had written to give him support. Bishop Jones said he 
was saddened by the number of Christians who seemed to delight in the word 
“sodomite”, which they used in an abusive and menacing way; and by the 
abrasiveness of the gay lobby. He thought that scripture, tradition, and human 
experience made it impossible for the Church to conclude that homosexuality was an 
alternative form of human sexuality. Members of a number of denominations had 
reminded him that the Bishop represented as wide a range of Christian opinion as 
possible in Council debates. If he were speaking only for himself, he would be content 
to accept the legislation, but felt he would be neglecting his duty if he did not draw 
attention to the deep feeling of the majority of Christians that the change was 
unwelcome.  
In 1994, Tynwald discussed an extension to the range of lawful abortions.
358
 
Bishop Jones disapproved, seeing abortion in the United Kingdom as disastrous, 
leading to the killing of children. Christianity viewed all life as a gift from God, which 
it was only acceptable to take away in exceptional circumstances. He then criticized 
the detail of the proposal. Speaker Cain and Kermode welcomed the Bishop’s speech 
as powerful and constructive, and Quine said that his contribution was very telling, 
and he found it useful for a member of the Council to offer his guidance and help. 
Luft, on the other hand, despite his great respect for the Bishop, felt he had 
misdirected himself on this occasion.  
When the Council first considered the emerging Bill, Lowey regretted the 
absence of the Bishop “after his passionate intervention in Tynwald Court”.359 The 
Bishop was present at the second reading, however, and again opposed the Bill.
360
 He 
was particularly concerned that the Bill should not be accepted simply because of a 
vocal minority, and that the Council should have the courage to say the Bill was 
wrong and not what the Manx wanted. In this case the Council was “dealing with the 
sanctity of life, God’s creation”. By the discussion of the clauses he had shifted his 
opposition to individual points of detail, with a number of unsuccessful challenges to 
individual sections.
361
 At the third reading, however, Bishop Jones returned to his 
overall objection.
362
 God is the giver and taker of life, and life is sacred. Pro-
abortionists would not be deterred by any statutory wording that could be liberally 
interpreted, and there was still time to look at the Bill again. Christian thought that 
everyone with Christian convictions would be disturbed at the passage of the Bill, and 
they had a job to do in imbuing others with their level of faith. 
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(viii) Subjects where the contribution of the Bishop is seen as 
particularly appropriate. 
The debates summarized above contain much that is of interest in terms of 
how the Bishop is expected to contribute to the business of Tynwald, which we return 
to at length below. They also indicate to us that there are two broad categories where 
the input of the Bishop is not simply seen as acceptable, but particularly appropriate, 
so that the Bishop is prepared to speak on the topic, and other members actively seek 
his contribution - moral issues, and technical issues concerning the Manx Church. 
There are strong indicators, arising in relation to a number of Bishops, that the 
Bishop has a special role in relation to topics that are seen as involving moral issues. 
This arose particularly in relation to gaming. In a debate over the Casino,
363
 Moore 
argued for legislators to bring their religious views into their work generally, but 
Bishop Pollard dealt with the point more narrowly - he identified the topic as a moral 
issue and indicated that “we” (although it is unclear who he meant by this) had a right 
to deal with any moral issue before Tynwald. Bishop Gordon, again in relation to 
gambling,
364
 considered that moral issues would always come before a legislature, 
which could intervene when wrong moral choices impacted on the community. He 
returned to the point later,
365
 arguing that the law could help people to be their best, 
and that this was a matter of particular moral importance. Bishop Nicholls, in his 
contribution to the ongoing gaming debate,
366
 argued that the Church had a duty to 
speak on social issues, and Tynwald a duty to give moral leadership. Bishop Attwell, 
in his contribution to a Casino debate, supported one amendment explicitly on “moral 
grounds”.367 Additionally, as we will see in our discussion of the individual Bishops, 
on a number of occasions, a departing Bishop has been commended in particular for 
his spiritual and moral guidance. Bishop Pollard received a commendation for his 
“spiritual” support and guidance upon his retirement.368 Similarly, Bishop Attwood 
was thanked for his contributions on “heart and soul, and on morality in its greatest 
sense”.369 Bishop Jones made substantial contributions, clearly based on his view of 
Christian morality, to the debates on the legalisation of sex between men,
370
 
abortion,
371
 and Sunday trading.
372
 
This “moral” role for the Bishop is not necessarily an argument for an 
expansive role in the legislature, nor is it necessarily uncontested. During the debate 
on the removal of the Second Deemster,
373
 Nivison recalled, erroneously, a 
recommendation of the MacDonnell Report that the Bishop should vote only on moral 
issues, and suggested that he might be relieved of the duty to vote, although in 2001 
Singer pointed out the difficulties with this approach.
374
 On the second point, there are 
some indications, principally in the use of humour, that the special role of the Bishop 
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as a moral guide may not always be taken very seriously.
375
 In 1967, during a debate 
on the restriction of ‘pirate’ radio stations,376 the Bishop argued for the legislation as 
the stations were operating “contrary to the spirit of the law”. The Lieutenant-
Governor said: “[t]his is a question for the Attorney-General actually; he gives legal 
guidance, the Bishop moral”. This provoked laughter in the chamber, tying in with a 
regular tendency to treat explicit references to moral guidance from the Bishop as a 
source of levity.
377
 The special status of the Bishop as a “man of God” has also lead to 
more developed levity. During discussion of motor vehicle insurance the First 
Deemster gave an example of a hypothetical accident in which both the Attorney-
General and he had been negligent.
378
 The Lieutenant-Governor followed, beginning 
“If I am driving the Bishop about and a branch falls off a tree”, causing the Attorney-
General to interject, to much hilarity, “An Act of God!”. The Lieutenant-Governor 
participated, agreeing that it was better to leave the Bishop “out of it”. In 1990,379 
Bishop Jones, perhaps imprudently, raised a question about attaching a token 
indicating a dog was licensed to its collar. Jokes concerning the Bishop’s collar and 
his flock followed. Also in 1990,
380
 the President commented on the suitability of a 
Bill on driving instruction being taken through the Council by Bishop Jones, “who is 
usually in charge of giving directions in which one should travel”. In 1992 Barton 
moved an ecclesiastical Bill in the Council during the absence of the Bishop.
381
 
Anderson pondered whether, in his absence, the Council could include a clause to 
include women priests in the Isle of Man. Lowey replied, to general laughter, that the 
Council could try. 
As well as levity, the ecclesiastical role of the Bishop has very occasionally 
been used in an abusive way, although it should be stressed that the anticlerical thread 
in the Manx debates is a thin one. During an education debate,
382
 Bell shared an 
anecdote concerning schoolboys with Tynwald Court. The Bishop suggested that Bell 
should have spoken with the head teacher concerned, and carried on with “May I say 
to him …”. Bell interjected with “You are not going to preach to me, please”. The 
Bishop responded that “I am not preaching to you. It would be a very good thing if I 
did, perhaps, but not this afternoon”. In discussion of Sunday trading in 1993, Duggan 
referred to the Bishop’s obligation to speak for his “flock” in a dismissive way,383 
while during discussion of the same topic in 1995 Kermode argued that some of the 
activities of clergy were responsible for a decline in churchgoing - “you can see it in 
the Sunday papers every week”.384 In 2001, during the debate on the Bishop’s vote,385 
Cannell made the point that other members of Tynwald could speak with a Christian 
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voice by noting that “Christianity does not have to be expressed with a purple frock 
and dog-collar”. 
We can also identify a number of instances where the contribution of the Lord 
Bishop has been made, or looked for, on what might be regarded as a technical issue 
concerning the Manx Church.
386
 This is a theme most strongly found in relation to 
Church legislation, but can also be seen during discussion of possible abolition of the 
diocese, church property, and even the protest of Bishop Gordon concerning the 
presentation of prayers to open Council meetings.
387
 Additionally, in 1968, during 
discussion of oaths by young persons,
388
 the Lieutenant-Governor asked Bishop 
Gordon’s view on the use of oaths, following press discussion. The Bishop said that 
one should be just as truthful whether on oath or not, but it was “good to be reminded 
of something beyond this world to help you to be your best”. In 1969 Bishop Gordon 
provided guidance to the Attorney-General on references in an interpretation Bill to 
“ecclesiastical commissioners”;389 while in 1993 Bishop Jones provided guidance on 
the role of Church of England prison chaplains.
390
 Although Bishop Jones was keen to 
disavow a similarity between his role and that of the Attorney-General, who acts as a 
technical expert on Manx law for the Council,
391
 it does appear that on technical 
issues concerning the Manx Church, he discharges just this role.
392
 Although outside 
of our period, the ability of the Bishop to identify interactions between Manx law and 
the Manx Church was seen as a real advantage by Archdeacon Philpot in 1837,
393
 
Bishop Straton in 1907, and the MacDonnell Committee.
394
 
III.4. Modes of contribution by the Bishop. 
In this section we are concerned less with how the Bishops have chosen to 
express themselves in debates, and more with what was seen by the Bishop and other 
members of Tynwald as the appropriate way for him to contribute to the work of 
Tynwald. The two issues are obviously related, but distinct, as we will see when we 
come to consider an instance where a Bishop acted contrary to the expectations of his 
fellow legislators. In gauging what sort of contributions might be appropriate, it might 
seem necessary to determine the basis upon which the Bishop is present in the 
legislature. On a number of occasions, the legislature has considered different 
theoretical underpinnings for the legislative role.   
A recurrent theme is that the Bishop has traditionally been a part of Tynwald, 
so that his position contributes to the uniqueness of the Isle of Man. We see this most 
explicitly during the debate on the removal of the First Deemster from the Council,
395
 
but the significance of tradition can also be seen in, for instance, the speech of Bishop 
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Gordon when he took his seat in Council.
396
 The obverse of this argument is that his 
traditional position is antiquated, and opposed to the continuing modernization of the 
Manx constitution. This can be seen as an important theme throughout the reforms to 
the composition of the Council, and in particular during the debate on the removal of 
the Second Deemster.
397
 Critics of the Bishop’s position have made a particular use of 
arguments from tradition to undermine the legitimacy of his legislative function. 
Callister raises this as a criticism of the Council during a debate on Tynwald Day 
ceremonial arrangements,
398
 but most clearly during debate over the role of the 
Second Deemster in the Council. He saw the Council as a feudalistic remnant of the 
past, and the Bishop’s place in it as a remnant of his baronial position.399 Interestingly, 
this justification has normally been put forward by opponents of the Bishop’s 
continued position, and deployed to criticize the position as archaic; only occasionally 
is the Bishop’s position as of traditional right put forward as a positive feature.400 
More utilitarian arguments have also been deployed. The self-governance of 
the Manx Church under its own Bishop was seen as consonant with the autonomy of 
the Isle of Man more generally. During one debate,
401
 Cowin defended the role of the 
Bishop in Council, fearing that if he was done away with, the Island would be under 
the Archbishop of York, and thence the United Kingdom.
402
 During debate of a 
measure to allow for simpler extension of measures that had been adopted for England 
by the General Synod,
403
 Mann saw the issues explicitly in terms of independence. He 
criticized supporters of the measure for applying English legislation, contrary to other 
constitutional developments, in an area where the rights of the Island were at their 
strongest. The continued strength of the position of the Bishop, both fiscally and 
constitutionally, was seen as a key to the otherwise anomalous continuation of the 
Diocese of Sodor and Man. A perception of the Diocese as precarious can be seen 
during the debates on the future of Bishopscourt, in particular the contribution of 
Deemster Easton.
404
 He was concerned that the Church Commissioners of England 
had financial reasons for wishing the demise of the Diocese, citing the view of Bishop 
Pollard that there would be no question of a Bishopric with seventeen parishes and 
50,000 people were it not for its antiquity. During a debate on a measure to harmonise 
English and Manx ecclesiastical legislation Bishop Gordon was called upon to 
reassure the Council that this was not the first step in abolishing the Diocese.
405
 In a 
newspaper interview in 1970, Bishop Gordon had commented on the precarious 
position of the Diocese: “One of the reasons for the continuation of this Bishopric – 
by far the smallest of the 43 Dioceses of the Church of England – is the Island’s 
separate political status and the Bishop’s unique position in it. If the Bishop were 
removed from the Legislative Council the Bishopric might well be considered 
unviable and withdrawn altogether”.406   The linkage between the role of the Bishop in 
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the Council and the continued survival of the Diocese was made explicit by Thornton-
Duesbury during the debate on the removal of the First Deemster from the Council, 
407
 
and was an important theme in the 1982-3 discussions of the Bishops role.
408
 It 
remained a concern in 1994, by which point even opponents of the Bishops role were 
prepared to acknowledge it, with Cringle seeing it as a price to be paid for the 
democratisation of Tynwald. 
 The unique way in which the Bishop has been appointed has also been the 
subject of comment in the debates. A strong theme in the debates concerning the 
membership of the Council was that the Keys, or perhaps even the electorate, should 
be responsible for all appointments to the Council. Thus, his ex officio role was no 
more acceptable to some members than the role of any other official member. Beyond 
the role of the Keys in appointing to the Council, Kermeen linked criticisms of the 
Bishop’s position in the Council with the relative exclusion of the Island from the 
process by which a nomination was made to a vacancy in the See.
409
 There have also 
been hints of anti-English feeling in some contributions to debates. As a rhetorical 
device, this can be seen most clearly by the suggestion by the Speaker, Kerruish, that 
if the new Bishop was unwilling to live in Bishopscourt he could go back to 
England.
410
 More thoughtfully, Delaney advocated the removal of the Bishop’s vote 
in 1977, in part because he was able to vote as soon as he took up office, although he 
would not have the Island’s interests at heart, or sufficient experience of the Island.411 
On occasion, however, the mode of appointment of the Bishop has been seen as a 
positive benefit. During the discussion of corporal punishment Bishop Nicholls found 
it easier to oppose a referendum on the question because he was a very privileged 
member of Tynwald Court who did not have to submit himself to the electorate,
412
 
and some contributors to the 1982-3 debate saw this “independence” as a positive 
aspect of the Bishops role.
413
 
The position of the Bishop has also been seen as part of a broader web of 
Establishment, which carries with it both privileges and burdens for the Manx Church. 
Such a view of Establishment can be found in the debates, most notably in relation to 
scrutiny of ecclesiastical legislation by Tynwald.
414
 Simcocks, for instance, saw 
Tynwald’s role as flowing from the Establishment of the Manx Church,415 while 
McFee saw Establishment as a relationship with disadvantages and advantages.
416
 
Irving felt that if the Church was unhappy with the details of the relationship, it was 
time to consider disestablishment.
417
 The role of the Manx Church in the life of the 
Island was also touched upon by Bishop Gordon, who objected to the description of 
Tynwald Day as a state occasion, preferring to see it as national occasion which 
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involved both the Church and the State.
418
 In this context, it is striking that the early 
discussions of reform of the Legislative Council include only one reference to the 
impact upon Establishment of the Manx Church, with Delaney arguing that the 
Bishop should lose his vote, but continue to sit on the Council as a representative of 
the Established Church.
419
 
The competing claims of these theoretical issues have not been resolved, but 
this has not hampered Tynwald from developing an implicit set of four principles 
about how religious representation should be accommodated. As discussed below 
these are the expectation that the Bishop should be non-partisan; that he should 
represent the Manx Church, Manx Christianity, and perhaps even religion more 
generally; that he may make use of both secular and religious modes of 
argumentation; and that he is not the only member of the legislature who may 
represent religious perspectives or make use of religious argumentation. 
The strongest expectation from the debates is that the Bishop should be non-
partisan, and this has been put forward by supporters of the Bishop’s role - for 
instance by Bishop Jones himself during the 1994 debate,
420
 and Lowey during the 
1998-2001 debate.
421
 There are not a significant number of examples of this 
expectation in practice, but this may be evidence for its power, and so the extent to 
which it is followed. This interpretation is supported by the strength of the reaction on 
the one occasion when a Bishop did act in a way that could be interpreted as partisan - 
albeit not in terms of Manx party politics. 
  In 1963 Tynwald Court was discussing the definition of Manx worker under 
the employment regulations intended to restrict immigrant workers.
422
 Bishop Pollard 
indicated that he regularly told the English Bishops and Church Assembly bodies that 
unemployment was a minor problem in the Isle of Man, and that unemployment was 
much worse in the United Kingdom. He then suggested that this would get worse still 
if Labour Party policy were implemented. Nivison queried what he meant by policy, 
and was directed by Bishop Pollard to the party’s statement - Nivison replied by 
suggesting that the Bishop should read the New Testament. Moore objected to the 
“vicious” attack of Bishop Pollard. He had always believed that the Bishop should sit 
in Tynwald Court as a historic right, but that this debate had changed his belief. 
Legislative business changed to the report of the Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries,
423
 but the controversy triggered by the Bishop’s remarks continued. 
Callister directed the Bishop to the Labour Party, and in particular to their policies on 
employment. Bishop Pollard indicated he had read them, and could agree with none of 
them. Gale was “disappointed and disgusted” by the Bishop’s remarks - one might 
conclude that he should be removed from Tynwald Court if he was going to 
participate in debate as he did this morning. Gale was prepared to attribute them to the 
Bishop’s recent illness. Simcocks saw no justification for the “childish” attack on 
Bishop Pollard simply because he had indicated an attitude to an organization’s 
policy. The suggestion he should not sit in the legislature was “not socialism but 
communism”, and a fair warning to the population of the Island. Later, during the 
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debate on Bishopscourt, 
424
 Nivison indicated that the “partisan” Bishop’s outbursts 
needed to be controlled. It seems likely that this is a further reference to this conflict. 
In 1996, a report by a Committee of the House of Keys referred to a tradition of the 
Bishops, on the whole, displaying a spirit of independence and impartiality
425
 - again, 
reiterating the importance of this expectation.  
Secondly, although an individual Bishop will sometimes make it clear that he 
speaks for no-one but himself,
426
 it is more usual for the Bishop to be being treated as 
a representative of some sort of religious community, although there are important 
differences in the breadth of his constituency. We have already referred to Delaney’s 
consideration of the legislative role of the Bishop as being associated with 
Establishment. Only a relatively small proportion of the Manx population are active 
members of the Manx Church, however, with MacDonald for instance describing it as 
a minority Church.
427
 Given the particular religious demographics of the Isle of Man, 
a stronger theme has been the role of the Bishop as a representative of Christianity in 
the Island more generally. On a number of occasions, members of Tynwald have 
stressed that the Bishop had a representative role beyond Anglicans.
428
 During the 
Bishopscourt debate,
429
 Quayle saw the site as an important focus for Manx spiritual 
life, because people thought of the Bishop as Bishop for the whole Island, not just for 
Anglicans, with Bishop Nicholls having embraced the whole Christian spectrum. 
Bishop Gordon saw himself as exercising this role. During a debate on the procedure 
for ecclesiastical legislation,
430
 the Bishop argued that many Roman Catholic and Free 
Church leaders saw Establishment as a national recognition of religion more broadly. 
In particular, the Bishop saw himself as speaking in Tynwald for Christians as a 
whole, rather than just for Anglicans. During the 1994 debate Lowey stated this most 
widely, seeing the Bishop as Bishop for everyone on the Island, regardless of his or 
her faith.
431
 At the same time, Bishop Jones’ argued that his place in the Council arose 
not because of his place in the Church of England, but because the Lord of Mann had 
appointed him to serve her people in that part of the Church that is in the Isle of 
Man.
432
 This was also a strong theme in the 1998-2001 debate.  
There is considerable evidence to support this statement of the Bishops role. 
During the debate on proposals for development of the main Manx hospital,
433
 the 
Bishop asked for an interdenominational chapel and chaplains’ room to be 
incorporated in the plans, although not for Health Service funding of chaplains as in 
England. He returned to this proposal in 1970.
434
 Another example of 
interdenominational representation came up in relation to fire regulations,
435
 where 
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the Bishop raised the problem of stringent fire regulations for small church halls, 
Methodist as well as Anglican. The concerns of Methodists were raised again in 
relation to gambling in 1981,
436
 and the Bishop spoke knowledgably on a bill dealing 
purely with Methodist affairs in 1982.
437
 Another example, although one met by 
incorrect responses from the Attorney General, was the concern of the Bishop as to 
how far clergy, including Roman Catholic priests and Free Church ministers, were 
precluded from standing for some offices.
438
 Similarly, in drawing upon sources of 
argumentation, Bishops have explicitly made use of Christianity as broadly defined, 
as well as institutional sources within the Manx Church. We have already referred to 
the Bishop feeling the need to distinguish between his own view, and that of the Isle 
of Man Council of Churches, in relation to corporal punishment.
439
 On other 
occasions the Council has been used by the Bishop in debate. In relation to aid for 
British Honduras,
440
 the Bishop asked whether the Lieutenant-Governor would act on 
the appeal to Tynwald by the Isle of Man Council of Churches; and he referred 
explicitly to the opposition of the Council to a licensing measure,
441
 and to a national 
lottery.
442
 While Bishops have made use of the IMCC, they have also made use of 
distinctively Anglican structures. During discussion of whether to introduce the 
breathalyser to the Isle of Man,
443
 the Bishop noted that he had raised the issue in the 
Diocesan magazine eighteen months before, and some of the responses had not been 
very polite.
444
 During a discussion of divorce reform, Bishop Attwell indicated that he 
was very unhappy with a particular measure “as are the English Bishops”.445 Bishop 
Jones also made use of materials from the Salvation Army to explain a distinctively 
Christian viewpoint on Sunday trading, rather than an Anglican document, because he 
wished to avoid appearing too “churchy”.446 
The contribution of Bishop Jones to the debate on sexual acts between men is 
particularly interesting. At the beginning of the debate, the Bishop referred to having 
consulted with other churches on the moral status of homosexual acts. Later, however, 
the Bishop distinguished between his own views and those of the majority of Manx 
Christians, which he had gauged by discussions with a cross-section of Christians of 
all denominations.
447
 Laying aside his private and personal interests, he felt he was 
under a duty to represent as wide a range of Christian opinion as possible. 
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But there are clear limits to how far Bishops will go with this expanded role. 
During debate on a bill to allow sixteen year olds to consent to surgical treatment,
448
 
the Bishop expressed concern that parents should continue in control of the child until 
it reached adulthood. The Lieutenant-Governor referred to difficulties when drastic 
operations were necessary to save life. The Attorney-General indicated that 
sometimes parents might not agree because of religious reasons. The Lieutenant-
Governor responded: “I am not talking about those strange people”. This did not 
prompt any intervention by the Bishop. A particularly stimulating example arose 
during discussion of a bill dealing with animal welfare,
449
 during which Bishop 
Nicholls asked whether the Bill would permit Jewish and Muslim slaughter, such 
slaughter having been permitted in the United Kingdom although it had caused great 
distress to many people, and was different “from the one used in (if I may use the 
words in the widest terms) a Christian community”. It may be relevant to 
understanding Bishop Nicholls’ stance on this point to consider an earlier debate. 
During discussion of a criminal law bill dealing with theft in 1977,
450
 Bishop Nicholls 
praised the Manx quality of life. He had lived for eighteen years in the West 
Midlands, in “a society that was becoming more and more multiracial on the one hand 
and more and more frightening on the other”. He wished for a firmer stance on 
violence, and more consideration for victims. A later Bishop, Bishop Attwell, also 
saw difficulties with some Islamic practices. During a debate on reform of the law 
relating to marriage and divorce, he noted that a proposal could cause problems, as in 
England “with regard to Muslims and Koranic law, where you can marry a girl at 12 
and divorce is simply a male thing - you just say ‘I do not like you’ and clear off”.451 
Again, to place this in some context, during discussion of medical registration, Bishop 
Attwell expressed his concerns that procedures for testing the English language 
expertise of Indian doctors were inadequate.
452
 
Bishop Jones involvement in Tynwald Court on the 16th of May 2000 is also 
illuminating. During the session, a resolution was before the Court to approve 
regulations dealing with motor-cycle helmets, including an exemption for turbaned 
Sikhs.
453
 Cannell objected to this clause, on the basis that he could not think of 
another instance where religious conviction provided an exemption from complying 
with the law, and he thought this was unacceptable discrimination in favour of Sikhs. 
Bishop Jones did not respond with a defence of the religious interests of Sikhs. 
Rather, when the debate moved on to a resolution to approve summer opening of 
public houses,
454
 he noted that he was glad that Tynwald Court had earlier respected 
the turbans of the Sikhs in a very sensitive way; so it should be noted that a number of 
deeply religious people of varying denominations would be very concerned with the 
proposed regulations. 
Although the Bishops have more clearly fulfilled an interdenominational role 
than an inter-faith one, it will be recalled that non-Christian communities in the Isle of 
Man are comparatively small. Thus, it may be that the interests of non-Christians 
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simply never arise in legislative debates. The examples above, of instances where the 
Bishop had an opportunity to speak for non-Christian interests but failed to do so, 
suggest that this is not a complete explanation. Additionally, there is a recent instance 
of Bishop Jones constructing the Island as a Christian country, rather than a multifaith 
one. In 2000, during discussion of the Manx Human Rights Bill,
455
 the question arose 
as to whether the Isle of Man was a multifaith society. He noted that, during a briefing 
on the UK Act, a Home Office official had stressed that it took into account the fact 
that England was not a Christian country, but a multifaith one. The Bishop saw the 
Island as still a Christian country, and so doubted whether a model drawn, explicitly, 
from a multifaith country would be appropriate. Lowey doubted whether the 
conclusion was apt, while Waft suggested that even the Isle of Man was becoming 
more of a multifaith country. In 2001 the Bishop took a leading role in resisting a 
description of religious education as “wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian 
character”, preferring to delete “broadly”.456 In the Keys the deletion was seen as 
departing from the principle of comparative religion being imported from the English 
Bill, and Hannan expressed surprise that the amendment had come from the Bishop, 
given the Church of England’s lead role in interfaith dialogue.457 No agreement 
followed a meeting of Keys and Council members,
458
 and the Bill was eventually 
enacted with the original wording.
459
 Later the Bishop stressed that his concern had 
been to ensure “a very firm base of moral and religious teaching”.460 
If there is a strong expectation that the Bishop should not be politically 
partisan, there is some indication that some Bishops have themselves been keen not to 
be seen as partisan in relation to whatever their religious constituency is understood to 
be. Bishop Pollard, when speaking in opposition to extended Sunday trading on the 
basis that it would secularise the day,
461
 stressed that although commerce could 
impact upon churchgoing, this was not his concern. Rather, like the rest of the Council 
he was there to conserve the good of society as a whole. Similarly, when he took his 
seat,
462
 Bishop Gordon stressed that the link between Church and State was of value 
to the whole community - the Bishop stood for the good traditions of the Island; a 
point reiterated by Bishop Attwell when he took up office.
463
 This may also explain 
the conduct of Bishop Nicholls during the Bishopscourt debate. Although present 
during earlier stages of the debate,
464
 when Tynwald came to approve the government 
purchase, he withdrew.
465
 In relation to Sunday trading, we have already seen how 
other members of Tynwald were prepared to categorise Bishop Jones’ contribution as 
special pleading, albeit pleading he was duty bound to make on behalf of his religious 
organisation.
466
 This desire to avoid being seen simply as a distinctively religious 
narrative may also be seen in the argumentation choices of Bishops in some debates - 
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for instance, explaining the interplay of sociological and religious arguments in the 
Sunday trading debate. 
Moving from the question of representation, we have already seen an 
important technical role for the Bishop, in particular in relation to ecclesiastical 
legislation. Given the traditions of Anglican Christianity from which the Bishops 
emerge, we might also expect the Bishop to stress his role as an expert on religious 
sources. This does not, however, emerge strongly from his own contributions. Perhaps 
the clearest examples can be found in conceptions of human nature. During discussion 
of whether elected local government officers who were council house tenants should 
be allowed to vote on housing issues,
467
 the Bishop noted that even the best humans 
can judge wrongly when their own interests are concerned - that being what the 
theologians call original sin.
468
 In discussing rabies regulations, the Bishop noted that 
cats and dogs were part of the fullness of human life.
469
 In neither case did the Bishop 
rely upon a role as interpreter of canonical texts. Exceptions to this can be found in 
the work of Bishop Attwell, who based his stance on Sunday opening initially on the 
Sabbath commandment, although he later added sociological and psychological 
arguments to his opposition, and his stance on gaming on mainstream theologians; 
while Bishop Jones similarly invoked the Fourth Commandment for his opposition to 
deregulated Sunday trading. During a debate on the legalisation of sexual acts 
between men, Bishop Jones expressed the wish that there was sufficient time for a 
bible study on Genesis, Deuteronomy, Leviticus, Judges, Romans, and Corinthians.
470
 
Bishops have also been criticized, albeit implicitly, for their technical skills in 
relation to religious sources. This can be seen in Nivison’s criticism during the 
corporal punishment debate - as Nivison based his view on a reading of the New 
Testament, and the Bishop disagreed, the Bishop must have been failing in his 
interpretation of that text. The point arose again in relation to capital punishment,
471
 
where the Bishop supported abolition of the death sentence. He argued that the New 
Testament had much higher and deeper principles than the Old Testament emphasis 
on retribution. Interpreting Simcock’s comments in the debate as a criticism of the 
Bishop’s contribution, McFee defended the Bishop as speaking with the force and 
sincerity he would expect from any legislator. Macleod had expected the Bishop to 
make the contribution that he did - although the Bishop preached the Bible he did not 
believe in the Old Testament.  
It is worth noting that the technical justification for the role of the Bishop may 
be seen as putting them in the same position as the Attorney General, who is the 
expert legal advisor on the Council. We have already seen, in relation to the use of 
humour in debates, that analogies have occasionally been drawn between the Bishop 
and the Attorney General. In the 1994 debates, Bishop Jones was keen to draw a 
distinction between them in order to preserve his vote - the Attorney General was an 
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(expert) advisor, the Bishop was a representative.
472
 This was a theme that also 
emerged during the 1998-2001 debate. 
Finally, if the Bishop is seen as a professional, religious officer, with a special 
expertise in religious issues, and a special role in representing religion, there is an 
expectation that he will not be the sole legislator with religious convictions, and so 
should not act as if he is. In the discussion of the right of the Bishop to discuss 
contentious matters, we have already seen how Moore defended the right of every 
legislator to bring their own religious beliefs into the political arena.
473
 We can see a 
number of instances where this has occurred with members other than the Bishop.
474
 
In the discussion of corporal punishment in 1962,
475
 the Attorney-General suggested 
that Nivison needed to think of the victim “rather than the others”. Nivison replied 
that “Christ had regard to the others”, leading another member, Moore, to observe that 
“He thrashed and turned the moneychangers out. I am in favour of birching”. In a 
debate on divorce,
476
 Nivison referred to religious objections to part of the Bill, 
although he did not claim them as his own; and in a debate on corporal punishment 
under the Theft Act he made use of Biblical discourse: “Do-gooders have been trying 
to make us soft since Cain slew Abel”.477 Similarly, in a discussion that effectively 
centred on the legislation of sexual activity between males,
478
 while Bishop Attwell 
sought to sever discussion of law and morality, Corrin said “I’ve got a job holding 
myself back from really describing in working man’s language what is being 
proposed. Look in the Bible; sodomy, buggery, you name it”. These examples suggest 
that the Bishop is not necessarily to be seen as the sole Christian voice in the 
legislature and, as Cannell suggested during a 2001 debate on the Bishop’s vote, the 
removal of the Bishop would not equal the removal of Christian perspectives.
479
 
Indeed, the number of members referring to their own religious convictions during 
debates on ecclesiastical legislation,
480
 suggests that many Christian voices can be 
found in Tynwald during our period. Members have also referred to Christian 
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viewpoints that have been put to them - for instance Barton’s reference to 
correspondence received from many Christians on legalizing sex between men. 
This raises the possibility of a clash between the Christianity enunciated by the 
Bishop, and that of another member. Such a clash can be found in the initial 
discussion of corporal punishment, where Nivison criticized the Bishop for failing to 
provide Christian leadership.
481
 In reality, Nivison was criticizing the Bishop for 
failing to come to the same conclusions as he did to the contents of ‘the’ Christian 
stance. Similarly, during a discussion on Sunday trading, Kermode made use of the 
example of Jesus to criticize what he saw as the Bishop’s emphasis on church 
attendance; while Karran, who agreed with the Bishop’s points, welcomed his voicing 
the fears of the Christian community of which he was a leader.
 
Later, in a 1994 debate 
on the same topic, Kermode similarly opposed Bishop Jones’ emphasis on Sabbath 
observance by noting that if an individual chose to open their shop on a Sunday it did 
not make them any less of a Christian. There was a similar difference of opinion in 
relation to sexual acts between men, where Lowey indicated that he would not argue 
with Bishop Jones on morals or religion, but many devout Christians were opposed to 
a change the Bishop supported. 
III.5 The five Bishops as individuals. 
So far, our discussion is in danger of homogenizing the episcopates of the five 
men who were Bishops during the period of our study. Although there is much 
continuity throughout our period, as is clear from the preceding sections, it is 
important to stress that important differences between the five Bishops also emerge 
from our analysis. In particular, these differences illustrate the importance of 
individual personality where a single individual acts as the only religious 
representative in a democratic legislature. 
 (i) Bishop Pollard 
The departure of a sitting Bishop, or arrival of a new incumbent, have 
provided moments for reflection on the role of the Bishop in the Manx constitution. 
On his resignation, Bishop Pollard received a tribute from the Lieutenant-Governor in 
Tynwald Court.
482
 The Lieutenant-Governor said that he had always been a source of 
great spiritual support and guidance in debate, and commended his work on the 
Boards of Education and Social Services.
483
 He had helped to raise clergy stipends to 
more respectable levels, and had been forthright on the need for the cathedral, 
although not all clergy or laity agreed. 
As already identified, Bishop Pollard saw a special role for the Bishop in 
relation to morality. We can see this in the debate on the Casino,
484
 and also, in a 
negative sense, in discussion of a Bill to restrict high rates of interest, where the 
Bishop suggested that the term “usury” should be replaced with “lawful interest”, 
which would not carry with it the same moral overtone.
485
 The primary moral issue of 
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particular concern to this Bishop was gaming, as discussed above. As part of this, he 
showed a concern with Christian festivals and holy days, moving a clause to forbid 
proscribed gambling on Good Friday and Christmas Day.
486
 In terms of his expertise 
as a leader of the Manx Church, Bishop Pollard was rarely called upon to speak, with 
the only purely ecclesiastical point upon which he expressed a view being the state of 
churchyards and variations in the burial rate between parishes.
487
 
On broader issues, he took a view on constitutional affairs, speaking on the 
proper role of the Speaker of the House of Keys,
488
 and rejecting the MacDonnell 
Committee as being inferior to a committee appointed from the Island with intimate 
knowledge of Manx affairs.
489
  Additionally, Bishop Pollard took a definite, but 
minority view, on cultural activities when he urged a financial guarantee for a music 
festival, arguing that the government should take a part in the Island’s cultural 
activities.
490
 He made a detailed contribution to discussion of National Health Service 
and hospital matters, with an important role on the relevant Board of Tynwald,
491
 and 
had a similar involvement in social security issues.
492
 On his retirement the 
Lieutenant-Governor also acknowledged his role on the Board of Education,
493
 
although this does not emerge from the legislative debates after 1961.  
As well as these substantive points, Bishop Pollard drew upon the broader 
connections flowing from his office. For instance, he referred to a meeting with the 
Home Office to discuss civil defence,
494
 and to providing English Bishops and Church 
Assembly with information on the Island.
495
 
(ii) Bishop Gordon. 
His successor, Bishop Gordon, was sworn in to the Council in 1966.
496
 The 
Lieutenant-Governor referred to him as “constructively merciful rather than 
negatively critical of human frailties”. He observed that there had been press 
suggestions that the non-elected Members of the Council were blots on Manx 
democracy, but suggested that perhaps this confused ex-officio with the hereditary 
principle. Certainly, he was conscious of the value of having in the Council a 
churchman who was esteemed by the whole people of Essex. The Bishop replied that 
he had already gathered his office was a controversial one, with a jocular reference to 
the flight of Bishop Murray from the Isle of Man. He stressed that the ancient link 
between church and State involved in his presence on the Council could be of value to 
the whole community - the Bishop stood for the good traditions of the land, which he 
would endeavour to maintain, develop and enrich in the present day. On his 
resignation, Bishop Gordon received a tribute for contributions that the Lieutenant-
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Governor understood were of a very high order in certain areas.
497
 Nivison said that 
the Bishop’s advice in the Board of Education was very valuable, and his concern for 
elderly people in particular had “badgered us” to speed up provision of assistance. 
There are strong continuities between Bishop Pollard and Bishop Gordon. 
Like his predecessor, Bishop Gordon spoke on what he saw as moral issues. As 
discussed above, gaming remained the principal moral issue identified by the Bishop. 
He also argued for the protection of a Christian Sunday, objecting to the extension of 
shop opening hours.
498
 A number of additional issues arose, however, which Bishop 
Gordon seems to have engaged with as fundamentally moral issues. During discussion 
of sexual offences the Bishop queried whether the penalties for brothel-keeping were 
sufficiently stiff.
499
 When discussing revenue he spoke against lowering revenue on 
tobacco and alcohol, as he did not want the Isle of Man to be seen as a place to drink 
and smoke cheaply,
500
 and returned to a paternalistic view in relation to alcohol at a 
later point.
501
 He supported proposals to abolish capital punishment,
502
 the authority 
of parents over children’s healthcare,503 and the value of compulsory mediation during 
marital breakdown.
504
 Perhaps most clearly, in a discussion of the government 
estimates in 1973,
505
 the Bishop opposed abolition of the Postcard Censorship 
Committee, seeing it as making a small “contribution to wholesomeness”. He would 
have liked to have seen more censorship of bookshops and stalls, seeing it as 
“spraying people’s minds”, analogous to measures taken to deal with foot and mouth 
disease. 
Bishop Gordon’s principal contribution on technical issues was in relation to 
Church legislation, which it will be recalled was a controversial topic during his 
episcopate. He also took a, comparative minor, role in constitutional affairs, speaking 
to the independence of the Council,
506
 and the composition of Boards of Tynwald.
507
 
As with Pollard, Bishop Gordon was initially elected to the Boards of 
Education and Social Services,
508
 and took an active role in both areas. In relation to 
Education,
509
 he entered into very detailed discussions on educational matters,
510
 and 
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put forward a strong policy position on the school-leaving age,
511
 and the merits of 
schools affiliated with particular religious communities.
512
 In that debate he indicated 
that the Church had supported families in education before the State became involved. 
He lost his place in the Board of Education in 1971, following a debate stressing the 
importance of the dominance of Members of the Keys in key Boards,
513
 but continued 
to speak on education matters,
514
 including faith schools.
515
  In relation to social 
services,
516
 he dealt with the care of young offenders,
517
 chaplaincy in hospital,
518
 care 
for the elderly,
519
 and the value of legal aid for those not entitled to supplementary 
benefit.
520
 
Perhaps most significantly, Bishop Gordon substantially expanded the interest 
Bishop Pollard had shown in matters of Manx culture and traditions. In taking his seat 
in the Council, as we have already seen, Bishop Gordon identified one of his roles as 
standing for good traditions on the Island. In discussion of the Education Bill he 
argued against change for change’s sake,521 while on constitutional reform he argued 
for a slow, steady progress.
522
 He also spoke on issues related to the Manx 
Museum,
523
 the preservation of the environment,
524
 the benefits of footpaths,
525
 
particularly in relation to the dangers of the roads;
526
 and the need for support for the 
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arts.
527
 He described coining of money intended for collectors only as undignified,
528
 
and argued for an image of the Island that would attract a more respectable and sober 
kind of holidaymaker than those who sought out Majorca.
529
 
There were two significant departures from the approach of Bishop Pollard. 
Firstly, Bishop Gordon appears to have been concerned with the general quality of 
legislation emerging from Tynwald; and concerned that his contributions should have 
a solid theoretical foundation. He spoke in favour of examiners having wide powers to 
inspect vehicles, with the saving of lives justifying the restriction of liberty.
530
 He 
favoured obedience to the spirit of the law even where it could be argued against on 
its merits;
531
 a paternalistic stance on some matters;
532
 and careful control of the 
government by law,
533
 and taxation.
534
 He also showed a more general concern for the 
quality of legislation, for instance in relation to the provision of gas,
535
 and postal 
services.
536
 Secondly, Bishop Gordon was involved in expediting passage of 
legislation to protect horses from inappropriate treatment,
537
 called for sympathy for 
those whose pets were excluded from the Island because of fears over rabies,
538
 and 
supporting measures to restrict hare-coursing.
539
 
(iii) Bishop Nicholls. 
Bishop Nicholls was formally welcomed in 1974.
540
 His appointment, and the 
period after he took office, was to some extent coloured by the Bishopscourt 
controversy discussed elsewhere.
541
 When he left office in 1983, Nivison’s tribute 
included particular reference to his active involvement in the work of the legislature, 
and the extent to which he had become involved in the life of the Isle of Man as soon 
as he arrived.
542
 In his reply the Bishop noted that he had enjoyed his work in the 
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Council, which had included ministry to “some Members of the Legislative Council 
who in eventide of life, have welcomed the ministry of a Bishop representing the 
Church”; and thanked the legislature for passing much needed church legislation 
during his term. He drew an explicit parallel with service in the House of Lords as a 
Lord Spiritual, preferring his office in Tynwald. 
The interventions of Bishop Nicholls represent primarily a continuation of the 
role of Bishop Gordon, but with a return to the argumentation style of Bishop Pollard. 
In particular, the explicit effort to link the legislative debate with a theoretical 
foundation is notably missing from his contributions. The topics that concerned 
Bishop Nicholls, however, are very much the same as those that concerned Bishop 
Gordon. 
As with his predecessors, Bishop Nicholls made particular contributions to 
topics with a moral element. We have already seen his involvement in the ongoing 
debate on gaming,
543
 and he was also concerned over clubs getting a Good Friday 
liquor licence.
544
 He was concerned with aid and assistance for those in the 
developing world - for instance in relation to disaster relief for British Honduras,
545
 
and reception of refugees.
546
 Some of his concerns over the significance of the family 
may also be seen in this light. He spoke on a ban of sale of alcohol to young 
persons,
547
 the desirability of allowing children to sit with their parents during pub 
lunches,
548
 and against encouraging young people to use amusement arcades.
549
 He 
also warned for caution over capital punishment partly on basis that it could deprive 
children of both parents - one through murder, one through punishment.
550
 In relation 
to technical matters, Bishop Nicholls was involved in a substantial body of Church 
legislation, which as we have seen did not always seem to other legislators to be a 
sensible use of legislative time.
551
 In 1980, during a debate on a piece of ecclesiastical 
legislation he reflected on his activities in this sphere.
552
 He noted that during his six 
years in office he had endeavoured to bring the legislation of the Manx Church into 
line with the dioceses of England. 
Like his predecessors, Bishop Nicholls was frequently involved in education 
and social security matters, on a number of occasions drawing on his experience on 
the work permit appeals panel.
553
 He piloted a potentially contentious bill to more 
closely link Manx and English social security measures through the Council.
554
 He 
was also concerned with the social benefits of providing financial support for housing 
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improvements,
555
 and Millennium benefits for the poor.
556
 On more specific points, he 
was concerned that tips were not always passed on to the serving staff, 
557
 that debtors 
were not always properly served by auctions of their goods,
558
 and that farmers could 
be very seriously inconvenienced by road closures for motor-racing.
559
 Also as his 
predecessors, education was a recurring concern of Bishop Nicholls. He was involved 
in discussion of aid to a private school,
560
 penalties for parents who do not send their 
children to school,
561
 and general education policy and the need for additional 
schools.
562
  
Heritage, tradition, and culture also interested Bishop Nicholls. he stressed the 
importance of steam railway in attracting visitors,
563
 the preservation of the Villa 
Marina,
564
 the significance of historical and architectural value in deciding on the use 
of  church property,
565
 and the implications of the listed building system.
566
 He was 
also concerned with opportunities for local artists.
567
 More nebulously, he seemed to 
respect traditions. For instance in relation to corporal punishment, he expressed his 
admiration for the ladies of the Isle of Man for trying to preserve something they held 
dear, which had meant much to the Island through the years.
568
 
On one issue, Bishop Nicholls superficially was in agreement with a well-
defined trend in the contributions of Bishop Gordon - concern over cruelty to animals. 
It should be noted, however, that Bishop Nicholls sole contribution on this point arose 
over religious slaughter methods.
569
  
(iv) Bishop Attwell. 
Bishop Attwell’s welcome in 1983 included a number of jocular references to 
the “hot seat” in Tynwald.570 The Speaker commended the works of a Manx poet, 
T.E. Brown, to the new Bishop, as useful in understanding Manx aspirations. The 
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Bishop indicated that he would seek to appreciate all that was important in the Manx 
way of life and to the Manx nation, and would try to master the Manx language. In 
particular, he stressed that he was to be of service to the whole Island, and not to a 
small section or group. On leaving office in 1988,
571
 Bishop Attwell admitted that he 
had not found learning Manx an easy task. The Lieutenant-Governor, in formally 
thanking the Bishop for his work, particularly noted his contribution to debates on 
“youth, on heart and soul, and on morality in its greatest sense”. 
The interventions of Bishop Attwell, as with Bishop Gordon, initially sought 
to explicitly identify philosophical foundations for legislative activity,
 572
 but this was 
a not trend present throughout his Bishopric. Although he was complemented for the 
volume of his attendance during his legislative career, compared with the other 
Bishops his contributions were relatively low key. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
identify a concern with issues of morality. In particular, he spoke on the importance of 
conventional family groups for children,
573
 and the importance of strengthening the 
institution of marriage.
574
 He also engaged with the continuing debate on Sunday 
trading.
575
 Like his predecessors, he spoke on education, particularly as a source of 
character development rather than simply vocational training;
576
 and culture, 
including Manx museum and archaeological issues.
577
 He was also concerned with 
overseas development;
578
 and the need to deal with illegal drugs.
579
 
(v) Bishop Jones. 
Bishop Jones’ welcome in 1989 included a reference to the antiquity of his 
place on the Council by President Anderson,
580
 and recommendation by the Speaker 
that, once again, the new Bishop should look to the works of T.E. Brown.
581
 
Bishop Jones continued to be concerned with questions of morality, 
supplementing the discussion of sex between men and abortion discussed above with 
a contribution to a debate on censorship.
 582
 He also continued the link between the 
Bishops and heritage, taking a leading role in debates on the Manx Museum,
583
 and 
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the creation of a Manx Patriot’s Roll of Honour.584 He continued to contribute to 
debates on education, particularly religious education,
585
 and the care of children.
586
 
On broader social issues, a recurrent concern was addiction, in a sense that he 
interpreted broadly enough to encompass prohibited drugs, but also alcohol, tobacco, 
and lottery scratch cards.
587
 Finally, he continued to deal with specifically Manx 
Church issues, such as the position of clergy of the Manx Church, particularly in 
relation to employment regulation.
 588
 
III.6. Conclusions. 
It seems to us that the preceding survey of the construction of the Bishop’s 
role in the Manx legislature supports a number of conclusions. 
Firstly, there are expectations, which appear to have been accepted by 
successive Bishops, that there are subject matters where the contribution of the Bishop 
is to be especially welcomed. These can be categorized as two broad classes: matters 
which implicate moral issues in a way beyond the normal legislative business of 
Tynwald; and matters which involve technicalities of the Manx Church, particularly 
ecclesiastical law or practice. These expectations suggest that the Bishop has a 
distinctive role which is both more powerful, and narrower, than that of other 
members of the legislature. In relation to moral issues, while the special voice of the 
Bishop has been vigorously contested by other legislators, it has also been suggested 
that his legislative role should be confined purely to such issues. In relation to 
technical issues concerning the Manx Church, hostility has been directed more 
towards the involvement of the national legislature in the internal affairs of a religious 
organisation. The special authority and expertise of the Bishop has been largely 
unchallenged, but if such business should not be before Tynwald at all, it provides 
little support for his legislative function. It is important to note, however, that the 
existing right of the Bishop to contribute to debates on any matter has never been 
contested nor, from our study, has he ever been criticized for speaking on a topic 
outside of these two broad categories.  
Secondly, there are expectations that the Bishop should contribute to the work 
of the legislature in a distinct manner, whatever topic is under discussion. (a) The 
Bishop is expected to work in a non-partisan, non-political manner. The strength of 
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the reaction by other legislators when Bishop Pollard appeared to act outside of this 
expectation may indicate the importance of this expectation. It is worth noting that 
Bishop Pollard erred in expressing a criticism of a non-Manx political party, at a time 
when the party political systems in the Isle of Man were, compared with the United 
Kingdom, of marginal importance. A Bishop who chose to endorse one side in a 
conflict between two Manx political parties could expect even more stringent 
criticism. (b) The Bishop is expected to act as a representative of the Manx Church, or 
Christianity generally, or perhaps religion generally. We have seen that on occasion 
Bishops have chosen to distance their own views from those of the broader religious 
community, or have been criticized for not sufficiently representing the range of 
opinion within that community. Bishops have, however, far more commonly accepted 
a representative role encompassing not simply the Manx Church, but Christianity 
within the Island more generally. As we have seen, however, within the Manx context 
it would be wrong to see the Bishop as a representative of religion outside the 
Christian denominations. (c) The Bishop is an expert on religious sources, who may 
make use of them in his argumentation. This is not, however, a major theme in the 
Bishops’ contributions to debate. We did not find a significant, consistent, difference 
between secular argumentation by the other members of Tynwald, and religious 
argumentation by the Bishop. There are numerous examples of Bishops using 
arguments whose grounds are exclusively secular; and of other members of Tynwald 
having recourse to their religious identity and beliefs in argument. Given the hostility 
and humour with which the Bishops have sometimes been met, it may have been poor 
tactics for a Bishop to regularly adopt an exclusively religious argumentative mode.   
 Thirdly, both of these sets of expectations have arisen in the absence of any 
clearly enunciated, let alone universally agreed, statement of the theoretical basis for 
the Bishop sitting, and voting, in Tynwald. During debates we have seen the Bishop 
represented as an undemocratic  vestige of a feudal order, sitting as Baron rather than 
Bishop; as a similarly undemocratic remnant of the former position of the appointed 
officers of the Lord, which should give way to the greater power of the Manx people; 
as a representative of the interests of the Manx Church; as a symbol and practical 
manifestation of the relationship between Manx Church and Manx State commonly 
described as establishment; as a representative of a disenfranchised clergy; as a 
representative of the people of the Manx Church, or of the Christian denominations, 
or religions more generally; as a non-partisan legislator isolated from the political 
pressures which directly or indirectly elected members of the legislator are subject to; 
or as an ecclesiastical specialist with extra-Insular experience. These constructions are 
not necessarily mutually compatible, and the implications in terms of role, legitimacy, 
and appointment are not identical. For instance, if the Bishop sits as a Baron, then the 
size of the Manx Church and his non-partisan role are irrelevant – he sits as of right 
and may do as he pleases. If, on the other hand, the Bishop sits as a non-partisan 
legislator isolated from political pressures then not only is this called into question if a 
Bishop becomes involved in partisan discourse, but it is no longer obvious that when 
appointing a non-partisan legislator it should necessarily be the Lord Bishop of Sodor 
and Man, ex officio. 
Fourthly, it is not possible to treat a religious organization that has the power 
to appoint a member of the legislator as a forbidden zone for analysis. In the debates 
on the role of the Bishop, there were a number of references to the process by which 
the Bishop is appointed. Appointment of a religious leader, albeit one in a religious 
organization with a special link with the State, is an essentially internal affair. But 
when it leads, ex officio, to membership of the national legislature, it becomes a 
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legitimate subject for constitutional analysis. The most striking, and to our eyes, 
important example of this Church/State interaction concerns the repeated concerns 
that the removal of the Bishop from Tynwald would lead to the extinction of the 
Diocese of Sodor and Man as a separate entity, with a damaging impact on national 
pride and independence, as well as more practical losses to the community of the 
Manx Church. From the legislative debates there are times that the Lord Bishop is a 
member of Tynwald because he is Lord Bishop; and there is a diocese to which he can 
be Lord Bishop because he is a member of Tynwald. 
Fifthly, when we talk about “the Bishops”, it is important to stress that we are 
actually discussing five men who, in succession, held a single office. It is clear from 
both the style, and content, of the contributions to the debates of Tynwald, that there 
was extensive personal variation between Bishops. All, to us, exercised their role in 
line with fundamental expectations as noted above. But individual differences are 
important around this commonality. For instance, Bishop Gordon’s aversion to the 
motor car informs a number of his contributions. It may be that religious 
representation that consists of a single person, particularly if that person is not 
simultaneously restricted and empowered by organizational support, raises quite 
different issues from a larger representation. It may be that a significant difference 
between the Lord Bishop of Mann, and the Lords Spiritual of the United Kingdom, is 
simply the difference between one Bishop, acting with only diocesan support and 
twenty-six, acting with a more extensive support structure. 
Having considered the Manx context, the development of ecclesiastical 
representation in Tynwald, and the way in which this representation actually operated 
between 1961 and 2001, in the final chapter we move to evaluate the Manx 
experience of religious representation in a democratic legislature. 
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IV. Evaluating the Bishop’s role in Tynwald. 
In the preceding chapters we described the constitutional and religious context 
in which the Bishop operates; discussed the growth, decline, and contemporary 
challenges facing ecclesiastical officers in Tynwald; and analysed at length how the 
legislative function of the give Bishops were performed between 1961 and 2001. 
In this chapter our primary concern is to contribute to evaluation of the 
Bishop’s role in Tynwald and, more broadly, to understanding of the role of ex officio 
religious officers in democratic legislatures. Although unusual, the Isle of Man is not 
unique in having ex officio religious representatives in the national legislature. In 
Andorra, the Bishop of Urgell is “in personal and exclusive right”, co-Prince with the 
President of the French Republic.
589
 In Bhutan, the Tshojdu (national assembly) 
established in 1953 has a tripartite system of represention which in 1989 consisted of 
30 officials, 10 monks, and 110 representatives of the people. The monks are 
appointed by the Central Monk Body at Thimphu.
590
 In Brunei, the Legislative 
Council consists of six ex officio members, including the Religious Advisor appointed 
by the Sultan, five official members, and ten nominated members.
591
 In Iran seats in 
the 230 member Islamic Consultative Assembly are reserved for the recognised 
minority religions of Zoroastrians, Jews, Assyric and Chaldean Christians, and both 
the Northern and Southern Armenian Christians.
592
 In Jersey, the Dean sits as a non-
voting member of the States.
593
  The officers closest to the Lord Bishop in context and 
role are the Lords Spiritual of the Westminster Parliament. Accordingly, in this 
chapter we draw to some extent upon the United Kingdom debate over the Lords 
Spiritual, and religious representation more broadly. It should be stressed, however, 
that the focus of this report is upon the Manx experience, rather than an explicitly 
comparative consideration of Parliament and Tynwald. Keeping this focus on 
Tynwald, we consider three key evaluative issues. 
Firstly, we detail a taxonomy of religious representation in deliberative 
assemblies, and show how the Bishop fits into this taxonomy. By unpacking the 
characteristics of the Bishop’s role in this way, it may be possible to develop the 
debate by detailed engagement with the genuinely contentious issues. 
Secondly, we consider the impact of the European Convention on Human 
Rights on this aspect of the Manx constitution. Despite a troubled relationship with 
the organs of the Convention, it remains the closest, and most powerful route by 
which the international human rights regime can influence Manx law. This has always 
been the case, given the regional profile of the Convention, but will be exacerbated by 
the growing impact of the Human Rights Act 2001, an Act of Tynwald. Accordingly, 
we consider possible areas of incompatibility between the Bishop’s role, as currently 
defined, and the Convention. 
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Thirdly, we consider the possible justifications for the Bishop’s role. As we 
noted earlier, the role of the Bishop has not been justified in a sustained way – rather, 
possibly justifications have been presented, or attacked, in rapid succession. In this 
section, we draw out the implications of the possible justifications at greater length. 
IV.1 A taxonomy of religious representation. 
 
It seems to us that, before seeking to analysis the potentially problematic 
issues arising from the Bishop’s place in Tynwald, it is useful to draw out the key 
elements of that position. In doing so, we have identified a series of questions that 
might usefully guide the consideration of religious representation in any democratic 
legislature. 
(i) Incidental/integral representation. 
There is a distinction between a member of an assembly who functions as a 
religious representative, and someone who is a member of such an assembly because 
they are a religious representative. At one extreme, an elected MHK may seek to 
represent their spirituality, but apart from the unquantifiable impact their religious 
identity had on their electorate, this is not relevant to their right to sit in the assembly. 
At the other extreme, the Bishop sits in the assembly because of his place in the Manx 
Church – if he were to leave that Church, he would ipso facto lose his place in the 
assembly. The distinction between incidental and integral is of analytical importance. 
If the member has only an incidental role, analysis of their functioning should proceed 
initially by reference to their primary role, and only then focus on their role as a 
religious representative. Identifying such representatives may, in any case, be a 
difficult task. If integrated, however, their functioning and legitimacy needs to be 
considered primarily by reference to their role as a religious representative. In a 
practical sense, of course, incidental/integral may best be seen as a spectrum, rather 
than a dichotomy. Consider, for instance, a life peer appointed to the House of Lords 
while holding, or having held, a leadership role in a minority faith community. He or 
she may be expected to represent that community in the legislature, and be portrayed 
as an example of non-Church representation,
 594
 but representation would not be 
integral to their place in the Lords. 
Even within a spectrum, the Bishop lies at the integrated end. In a legal sense, 
he sits ex officio and loses his seat along with his ecclesiastical office. In a practical 
sense, the Bishop sees himself, and is seen by other members, as a religious 
representative in a way not shared by the rest of the Council. We will discuss the 
theoretical bases for his role in a later section, but it is worth noting at this point that 
even if a non-religious basis explains his original presence on the Council, it does not 
explain his survival as the sole voting ex officio member. This is best explained by his 
role as a religious representative. 
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(ii) Established/non-Established representative. 
One of us has argued elsewhere that “establishment” is a term of limited utility 
for legal analysis,
595
 but that “Establishment” may be convenient shorthand for the 
position of a State Church.
596
 Taking this as the meaning for Establishment, there may 
be an important distinction between representation of an Established religion, and of 
any other religion. If representation forms part of Establishment, then taking it in 
isolation may distort proper evaluation. For instance, if the internal rules of an 
Established religion are determined by the national legislature, then the representation 
may be seen as a safeguard – one comprehensible only within the broader framework 
of a particular State/Church relationship. Similarly, if representation forms part of 
Establishment, claims to representation by other religious groups may be resisted on 
the grounds of different placing – the groups are not State Churches with the mix of 
advantages and disadvantages that status carries with it, and so are not entitled to 
religious representation. 
If the representation is not part of Establishment, however, this departs from 
an exclusive, bipolar relationship between the State legislature and one (or 
exceptionally more than one) State Church. In particular, it raises important questions 
of how communities to be represented are selected. If the decision has not already 
been made via identification of the State church, what criteria should be used? 
Possibilities include historical presence in the jurisdiction, philosophical 
distinctiveness, vulnerability to oppression, social acceptability, demographic power, 
association with a significant ethnic or racial minority. Once we have non-Established 
representatives, these questions move to the fore, both analytically and practically.  
A recurring theme in the Manx debates is that the position of the Bishop forms 
part of a broader, and complex, relationship between the Manx Church and the Manx 
State. So, for instance, we find discussions linking the role of the Lord Bishop with 
the special procedure by which Tynwald became intimately involved in ecclesiastical 
legislation - at its bluntest, review of such legislation being the price the Church pays 
for Establishment, and in particular for representation by the Bishop.
597
 Additionally, 
as has been seen in the UK context, the presence of representatives of the national 
church in the national legislature may be an important symbol of the place of that 
church in national life.
598
 Accordingly, the Bishop’s role is best viewed as forming 
part of a broader Establishment.  
(iii) Organisation/community representation. 
Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, there is an important 
distinction between representation of  a community and an organisation. A 
community is a potentially amorphous grouping of individuals who may define its 
boundaries in their own way, or have different understandings of how the community 
functions, and who leads it. For instance, consider the “Christian community”. Does 
this include Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints? Members of each tradition would see 
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themselves as Christian, but a substantial number of each group would not accord that 
status to the other traditions. Even once a community has been defined, it does not 
follow that mechanisms to allow the State to interact with it will exist. For instance, 
the Pagan communities of the United Kingdom have tended to reject many ideas of 
authority, hierarchy, and the need for legitimation by an individual or organisation 
outside the individual practitioner. The difficulties of a State wishing to interact on, 
say, the details of animal rights legislation, are clear. The lack of clear hierarchies by 
which the State could interact with some religious communities was central to the 
decision of the UK Government to reject proposals to extend ex officio religious 
representation beyond the Church of England.
599
 
Where the representation is of a religious organisation, on the other hand, 
these problems are notably reduced. We may be unable to adequately define the 
Roman Catholic community, but it is comparatively simple to identify the 
organisation of the Roman Catholic Church. Similarly, organisations by definition 
possess structures capable of making decisions corporately and acting upon them. 
Thus it is possible for the State, as a corporate entity, to interact with the religious 
organisation, as a corporate entity. In particular, as we discuss below, it is possible for 
the State to turn to the organisation’s own systems to identify religious 
representatives. 
In relation to the Bishop, although as we discuss below he has a wider 
representational role, the centre of his representation is the Manx Church. There are 
many instances of his being seen as the voice of the Manx Church and an expert on 
technical matters concerning it. Additionally, whatever support the Bishop may enjoy 
outside that organisations, if he were to lose his position within its structures, he 
would cease to be a member of Tynwald. Accordingly, the Bishop is best seen as an 
organisational representative of the Manx Church. 
(iv) Denominational/Inter-denominational representation. 
If we take the idea of denomination to mean one of a number of separate 
communities, and associated organisations, that see themselves as distinct but 
intimately related to other communities within a broader shared tradition, there may 
be an important distinction between denominational and interdenominational 
representation. With denomination representation, the representative would act in 
relation only to that denomination. With interdenominational representation, they 
would act in relation to an interdenominational community within a shared religious 
tradition. A third possibility, exemplified by the Bishop, is that the representation is 
based firmly within a single denomination but sees, and is seen as owing, a 
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responsibility to represent other denominations.
600
 This weak interdenominational 
role, visible in other areas of public life, 
601
 is clearly visible in the Bishop’s role.  
Although the legal basis for the position of the Bishop is his place within the 
hierarchy of the Manx Church, successive Bishops have tended to base their claims, 
not upon exclusive representation of the Manx Church, but upon representation of 
Christianity of all denominations. As we have discussed above, the Lord Bishops 
appear to have taken this duty very seriously, with extensive consultation with 
ecumenical bodies, reference to the concerns of other denominations, use of materials 
produced by other denominations, and even expression of views with which 
individual Bishops disagreed, in the interests of fairly representing Christian opinion 
broadly. 
(v) Religious/Inter-religious representation. 
Clearly there are significant issues raised by interdenominational 
representation, from identification of a community or organisation with a 
representative role, to the contentious issue of how a member of one denomination 
can fairly represent issues that are of concern only to a different strand of the shared 
tradition. If the focus shifts to inter-religious representation, these issues are 
exacerbated. In particular, if the range of human spiritualities are to be represented by 
a single representative or set of representatives coming from a single tradition, there is 
a danger of homogenising the rich variety of values and ethical systems, and social 
missions, into an insufficiently differentiated “religious” view. Additionally, by 
shifting the focus into different religions, the possibility of needs that are not only not 
shared by the representative, but are positively antithetical, is increased. To take a 
hypothetical, let us say a religious community that accepted much Christian teaching, 
but chose to pledge allegiance to a specifically Christian Satan, was concerned that a 
Bill dealing with animal slaughter would adversely impact on a key ritual intended to 
reduce the power of Christ in the world. A Bishop of the Manx Church may find it 
more difficult to represent this religious view effectively – or indeed at all – than say 
Methodist concerns over gaming. 
Although the work of the Bishops in our study suggests that an Anglican 
leader can provide some form of representation for Christianity more broadly, the 
Manx experience suggests that this representation breaks down as we move from 
interdenominational to inter-religious representation. The Bishops do not have an 
impressive record of raising non-Christian, or even Christian non-mainstream, 
concerns. This may be in part due to the lack of established non-Christian 
communities within the Isle of Man for much of our period, so that the Bishops were 
not made aware of religious needs. The opposition to particular religious practices, 
particularly within Islam, cannot be explained so easily. 
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(vi) State/Organisation or community appointment. 
Ultimately, the decision as to the composition of the legislature lies with the 
State. In the Isle of Man, for instance, this can be seen in the Acts of Tynwald 
defining the Council. The State may, however, choose to delegate the identification of 
individual representatives to religious communities or organisations. This can be 
illustrated by the Wakeham Report,
602
 which recommended three tiers of religious 
representation, at least in terms of appointment. The Church of England would 
appoint sixteen representatives, whose identity was for it to determine.
603
 Ten other 
Christian representatives would be appointed by the (State) Appointments 
Commission after extensive consultation with Churches Together in England and 
analagous bodies.
604
 Over time a convention might arise where names put forward 
during this consultation would normally be accepted.
605
 Five non-Christians would be 
appointed by the Appointments Commission, ultimately on the basis of their 
assessment of the individual, although community organisations would be welcome to 
make suggestions to the Commission. 
There are practical advantages for the State in delegating appointment to a 
religious organisation. By allowing the organisation to appoint its own representative, 
the State steps back from the process, reducing to some extent the entanglement of 
Church and State, as well as avoiding responsibility for contentious appointments. 
In the Manx context, appointment lies within the Manx Church. The 
relationship of the Church to the Crown, however, means that the decision ultimately 
lies with the United Kingdom Prime Minister. The Manx experience suggests that 
even a clearly defined procedure for appointing a religious representative by reference 
to a religious organisation can be controversial. The appointment of the Bishop ipso 
facto involves the appointment of a new member to the Council, and has accordingly 
been the subject of discussion within Tynwald. Debates over the internal processes by 
which a religious organisation appoints its representative may be complicated if the 
values of that religious organisation do not accord with those of the legislature. We 
see this most clearly in the Manx context where opponents of the Bishop’s vote refer 
to the “undemocratic” nature of his appointment; and defenders feel it tactically wise 
to base their arguments on - rather tenuous - claims that the Lord Bishop is appointed 
democratically. It is of interest that the gender bar in the Church has not been a matter 
for discussion - although the Bishop is the only member of Tynwald who is legally 
required to be a man, this has not been put forward as a criticism of his position. 
(vii) Individual/Corporate representation. 
Potential differences may also lie between corporate representation of a 
constituency by a body of members, and representation by a single member. With 
corporate representation, it is possible both to share responsibility for contributing to 
debates, to develop expertise in particular areas and, crucially, to dilute the impact of 
a single individual’s personality on the representation. This is particularly the case if 
the corporate representation is associated with administrative support such as that 
enjoyed by the Lords Spiritual in Wesminster. On the other hand, a single 
representative not only must represent the constituency across the full spectrum of 
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legislative business, but also has the potential to mould that representation on the 
basis of their own personality, legislative style, and interests. 
In the Isle of Man, since the reforms of the early twentieth century, the Bishop 
sits as the sole ex officio representative of the Manx Church. Our review of the 
debates since 1961 suggests that the different Bishops had different personalities, 
argumentation styles, and topics of interest. As the sole religious representative, these 
individual characteristics are less diluted than in the case of a larger, at least partly 
corporate, legislative presence such as with the Lords Spiritual. 
(viii) Proportion of representation. 
The preceding categorisation focuses on the absolute size of a representative 
group. The proportion of members who are also religious representatives may also be 
significant. In pragmatic terms, the larger the religious bloc, the more likely its votes 
are to be decisive. Less easily quantified, the more representatives sit to represent 
religion, the more the argumentation within the body as a whole is likely to reflect 
that. In the Isle of Man, the population of voting members who are religious 
representatives is comparatively high – more than 10% of the Council, as opposed to 
roughly 4% in the House of Lords.
606
 
 (ix) Distinctive/Non-distinctive role. 
Although a representative may be appointed to represent a particular religious 
community, once appointed he may function, or be entitled to function, in the same 
way as members who owe their position to different routes. As a matter of 
constitutional law, and practice, the Bishop is entitled to speak on any topic before 
Tynwald. Against this de jure licence, however, there is clear evidence of expectations 
that the Bishop has a special role in the legislature. He is a technical expert on the 
Church of England, a spiritual guide particularly on moral issues, and a non-partisan 
member of the legislature detached from the political process.  
(x) Distinctive/Non-distinctive argumentation. 
Similarly, although there are no restrictions on the Bishop’s use of non-
religious argumentation, there is some evidence of a distinctive mode of 
argumentation being broadly tolerated. The way in which the Bishop has used sources 
in debate has not, generally, proven very contentious. On occasions when the Bishop 
has been criticized for his use of sources, this has generally been as part of a challenge 
from the spirituality of another representative - a rather stronger theme in the debates. 
There are indications in the debates, however, that Bishops can choose between two 
different forms of argumentation, based upon their choice of sources. The first form 
draws upon religious sources that, in the absence of the religious beliefs of the 
Bishop, lack authority. For instance, the reference to the Fourth Commandment in the 
debates over Sunday trading may make a powerful contribution to debate between 
Christians. A participant who does not give the Fourth Commandment any spiritual 
authority, however, will treat it as important only, at the most, as an indicator of the 
place of Sabbath day observance to some members of the Manx community. As we 
have seen, the Bishop has no monopoly on the use of religious arguments based upon 
religious sources, but the expectations that he should provide spiritual and moral 
guidance, and speak for the Christian communities of the Island, support his use of 
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this form of argument.
607
 The second form draws upon sources, and types of 
knowledge, which can be shared by legislators regardless of their religious beliefs. So 
we find examples of the Bishop referring to the views of Manx people he has talked 
to, unemployment figures, and the sociological merits of a shared day of rest 
regardless of religious culture.  
(xi) Exclusive/Non-Exclusive religious voice. 
The presence of a religious representative in the assembly raises the possibility 
of two types of religious voice – the professional voice of the religious representative 
and the amateur, perhaps illegitimate, voices of other members. There is no indication 
in constitutional law and practice, or the debates of Tynwald, that other religious 
voices in the assembly should be silenced. Indeed, a recurring theme in the debates, 
both explicitly and implicitly, is the tension between an ex officio member of the 
Council who is seen as having a special religious role; and the spiritualities of other 
members of the legislature. Explicitly, we see this in challenges to the authority of the 
Bishop to accurately interpret Christian doctrine, or to speak for the Christian people 
of the Island; and, perhaps most pungently, in arguments that a Christian voice in the 
legislature can be well served without a Bishop. Implicitly we see this in the recurring 
theme that the moral and spiritual leadership of the Bishop, and their role as a 
religious figure generally, is a source of amusement to other legislators. Something 
about another legislator as an authority on moral matters strikes a number of members 
of Tynwald, repeatedly and throughout our period, as risible.  
(xii) Describing the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man in Tynwald, and 
the Lords Spiritual in Parliament. 
Although a taxonomy may be of general value in clarifying understanding of 
the place of religious representation in Tynwald, this taxonomy may serve a more 
specific purpose for this study. In the sections that follow we have recourse to the 
comparatively large body of literature that has considered the role, and future, of 
religious representation in Parliament. To place this literature into context, and to 
show its relevance to the Manx experience, it is useful to compare the Lord Bishop 
with the Lords Spiritual. 
A full comparison would require an analysis of the debates similar to that 
carried out for Tynwald in this study. There are, however, a number of existing 
studies of the Lords Spiritual that may be drawn upon even at this stage. In particular, 
we have the general study of the House of Lords by Bromhead in 1958,
608
 the 
important review of the Lords Spiritual by Weare in 1966,
609
 the study of the Lords 
Spiritual by Drewry and Brock in 1971,
610
 the detailed study of them between 1979 
and 1987 published by Brown in 1994,
611
 and the body of commentary surrounding 
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the Labour Government’s reform of the House of Lords since 1997.612 Drawing on the 
secondary sources reveals a representation in Parliament similar, but not identical, to 
that in Tynwald. 
 
 Integrated/ 
Incidental 
Established Org./ 
Community 
Inter-
denominational 
Inter- 
Religious 
Sodor 
and Man 
Integrated Yes Org. Weak  
Inter-denom. 
No. 
Lords 
Spiritual 
Integrated Yes Org. Weak  
Inter-denom. 
Possibly. 
 
 Appointed Individual 
/corporate 
% Role Argument Exclusive 
Sodor 
and Man 
Org. Ind. 11 Distinct Distinct No 
Lords 
Spiritual 
Org. Corp. 4 Distinct Distinct No 
 
The Lords Spiritual sit as integrated religious representatives. Although it is 
possible to argue that they entered the Lords as Barons,
613
 and so constitute merely a 
“hangover from the middle ages”,614 this historical explanation – if valid – is no 
longer the prime justification for their presence.
615
 Rather, they sit as representatives 
of the Church of England.
616
 Although summoned individually,
617
 they sit by virtue of 
their ecclesiastical office. When a Bishop already a member of the House changes his 
See “he has to be reintroduced to the House as the representative of that particular 
See”.618 Similarly, “[t]he Bishops are the only true ex officio members of the House 
of Lords, as they retire from the House on retirement from their See”.619 Accordingly, 
the Lords Spiritual are integrated representatives in a way identical to the Lord 
Bishop. 
The Lords Spiritual sit as representatives of an Established Church, the Church 
of England. In her recent discussion of the issue, Smith sees this as central to 
understanding the role of the Lords Spiritual,
620
 and it has informed many 
considerations of reform of that role.
621
 To that extent, the position is very similar to 
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that of the Lord Bishop. The multinational nature of the United Kingdom, as opposed 
to the Isle of Man, adds a slight complication however. The Church of England is one 
Established church in the United Kingdom. Arguably the Church of Scotland is also 
Established, and this has led to proposals for “the inclusion of the Moderator of the 
Church of Scotland [to rectify] an injustice to the Established Church north of the 
border”.622 
The Lords Spiritual sit as representatives of a religious organisation, the 
Church of England, rather than a religious community. As with the Lord Bishop, the 
same evidence that indicates the Lords Spiritual have an integral role, indicate that it 
is an organisational representation. 
The Lords Spiritual have a weak interdenominational role. Bromhead saw the 
contributions of Archbishop Fisher, for instance, as “on behalf of the Church, and 
perhaps organised Christianity in general”.623 Contributing to a collection of essays in 
1954, Archbishop Garret thought that “[i]ncreasingly when the Bishops speak they are 
not only representing their own Church, but the great body of Christian opinion in the 
nation”.624 Brown saw more than 60% of Bishops’ interventions between 1979 and 
1987 as involving Church or Christian interests.
625
 In a recent passage quoted in the 
following paragraph, the Church of England describes its role in Parliament as 
encompassing speaking for other denominations. Although a definitive finding on this 
point will require a detailed study similar to that carried out of Tynwald, it seems 
likely that the interdenominational role is similar in both legislatures. It will be 
recalled, however, that the Manx Church has long been a minority denomination in 
the Island. 
The Lords may, in contrast to the Lord Bishop, have a weak inter-religious 
role. Certainly this is a role that has been claimed by the Church of England itself. In a 
detailed response to the Royal Commission considering reform of the House of Lords, 
it argued: “Bishops will be found speaking not just for the Church of England but for 
its partners in other Christian churches, and for people of other faiths and none”.626 As 
we have seen, a similar claim for the Lord Bishop is not supported by the evidence of 
the debates. We might expect to find this role being carried out more in multifaith 
Britain than Christian Mann, however, and some evidence supports this role. Lord 
Jakobovits, a life peer, has said that “[i]t does not bother me that as a rabbi I exercise 
less authority than the bishops. I often wish that the Anglican bishops had more 
influence and spoke with greater authority”.627 This may indicate that the work of the 
Lords Spiritual is seen as broadly religious, and there is evidence in recent debates of 
attempts by them to represent non-Christian religious interests.
628
 Accordingly, while 
some commentators have doubted the willingness or ability of the Bishops to fully 
perform an inter-religious role,
629
 the possibility that the Lords Spiritual carry out this 
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role to a greater extent than the Lord Bishop needs to be left open, and may constitute 
a difference between the two roles. 
The Lords Spiritual are appointed by an organisation, the Church of England. 
As with the Manx Church, this is complicated by the role of Royal patronage – 
exercised on the binding advice of the Prime Minister – in making the appointment. 
Nonetheless, once a Bishop has been appointed by the Church’s own procedures, 
there is no discretion in any State actor as to whether a Bishop becomes a member of 
the Lords. 
The Lords Spiritual sit as corporate rather than individual representatives, a 
marked contrast to the Lord Bishop. This should not be overstated, and in particular it 
would be erroneous to view the bishops’ bench as equivalent to a political party, with 
a party line and an interest in the number of votes cast on central issues. The Church 
of England has described the bishops as “primarily independent local leaders”.630 In 
his consideration of their group life, Brown comes close to endorsing with those who 
saw their group  behaviour as “both inconsistent and spasmodic”.631 This comes from 
an institutional priority for a bishop speaking on an issue of concern, “no matter what 
he may actually say”.632 Similarly, the bishops do not sit in groups, or vote in large 
numbers, even on key debates. With their range of other duties across England, the 
emphasis is upon ensuring a representation, not upon a volume of attendance.
633
 
Nonetheless,corporate representation opens up two possibilties closed to the 
individual Lord Bishop. First, there is the possibility of dividing the legislative duties 
between the Lords Spiritual, and allowing individual bishops to develop legislative 
specialisms. There is some evidence of an institutional attempt to do just this, 
although the emphasis is on ensuring an ecclesiastical voice, with specialists called in 
only when the duty bishop (present for prayers), cannot fulfil that role.
634
 Second, the 
differences between successive Lord Bishops can be replicated by contemporaneous 
Lords Spiritual – developing different areas of interest,635 contributing to debate on 
different topics,
636
 and even voting on different sides in the same issue. The pattern of 
representation of ecclesiastical views by a single bishop, or a handful of bishops, 
make this less significant than it would otherwise be. These remain, however, 
potentially important differences. 
The Lords Spiritual constitute a smaller percentage of the chamber than the 
Lord Bishop, although this has been increased with the exclusion of many hereditary 
peers from the House, and the subsequent reduction in total size. The House remains, 
however, an unusually large second chamber.
637
 At 4%, rather than 11%, we would 
expect to see fewer decisive votes in the UK than in the Island, particularly given the 
small number of Lords Spiritual present for any vote. Brown’s study of 1979-1987 
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found one decisive vote, but observed that if all the Lords Spiritual had voted with the 
bishop who attended, this would have risen to 63.
638
 Despite the small percentage of 
religious representatives in the House, a number of commentators have seen 
representation as already disproportionate, and fear that extension of representation to 
other religious communities would exacerbate the problem.
639
 Unlike the Lord 
Bishop, whose individual representation is either permitted or not, these concerns 
have led to debate over the number of bishops who should sit, with a reduction having 
been repeatedly suggested.
640
 
The Lords Spiritual, like the Lord Bishop, appear from the secondary sources 
to have a distinctive role in debates. As with the Lord Bishop, the Lords Spiritual are 
entitled to contribute to all the work of the House, and since the 1960s have done 
so.
641
 As with the Lord Bishop, however, we can see a special focus on the law of the 
Church of England, moral issues, and non-partisanship. Commentary tends to take for 
granted the role of the bishops in dealing with ecclesiastical business before the 
House,
642
 but this has been seen by others as sufficiently important to justify their 
presence in the House.
643
 Commentators, and the Church itself, have repeatedly seen 
the Lords Spiritual as bringing a special voice to bear on moral issues. In his 
discussion of the Lords Spiritual, Weare saw some bishops as limiting their 
contributions to moral or social welfare or education.
644
 Drewry and Brock likewise 
saw a role developing in relation to social, ethical and moral issues – in practise a very 
broad category.
645
 Winetrobe and Gay, writing in 1999, saw a continuing involvement 
in social and moral matters,
646
 a view endorsed by the Church of England submission 
to Wakeham. The Church saw the bishops as bringing a thoughtful concern with 
ethical principles to bear on all public and private issues.
647
 In the most recent 
consideration of the issue, Smith saw the debate over the Lords Spiritual as 
constructing them as specialists able to provide the House with expertise when 
discussing social, philosophical and theological issues.
648
 The non-partisan nature of 
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the Lords Spiritual, at least in the twentieth century, is also stressed by the sources.
649
 
Doubts have been expressed as to whether the Church of England will have its own, 
partisan, political agenda.
650
 In any case, it should be noted that non-partisan does not 
mean non-political, and that the backgrounds of the bishops may be seen as closing 
off some lines of argument.
651
 During the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832, for 
instance, their work in the Lords “cast them in the role of the most entrenched 
reactionaries. The palace of the Bishop of Bristol was burned down, and the 
Archbishop of Canterbury was assaulted with a dead cat”.652 
Nonetheless, the role of the Lords Spiritual in relation to non-partisan 
involvement in moral debates, and the provision of specialist guidance on 
ecclesiastical business before the House, seems very similar to that of the Lord Bishop 
in Tynwald. Additionally, they have a further specialist role by its nature absent from 
Tynwald, the representation of the regions in Westminster. Because of their diocesan 
base, this has been seen as an important justification for their role by the Church 
itself.
653
 During 1979-1987, Brown saw 21% of their contributions as concerning 
diocesan and regional issues.
654
 
Finally, it may be that the Lords Spiritual are able to use moral or religious 
modes of argumentation with greater ease than other members of the legislature.
655
 If 
this is the case then, like the Lord Bishop, this is unlikely to take the form of detailed 
theological analysis. Rather, they seek to offer “a voice of spiritual and moral 
concern”,656 using their role “if not for the expounding of theology then at least for the 
articulation of a wide cultural concensus based historically on the Christian 
tradition”.657 
It appears, therefore, that while there are instructive and significant differences 
between religious representation in Tynwald and Parliament, the two forms are 
sufficiently close together to allow investigation of one to benefit from work carried 
out on the other. 
IV.2 The impact of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Human Rights Act 2001. 
The relationship between the Isle of Man and the European Convention on 
Human Rights has not always been an easy one. The Crown, acting on the advice of 
the United Kingdom rather than the Manx executive, is responsible for the 
international relations of the Isle of Man. This includes creating international 
agreements binding upon the Island. Such agreements do not, of themselves, have 
legal force within the Manx legal system, although they can influence the 
interpretation and development of Manx law.
658
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Since 1950, when entering into international agreements the United Kingdom 
government has proceeded on the basis that the Island is not covered by an agreement 
unless it has been expressly included.
659
 The Island was, however, expressly included 
when the United Kingdom ratified the Convention, and accepted the right of 
individual application. This right, which allows individuals to bring alleged violations 
of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Convention to an international judicial 
body, was made use of in Tyrer v United Kingdom.
660
 As a result, the practice of 
judicial corporal punishment in the Isle of Man ceased,
661
 although in theory the birch 
could be applied in a suitable case.
662
 As a reaction to Tyrer, the right of individual 
application was allowed to lapse. In 1993, as part of a general programme of law 
reform intended to bring Manx law into line with the Convention and so allow the 
restoration of the right of individual application, corporal punishment was effectively 
abolished by Act of Tynwald. 
663
 
In 1993, although Tynwald was prepared to make a number of significant 
changes to particular areas of Manx law in order to meet the Crown’s obligations 
under the Convention, adoption of a general Bill of Rights was rejected.
664
 Following 
the passage of the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998, which was intended to 
provide mechanisms to give effect to Convention rights in United Kingdom laws, 
Tynwald reconsidered the issue. The Human Rights Act 2001 is modelled on the 
earlier United Kingdom legislation, with similar provisions to increase the role of the 
Convention in statutory interpretation,
665
 and mechanisms for formally addressing 
incompatibility between legislation in the Isle of Man and provisions of the 
Convention;
666
 and restricting the actions of public authorities by declaring acts in 
contravention of Convention commitments to generally be unlawful.
667
 As with the 
United Kingdom Act, the Act includes special provisions dealing with freedom of 
expression and religious rights.
668
 The latter provision, section 12, is identical to the 
Human Rights Act 1998 s.13.
669
 
Thus, we can see that not only is the ECHR a regional human rights system 
with a developing body of authoritative jurisprudence generated by international 
judicial bodies, but it is also one that has been given unique power in the Manx legal 
system. Accordingly, a consideration of international law and the role of the Lord 
Bishop may usefully focus on the provisions of the Convention. 
Three related questions need to be considered. Firstly, is religious 
representation in the national legislature permitted under the Convention? If it is not, 
then discussion of the following two questions is largely redundant. We argue below 
that religious representation is compatible with the Convention, so long as the 
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fundamental rights of members of other religious communities are respected. 
Secondly, is the gender bar on the Bishop permitted under the Convention while the 
Bishop has a seat in the national legislature? We will argue that, although the Manx 
Church may limit the gender of the Bishop in his ecclesiastical role, it is less clear that 
this bar is compatible with the Convention when applied to a member of the national 
legislature. This is not necessarily an argument against the role of the Bishop in 
Tynwald, but retention of that role may necessitate a change in the internal rules of 
the Manx Church. Thirdly, is religious representation of the Manx Church permitted 
when no other religious organisation or community is represented? We will argue that 
although there are burdens for other religious communities, these are not sufficient to 
render the differential treatment of the Manx Church religious discrimination against 
the excluded communities. 
 (i) Is representation of a religious organisation permitted under 
the Convention? 
The Convention includes an obligation upon the State to hold elections to 
legislatures. By Article 3 of the First Protocol the States “undertake to hold free 
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure 
the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature”. At first glance, this 
provision might seem to pose a serious challenge to the present Legislative Council, 
and in particular the role of the Bishop. It is, however, “an extraordinarily weak 
formulation”,670 which has been interpreted to allow legislatures to include members 
who have not been directly elected. In Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium,
671
 the 
Court was required to consider whether the details of Belgian electoral law satisfied 
Article 3. French-speakers elected by direct universal suffrage were confronted with 
the choice between being a member of the French group in the national assembly (and 
consequent exclusion from the regional council), or surrendering their national 
influence on behalf of their language group in order to participate in regional affairs. 
The majority found no violation of Article 3. The principal judgment of the Court 
including a suggestion that the Article applied to elections to the legislature “or at 
least one of its chambers if it has two or more”.672 In his concurring opinion, Farinha J 
disagreed, and although he thought the question of bicameral legislatures should be 
left to another day, he preferred “or at least one of its chambers if it has two or more, 
on the two-fold condition that the majority of the membership is elected and that the 
chamber or chambers whose members are not elected does not or do not have greater 
powers than the chambers that is freely elected by secret ballot”.673 His preferred 
formulation was intended to prevent structures at variance to the will of the people, 
which “might even lead to a corporative, elitist or class system which did not respect 
democracy”. Even this more expansive view of the role of the Article would support 
the current Legislative Council. States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation even in 
areas which clearly engage Article 3 issues,
674
 and a number of State legislatures 
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include second chambers which are not directly elected – for instance the House of 
Lords in the United Kingdom; and the Irish Seanad.
675
   
It is difficult to argue, therefore, that the Convention prohibits religious 
representation in the second chamber of the national legislature because of 
incompatibility with the principle of free election. This does not, however, show that 
such a scheme is compatible with the Convention. The place of the Bishop could 
constitute a violation of Convention rights held by the Bishop, by other members of 
the Manx Church, or by those outside the Manx Church. 
It may be argued that the Bishop’s role in the Council carries within it the 
possibility of violation of a Bishop’s Article 9 rights to freedom of religion. Let us say 
that a Bishop converts to a non-Christian religion and, as a result, loses his 
ecclesiastical office.
676
 Because his place in Tynwald is ex officio, he will 
simultaneously lose this place – he is ejected from the national legislature because of 
his religious conversion. Although there are no decisions directly on point, there is 
enough related jurisprudence to say with some confidence that this removal would not 
be in violation of the Convention. As a general principle, a worker faced with a 
conflict between his duties and his religious convictions cannot insist on being 
allowed to continue employment, but with modifications to accommodate their 
religious needs.
677
 In particular, a religious professional cannot insist on being 
allowed to retain a religious post, and to adopt convictions incompatible with the 
religious organisation which controls the post. In Knudsen v Norway, 
678
 the applicant 
was a vicar who refused to perform some of the duties of his post, as a protest against 
Norway’s abortion law. The Commission dealt with his Article 9 claim in categorical 
terms: “The Commission finds that a clergyman within a State Church system has not 
only religious duties but has also accepted certain obligations towards the State. If the 
requirements imposed upon him by the State should be in conflict with his 
convictions, he is free to relinquish his office as clergyman within the State Church, 
and the Commission regards this as an ultimate guarantee of his right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion”. This approach also applies if the clerics 
disagreement is a theological one. In Karlsson v Sweden,
679
 the applicant was a priest 
in the Swedish national church. He was a ‘gammal kyrklighet’, opposed to the 
ordination of women. During an interview for a position, he was asked whether he 
would be willing to cooperate with a female cleric. He did not address the question, 
doubting the authority of the interviews to ask this, and was found unqualified for the 
post. He claimed a violation of his Article 9 rights. The Commission found that 
Article 9 did not include “the right of a clergyman, within the framework of a church 
in which he is working or to which he applies for a post to practise a special religious 
conception”, so that the Church was not obliged to accept him for the post. Any 
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conflict between personal conviction and the requirements of the Church could be 
resolved by the cleric leaving his post, “and the Commission regards this as an 
ultimate guarantee of his right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion”.  
So, the individual who is the Bishop takes on a combination of ecclesiastical 
and State duties (one of which is to sit in Tynwald). If these become incompatible 
with his religious beliefs, his religious interests can be safeguarded by leaving the 
post. A more recent decision of the Grand Chamber can be reconciled with this view. 
In Buscarini v San Marino,
680
 the applicants had been required to take an oath “on the 
Holy Gospels” before taking their elected seats in the national legislature. The Court 
found that this constituted a burden upon their Article 9 rights, “since it required them 
to swear allegiance to a particular religion on pain of forfeiting their parliamentary 
seats”, and needed to be justified under Article 9(2). The oath “was tantamount to 
requiring two elected representatives of the people to swear allegiance to a particular 
religion, a requirement which is not compatible with Article 9 of the Convention. As 
the Commission rightly stated in its report, it would be contradictory to make the 
exercise of a mandate intended to represent different views of society within 
Parliament subject to a prior declaration of commitment to a particular set of beliefs”. 
Although an important decision in relation to religious tests for members of the 
legislature, Buscarini has no application to our, hypothetical, heretical Bishop. The 
Court stressed the electoral mandate of the applicants, which would be absent for the 
Bishop. More fundamentally, it cannot be argued that requiring the ex officio 
representative of the Manx Church to accept the tenets of that Church contains any 
internal contradiction. 
A slightly different focus would be upon the rights of individual members of 
the Manx Church. If we take the view that ex officio representation in the national 
legislature is a benefit to the community represented, it would seem a non sequitur to 
argue that members of the community thereby suffer damage to a Convention right. 
The jurisprudence of the Convention does not suggest that entanglement with the 
State is necessarily destructive to the interests of a religious community or 
organisation, and a number of cases can be found which endorse relationships that a 
strict separation of Church and State would preclude. For instance, the line of State 
church cases discussed above could be decided only if dual appointment as a religious 
professional and servant of the State was acceptable under the Convention. But if 
entanglement is not necessarily a burden, it may still be that in a particular case such a 
burden can be found. 
In the Manx context, the strongest argument is that the role of the Bishop in 
Tynwald serves to support the hierarchical organisation of the Manx Church, 
effectively giving State approval and influence to the head of the organisation, and so 
strengthening his position against more egalitarian movements within the community. 
This would depend upon evidence that the Bishop’s legislative role supported the 
hierarchical position, rather than emerging from it – the strongest evidence from our 
study concerns the continued survival of the Diocese, which is a rather different point. 
Even if this were shown, it is unlikely that the Convention requires States to avoid 
policy decisions which support particular structural preferences within religious 
communities. In any case, individual members of the Manx Church who do not 
approve of its structures can safeguard their Article 9 rights by leaving the Manx 
Church, and their Article 11 rights by forming an organisation truer to their values. If 
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Convention rights are not implicated by this structural support, s.12 arguments cannot 
be raised. 
An alternative argument based on the rights of members of the Manx Church 
can be built on the gender bar – by granting legislative power to the an official who, 
under the Manx Church’s internal rules, can only be male, Tynwald reinforces 
discrimination against women, and the exclusion of women from positions of 
authority in public life. This point is discussed at length in the following section.  
Finally, it may be argued that the role of the Bishop infringes on the human 
rights of members of other religious communities. It may be argued that to represent 
the Manx Church, but not other religious communities, in Tynwald constitutes 
discrimination on the grounds of religion, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. 
We will explore this further in a following section, as it may equally be used as an 
argument for the further representation of religious communities, rather than the 
exclusion of the Bishop. A conclusion that representing only the Manx Church 
constituted a violation of Article 14 would not, ipso facto, lead to the conclusion that 
representation of the Bishop is contrary to the Convention, as it might be possible to 
overcome the objection by increasing the religious communities represented in the 
Legislative Council. 
(ii) Is the gender bar on the religious representative permitted 
under the Convention?  
Since 1994 a woman has been able to be ordained as a priest in the Church of 
England and Manx Church,
681
 but no woman may be consecrated as Bishop.
682
 
Although it has been suggested that there have been “tentative moves towards 
consecrating women as bishops”,683 this would require a legal change. There is thus 
no route by which female members of the Church, including professional clergy, can 
become eligible for the office. Accordingly, of the places in the Manx legislature, the 
Bishop’s is unique in being de jure reserved for men. This is clearly differential 
treatment on the grounds of gender. Is it permitted under the Convention? 
The principal provision is Article 14 of the Convention. Article 14 provides: 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status”. This does not constitute a general 
prohibition on sex discrimination, but rather a protection against such discrimination 
in respect of Convention rights. A measure which is in conformity with the central 
Convention right involved (for instance, religious rights under Article 9), may infringe 
the Convention when that right is “read in conjunction with Article 14, for the reason 
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that it is of a discriminatory nature”.684 Not every instance of differential treatment is 
discrimination, however, as the State may seek to justify the treatment. This will fail if 
the distinction has no objective and reasonable justification, or there is no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised.
685
 
In Williamson v UK, 
686
 the applicant was a priest in the Church of England. 
He objected to the ordination of women as heretical, productive of schism, and 
unlawful. Before the Commission, he argued that the ordination violated his Article 9 
rights. The Commission rejected his arguments on the basis that his freedom of 
conscience could be protected by leaving the Church of England, endorsing the line of 
authorities noted above. Additionally: “the Commission recalls that Article 14 of the 
Convention prohibits discrimination in connection with Convention rights, and one of 
the aims of the Church of England in permitting the ordination of women was 
undoubtedly to achieve greater equality between men and women in that Church’s 
hierarchy … The Commission … finds that the Synod’s concern to abide by its view 
of scriptures can be regarded as coming within the meaning of ‘protection of … 
morals’, and the Synod’s wish to treat women equally can be regarded as necessary 
for the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’”. This may suggest that 
women clergy in the Manx Church have a right to the same treatment as male clergy, 
so that the bar on the consecration of women bishops is contrary to the Convention. 
Williamson can, however, be limited. In that case a powerful body within the 
Church of England had found that it was a legitimate understanding of the doctrines 
of the Church that women could be ordained. Thus, the differential treatment could 
not be justified as respecting the internal doctrines and structures of the religious 
community. The Court has been unsympathetic to arguments justifying the State 
taking action to favour a particular internal order within a religious community, 
687
 but 
has recognised the importance of internal structures to the community itself. In Hasan 
and Chaush v Bulgaria,
688
 a Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
considered the removal by the State of  the Chief Mufti. The Court found: “The Court 
recalls that religious communities traditionally and universally exist in the form of 
organised structures. They abide by rules which are often seen by followers as being 
of a divine origin. Religious ceremonies have their meaning and sacred value for the 
believers if they have been conducted by ministers empowered for that purpose in 
compliance with these rules. The personality of the religious ministers is undoubtedly 
of importance to every member of the community. Participation in the life of the 
community is thus a manifestation of one's religion, protected by Article 9 of the 
Convention. Where the organisation of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 
of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of Article 11, which safeguards 
associative life against unjustified State interference. Seen in this perspective, the 
believers' right to freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that the 
community will be allowed to function peacefully, free from arbitrary State 
intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities is 
indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue at the very 
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heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. It directly concerns not only the 
organisation of the community as such but also the effective enjoyment of the right to 
freedom of religion by all its active members. Were the organisational life of the 
community not protected by Article 9 of the Convention, all other aspects of the 
individual's freedom of religion would become vulnerable.”689  The Court has recently 
reiterated this in Affaire Eglise Metropolitan de Bessarabie et autres c. Moldova, 
where the Court found that “[i]n effect, the autonomy of religious communities is 
indispensable to pluralism in a democratic society, and this finds itself at the heart of 
the protection offered by Article 9”.690 Accordingly, the Court would have to give a 
strong emphasis to the right to non-discrimination on the grounds of gender over the 
right to religious self-determination in order to find the gender bar on the Bishop to be 
contrary to the Convention. 
If Convention organs are unlikely to require religious organisations to comply 
with non-discrimination norms, the Manx courts are less likely to apply the Human 
Rights Act in this way on their own initiative. In his review of United Kingdom 
precedents, Hill has identified a discernable reluctance by the courts to become 
involved in adjudicating disputes with a doctrinal element within religious 
communities generally, and this can be seen even in relation to the Church of 
England.
691
 There are no direct Manx precedents. The closest case is Halsall v 
Jones,
692
 where Deemster Cowley found that: “in all matters spiritual, no distinction is 
to be drawn between the Church of England in the United Kingdom and in the Isle of 
Man” (at 278), and so on the basis of the English cases found that the Bishop had an 
absolute authority to refuse an ordination. Given the importance of English cases in 
determining novel issues, and the similarities between the two jurisdictions here, we 
would expect to find a similar respect for religious autonomy in the Manx courts. In 
particular, in both jurisdictions a clause in the Human Rights Act requires particular 
regard to be had to the impact upon religious organisations of rights claims. Although 
the effect of this clause is opaque, it certainly will not reduce the preference for 
autonomy. 
Finding that religious organisations may depart from Convention norms 
internally does not, however, end this discussion. The Bishop is a public official not 
only in that a professional role in a State Church can involve public duties, but also in 
that he sits in the national legislature. He owes his seat to his place in the internal 
structures of the Manx Church, but contributing to Tynwald is a public role. The 
arguments based on internal autonomy of a religious community here are very much 
weaker, and the importance of gender equality much stronger. In particular, by 
analogy with the cases on freedom of conscience for ministers, the Manx Church may 
not be required to accept State views as to equality between the genders – if the 
possibility of a female Bishop is essential to the continued role, the Manx Church can 
protect its doctrines by asking for the Bishop to be removed from the Legislative 
Council; or by voluntarily modifying its internal structures to create such an 
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opportunity. Given that Convention organs have endorsed non-discrimination as a 
policy goal, and the small proportion of the legislature who are in practice female, a 
challenge to the composition of Tynwald may stand some chance of success. 
(iii) Is representation of the Manx Church, and no other religious 
organisation, permitted under the Convention? 
 
If our study suggests that this form of representation is permitted under the 
ECHR, a further question will then arise – does the ECHR require such 
representation? The ECHR contains a number of positive obligations upon States, but 
it is not obvious that this includes a duty to provide a voting place in the national 
legislature to religious organisations. If this is a requirement, then all States except the 
United Kingdom and Andorra are in contravention of their obligations under the 
Convention in respect of all religious communities; the United Kingdom in 
contravention for all but the Church of England and the Manx Church; and Andorra 
for all but the Catholic Church. 
A stronger argument, again based on non-discrimination, focuses on the 
position of the Manx Church in relation to other religious communities and 
organizations in the Isle of Man. It may be that representation of the Manx Church 
alone constitutes unacceptable discrimination against those of other communities. 
This will need to be resolved primarily in terms of an establishment/discrimination 
analysis. 
The principal concern here is the extent to which the representation of the 
Manx Church, while other communities are excluded, has an disproportionate impact 
on those communities. Darby v Sweden,
693
 the most important case on the distinction 
between (lawful) establishment and (unlawful) religious discrimination focussed on 
the impact upon the individual dissident within the context of a national church. In 
particular, “no one may be compelled to be involved directly in religious activities 
against his will”, which could include being made to pay a Church tax to a State 
church while not being a member. The role of the Lord Bishop does not have such an 
obvious impact on the life of those outside the Manx Church. 
Nonetheless, in the United Kingdom debate it has been largely assumed that 
representing the Church of England, but not other communities, constitutes unjust 
discrimination. Since the start of the twentieth century, commentators have pointed 
out the difficulties of extending religious representation to other groups. An early, and 
pithy, example, is Ramsey who in 1910 wrote on extending representation: “the 
difficulties of embodying the suggestion in a concrete proposal are so great as to be 
probably insurmountable. It might be possible for the Roman Catholic bishops to 
attend the meeting of the House … But certainly the hard working, and for the most 
part meanly-paid, ministers of the Dissenting Churches could not possibly find time to 
attend to the duties of a legislator, unless indeed the privilege of election was confined 
to London ministry, a proposal which would not be likely to arouse any wild 
enthusiasm in Wales, Scotland, the North of Ireland, or the English Provincial cities. 
More difficult still, how are the numbers and allocation of those representatives to be 
determined? Will the representatives of each sect or group of sects be proportionate to 
the number of their adherents and, if so, how are those numbers to be computed? Are 
all the sects named in Whittaker to be represented? If not, how and where is the line to 
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be drawn? The legislator who tries to draw it will find that he has put his hand into the 
hornet’s nest”.694 
Following the proposals of the Royal Commission that the Lords Spiritual 
should be joined by representatives of other denominations, and of other faiths, a 
number of commentators argued that it would be impossible to accommodate other 
communities. This led to the Government rejecting extension of religious 
representation because of the practical difficulties, principally: lack of a hierarchy in 
many denominations and faiths which could easily identify the representative; the 
theological objections of some groups to the link with the State; the large number of 
denominations and faiths making representation by a comparatively small group of 
representatives difficult, especially if larger groups were to receive multiple 
representatives; and the difficulties of identifying a single representative in a 
heterogenous faith community.
695
 To these concerns we can add the difference 
between these communities and the national and Established Church;
696
 the impact of 
the distinction between “the smallest denomination allowed to nominate and the 
largest denomination not allowed to nominate”;697 defining what a religious group 
is;
698
 the “problem of fair representation of those who declare they have no 
religion”;699 and the danger that religious representation will be partisan.700 
Some of these concerns are overstated, even in the United Kingdom context. 
The inability (because of their hierarchical choices) or unwillingness (because of their 
theological choices) of some groups to take up representation may not preclude other 
communities from doing so. Sensitivity in dealing with individual groups could 
overcome some of these difficulties – for instance appointing a Roman Catholic 
bishop to represent English Catholics, but a lay representative for Scottish 
Catholics.
701
 The problems of any individual representing a faith community apply to 
all religious communities, although they are exacerbated in some. The national role of 
the Church of England is not necessarily accepted by non-members – for some, it may 
have “a national presence, but this does not confer on it a nationally representative 
role”.702 The distinction between large and small groups, when we are operating on 
the groups right level, is not very unusual – consider for instance the impact of some 
systems of proportional representation on the largest group too small to be entitled to 
a member. The problem of those who will declare that they have no religion is a real 
one, but it is not the distinction between atheisms and other theisms. A scheme for 
religious representation could embrace what have been called “thinking 
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disbelievers”703 so long as they were sufficiently restrictive on doctrine (for instance 
on the ontological status of a metaphysical reality), and some form of community 
ethos. The real problem is those who hold religious beliefs – whether theist, atheist, or 
pantheist – but are insufficiently organised to be seen as a religious community. 
Nonetheless, these are very serious objections to extending religious 
representation beyond the established episcopalian churches of the United Kingdom 
and the Isle of Man. Some commentators have seen this as leading to the removal of 
the Lords Spiritual – if it is not possible to represent other religions ex officio, then it 
becomes necessary to remove what religious representation there is to avoid “the 
inequity of lack of representation of other denominations”.704 The same arguments 
could be used against schemes which extend religious representation to close analogs 
of the Lords Spiritual only – officers appointed to leadership roles of religious 
organisations such as the Moderator of the Church of Scotland.
705
 Alternatively, we 
could see the practicality of the Lord Bishop sitting in Tynwald as a distinction 
between him and representatives of other religious communities. Taking that 
approach, allowing the Lord Bishop to sit is differential treatment, but not unjust 
discrimination. The other key factor is the cost of the differential treatment to those 
excluded. What are the costs of exclusion from the legislature for other religious 
groups? 
In a later section we discuss the benefits to the Manx Church of representation. 
In a corporate sense, other communities suffer the lack of these benefits. Perhaps most 
tellingly, if the representation of the Manx Church has positive messages for the 
involvement of the Manx Church with the State, it is difficult to see how exclusion of 
other communities cannot carry a negative message. This would, however, seem 
intrinsic in the idea of a national Church – controversial in mainstream United States 
constitutional thought for instance, but entirely accepted under the ECHR. This 
suggests that the symbolic impact of non-representation is unlikely to be given great 
weight. More pragmatically, members of other communities may lack easy access to 
the legislative process. Given the interdenominational role of the Bishop, and the 
willingness of other members to put forward spiritual perspectives, this is also 
unlikely to be given great weight. 
Accordingly, and particularly in the context of a national legislature emerging 
from colonialism, the ECHR is unlikely to be interpreted as prohibiting representation 
of the Manx Church, and the Manx Church alone. It must be stressed, however, that 
this does not close the debate, or indicate that such special treatment cannot be unjust 
and discriminatory. A practice may be lawful, particularly in the context of an 
international legal regime seeking to ensure minimum standards across a diverse 
range of sovereign states, without being right. Deciding whether the place of the 
Bishop is justified must, inevitably, move beyond the legal question of whether it is 
lawful. 
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IV.3 Justifying the Bishop’s role. 
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the theoretical basis for the 
presence of the Bishop has not been developed in detail. It seems to us that the most 
likely explanation for his original presence lies not in his Barony, but in the decision 
of the Lord to summon him to join his Council. Although this may explain his 
presence as one officer amongst many, it does not provide a justification for his 
survival. With the placing of the Council on a statutory basis, all members owe their 
place to Act of Tynwald. The preceding review of the Bishop’s role allows us to 
evaluate in more detail the justifications for his distinctive place in Council. It seems 
to us that arguments put forward by the Manx Church, contributors to debates in 
Tynwald, reformers and commentators on the Lords Spiritual and the United 
Kingdom, and the project team, can usefully be divided into four broad categories.
706
 
Firstly, there are arguments which require acceptance of a particular 
metaphysical context to carry any weight. For instance: that the presence of the 
Bishop in the organs of the State was mandated by the will of God, or a godly way of 
organising the Church-Nation; or that the Bishop would, by virtue of his office, be 
granted a supernaturally acute understanding of the business before Tynwald; or that 
there is a higher power to which legislatures will be held accountable, and of who 
they need to be reminded.
707
 The difficulty with these types of argument is that they 
require the State to endorse a particular understanding of metaphysical reality, and so 
depart considerably from the ideal of neutrality between religions.
708
 It is unsurprising 
that these types of argument are very rarely deployed in the public sphere, beyond a 
brief reference to the Lord Bishop’s mission “to advance the Kingdom of God in a 
Christian country”. Because of the problems of shared context necessary to engage 
with these arguments, they are not taken account of in this analysis. Neither, for the 
same reasons, are arguments that the Bishop should be taken to represent errors as to 
the content of metaphysical reality. 
Secondly, there are arguments related to the legislative process – in other 
words that the participation of the Bishop in the legislative process leads to more 
efficient consideration and processing of potential legislation and/or results in a higher 
quality of final legislation. For instance: that the Bishop brings a more cosmopolitan 
perspective to the Council, or that he contributes technical expertise in relation to the 
Manx Church. These process based arguments have been deployed in relation to the 
Bishop. It seems a legitimate, generally comprehensible, aim to improve the 
efficiency of the legislative process, and the quality of the final product. 
Thirdly, there are arguments related to the broader interests of the State and 
society. Although it can be assumed that the process benefits above also constitute a 
benefit to the State as a whole, this category addresses benefits outside of the 
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legislative process. For instance: that his role serves to underpin the traditions and 
autonomy of the Island, or that it encourages compliance with the law by members of 
the Manx Church. These public benefit arguments can be seen in the Manx debates. It 
is, once again, a legitimate aim to seek to secure benefits for the public generally 
through the composition of the national legislature. 
Finally, there are arguments related to the interests of the represented 
community – in this case the Manx Church and Manx Christianity more broadly. To 
some extent, this is bound to overlap with the preceding category. Members of the 
Manx Church, and even more Manx Christians, are a substantial proportion of the 
population. Benefits to them can constitute a form of public benefit because of the 
number of beneficiaries or lead to indirect benefits – for instance, benefits to the 
Manx Church might encourage a feeling of belonging and citizenship amongst its 
members, which we can see as a public good. The distinction here is that these 
benefits are directly available only to members of the represented community. To take 
a pragmatic analogy, tax relief for charitable giving is intended to benefit the public as 
a whole by encouraging acts carrying with them a public benefit. It would be fair, 
however, to categorise the money saved because of such tax relief as a benefit to the 
individual who is saving the money. Examples of these community benefits include 
an entitlement for the community because of its traditional links with the State, or a 
route by which the leaders of the community can deploy argumentation to defend 
interests such as Church property. The legitimacy of composing the national 
legislature in order to accord benefits to a subset of the nation is less self-evident than 
in the preceding two categories. Nonetheless, we could see the territorial principal in 
relation to election of MHKs in a similar light. Although MHKs act in the national 
interest, rather than in the interest of their constituency, they frequently raise issues 
directly concerning their constituency; and are elected by this territorial community. 
(a) Process arguments. 
There are a number of different ways of seeing the role of the Bishop as 
improving the legislative process.  
Firstly, the unique way in which the Bishop is appointed to the Council, and 
holds office, results in degree of insultation from normal political life, and a non-
partisan voice in the legislature; his place in the Council until retirement also lends an 
element of continuity and stability to the membership of the Council which – in sharp 
contrast to the House of Lords where the Lords Spiritual are the only members who 
do not serve for life – is otherwise subject to change at regular intervals. He is not 
accountable to colleagues for what he says, as would be the case if he were in a 
formal voting bloc; nor is he accountable to any electorate, as would be the case if he 
were an independent member appointed for a fixed term by either the Manx 
population, or the House of Keys. Thus he is free to contribute to debates in a way 
which is divorced from these pressures, and with no fear of courting disapproval of a 
party or electorate because of his contributions. As Spencer put it, trenchantly, 
isolation from an electorate renders a legislator “inaccessible to an influence which, 
more than any other, corrupts and degrades members of the House of Commons – the 
fear of losing their seats if they vote according to their honest judgment”.709 Against 
these advantages, the unaccountability of the Bishop to any Manx organs might be 
seen, and at the end of the twentieth century frequently was seen, as undemocratic in a 
nation seeking to develop and maintain autonomy. In particular, it should be 
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remembered that the Bishop is, despite his long tenure, an appointee of someone – in 
the Manx context, the Crown acting upon the advice of a United Kingdom minister, 
albeit after consulation with organs of the Manx Church and the Church of England. 
Equally, if having one or more unaccountable members in the Council is seen 
as improving the process, there may be other ways in which this could be achieved. 
Perhaps the most modest way forward would be for some members of the Council to 
be hold office for a single, extremely long, term. Although they would have to 
command sufficient support – currently in the Keys - for their initial appointment, 
once appointed they could act free of the threat of removal by party bloc or electorate. 
Although this would have the advantage of putting initial appointment into Manx 
hands, it could increase the non-partisan nature of the unaccountable members. An 
alternative would be to appoint long-term members to the Council by lottery, or 
through a hereditary principle, or through some other non-volitional method of 
selection.
710
 Neither of these alternatives, however, would guarantee replicating the 
non-partisan autonomy of the Bishop. It will be recalled that, on the one instance of 
partisan contribution we found, the reaction against the Bishop was very strong. This 
expectation appears to have been internalised by Bishops – who are after all 
individuals aware of acting within a long tradition, and within a sophisticated 
ecclesiastical structure which carries with it serious expectations of appropriate 
episcopal conduct. The Bishop is unaccountable, and so arguably contributes a 
uniquely independent voice to the legislative process, but does not thereby act without 
restraint. Other systems of unaccountable membership may not be able to strike the 
same balance. 
Secondly, the technical expertise of the Bishop in relation to the Manx Church 
provides the Council with an in-house technical expertise on that Church, analogous 
to the expertise of the Attorney-General on Manx law. As we identified earlier, this 
has undoubtedly been an important part of the Bishop’s work in Tynwald. It is not an 
argument that has found favour with the Bishops themselves, however, as it 
potentially suggests a narrow role for the Bishop. If he is a technical expert on the 
Manx Church, then as the involvement of Tynwald with that Church declines – most 
importantly through the changes in the ecclesiastical legislative process – the strength 
of this justification also ebbs. If he is a technical expert, then his voice on matters 
outside that specialism loses power against the general role of the appointed members 
of the Council. Finally, and an illustration of the preceding point, if he is analogous to 
the Attorney-General, the same arguments that have led to the loss of that officer’s 
vote could be applied to the Bishop.
711
 It will also be recalled that the original Council 
was composed of Officers with responsibility, and expertise, in different areas of the 
Manx administration – the Bishop might be identified with the First and Second 
Deemsters, who no longer sit in the Council, rather than the Attorney-General. 
If technical expertise is a strong justification for the Bishop’s role, the 
Established character of the Manx Church explains why only that community is 
represented – no other religious community is so intimately entangled with the Manx 
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State. If it is the strongest one, however, two questions suggest themselves. Given that 
Tynwald primarily focuses on the development of laws, might it be more sensible for 
this function to be carried out by a specialist whose knowledge will always include a 
legal expertise – the Vicar-General, who it will be recalled formerly sat in the 
Council? If the ecclesiastical officer sits primarily as a technical advisor, should they 
have a full vote in the Council?  
Thirdly, the Bishop may possess a similar expertise over the content of 
Christian scriptures, and other religious sources. The arguments for his replacement 
by the Vicar-General are less potent here, but a more fundamental problem arises. We 
can appreciate how the national legislature would benefit from in-house advice on the 
structures and law of the Established Church. It is less clear why they would benefit 
from an expertise in the theological discipline of one religious tradition. In some 
cases, the interaction between proposed legislation and Christian practices may be 
important to assessing its merits, but this is better considered as representation of the 
religious communities needs or voice, discussed below. It is more difficult to come up 
with an instance when the process would benefit from this knowledge in the abstract – 
in particular, as we have seen, members who would seek to act in compliance with 
Christian teachings seem happy to develop their own understanding of these sources. 
Fourthly, the Bishop is almost certainly not Manx, but instead brings with him 
a broad experience of both Church and public life. One would expect, given the career 
structure of the Church of England, for the Bishop to be a man of some maturity, with 
experience of running complex, but non-commercial, organisations; and with a 
considerable track record in relatively poorly paid public service. As was observed 
during one consideration of reform, he brings to the process “his respected and 
authoritative personality”.  These expectations are not in any sense requirements for 
the post, however. The See has been occupied by a Manxman, and there are no special 
limits on who may be appointed to the See. Nonetheless, in practice we can see from 
the five Bishops studied in this report a particular pre-Council body of experience. 
The negative side of this detachment, as has been observed during the debates, 
is that a new Bishop will not necessarily have a good knowledge of, or affinity with, 
the Island. Furthermore, the need of the Council for a member with broader 
experience than that offered by a professional life within the Manx nation does not, 
necessarily, sit well with the development of Manx autonomy during the twentieth 
century. If, however, the Council’s process benefits from a foreign member, 
analogous to the Judge of Appeal in the judicial process, it is difficult to conceive of a 
practical alternative to the Bishop.  
The final, and most prevalent, process argument supporting his role is based 
upon the idea of a special spiritual voice in the Council, a counter to growing 
secularisation in Manx public life. As an ecclesiastical officer the Bishop brings a 
special voice to bear on, in particular, moral issues before the Council. In the United 
Kingdom context, many supporters of a role for the Lords Spiritual have stressed what 
Archbishop Garret described as their role in “forming and expressing the Christian 
conscience on some of the outstanding problems of the day. It is their special duty to 
scrutinise matters under debate in the light of the Christian faith”.712 As we have seen, 
the distinctiveness of the Bishop’s voice has been queried by other members – the 
ability of other religious adherents to provide a spiritual voice in addition to the 
Bishop shading into active opposition to an ex officio religious voice. It is also worth 
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considering why the spiritual voice selected should invariably be that of the Manx 
Church, albeit with a good level of consultation with Manx Christianity more broadly. 
Perhaps a more fundamental problem with this justification is the question of 
why a spiritual voice is to be particularly valued within the Council. As Shell has 
argued, “[i]n principle a second chamber ought to provide for the mobilising into a 
legislature of people whose experience is different, decidedly different, from that 
which is normal in the first chamber”.713 It may be that the process by which other 
members join the Council homogenises their perspectives, so that the addition of a 
professional cleric gives a valuable alternative view. Within the Council, as part of the 
process of debate, we would expect competition between differing views to enhance 
the legislative process. The difficulty with this argument is that the Bishop does not 
represent a very radical alternative from the Council as a whole – indeed, if he were 
the only practising Christian in Tynwald, his position might be attacked on just that 
basis. More radical alternatives could be provided by those whose life experiences, 
and values, might be expected to differ greatly from those of the other members of the 
Council – for instance assertive members of minority sexualities; or those who have 
rejected, or been excluded from, conventional ideas of employment; or those 
convicted of serious criminal offences. Each would seem able to contribute a more 
radically challenging perspective to the debates of the Council. 
(b) Public benefit arguments. 
Moving from improved legislation, a number of arguments are based upon a 
broader benefit to Manx society or the Manx state. 
Firstly, the role of the Bishop gives Tynwald a distinctive element, and so 
contributes to the distinctiveness of the Isle of Man. In particular, the role of the 
Bishop forms part of the traditional structures of the Isle of Man, representing a 
continuity of moral and spiritual tradition.
714
 This is more than an argument ad 
antiquitam, although this is the way it is sometimes presented by both supporters and 
opponents. Rather, it is recognised that the structures of the Isle of Man are unusual 
and worth preservation as part of a cultural heritage – a heritage which in part 
distinguishes the Isle of Man from neighbouring territories. 
It is difficult to argue that the role and composition of the Council is not now 
distinctive. The colonial model of Governor-Council-Assembly, with a member of a 
State church playing a role in this tripartate structure, has declined across the former 
British Empire. A more difficult question is the extent to which the composition of the 
national legislature, as distinct from its decisions, should be used to preserve cultural 
heritage. Large elements of the distinctive composition of the Council were lost 
throughout the twentieth century, the damage to the Manx heritage being justified by 
other advantages – including the loss of disadvantages flowing directly from the 
composition of the Council. 
Secondly, as we will see below, it can be argued that the place of the Bishop 
on the Council helps to secure the continued existence of the Diocese of Sodor and 
Man. As we will see below, this is primarily a community benefit argument. It can 
also be argued, however, that the existence of a Diocese encompassing, but limited, to 
the Isle of Man supports Manx autonomy. Taking the Manx Church to be a State 
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Church, its relationship with the Church of England may be significant in the 
relationship of the Manx and United Kingdom States. In particular, the current 
relationship may fairly be seen as one where the Bishop heads the Manx Church, but 
under the ultimate oversight of York. The parallels with the growth of Manx 
autonomy are clear, and can be seen across the debates.  
To some extent, this argument depends upon the Manx Church occupying a 
special place in public life, so that its hierarchy is significant in a way that is not true 
for, say, Methodism. As we have seen, the Manx Church can fairly be seen as a State 
Church. It would, undoubtedly, be more difficult for the Manx Church to retain its 
separate identity if it were part of a single Diocese, merged with part of the United 
Kingdom. Once again, a more difficult question is whether this should be given 
sufficient weight to influence the composition of the national legislature. 
Thirdly, the Bishop’s place in Council is both a symbol of the Establishment 
of the Manx Church,
715
 and one of the benefits which the Manx Church receives along 
with the burdens of Establishment. So, removal of the Bishop would be a symbolic 
severance of the Church and the State, while leaving the Manx Church encumbered 
without adjustment of the relationship more generally. This argument may, however, 
lose some power when the idea of Establishment is considered at more length. 
Establishment does not consist of a single keystone element, such as representation in 
the national legislature, but rather consists of a rich combination of laws touching on 
the position of the religious organisation. It is unhelpful to imagine that these laws 
developed as part of a single, coherent, policy vision. So, removal of the Bishop from 
Council would not necessarily signal disestablishment, rather than simply a change in 
Establishment; and such changes have been effected piecemeal before. In particular, 
in the Manx context, it is possible to identify the development of the Bishop’s seat in 
the Council, which happened some considerable time after the Manx Church 
established its special relationship with the Manx State. 
Fourthly, the place of the Bishop in the Council supports the Manx Church 
and, by doing so, encourages religious conformity and adherence to the State religion. 
This argument was put particularly strongly in the nineteenth century, but did not play 
a major role in denominational terms during the twentieth century, and has not 
appeared at all in the United Kingdom debate over the Lords Spiritual. With the 
Bishop emphasising his role as a Christian leader, however, it can be recast in terms 
of Christianity as a State religion. It will be recalled that at the end of the twentieth 
century Bishop Jones saw the Isle of Man as a Christian nation, as opposed to the 
multifaith United Kingdom. 
The difficulty with this argument is that it presupposes that encouraging 
religious conformity remains an appropriate end for State policy. Within the context 
of a confessional state which to some extent tolerated private sects, as it tolerated the 
presence of non-nationals in the territory, this is not a problem. As we saw in relation 
to Bishop Jones’ comments, however, it is open to question whether this is the true 
position of the Manx state. In particular, if Establishment does form part of a broader 
state policy encouraging the Manx population to adopt or adhere to religious 
conformity, then the obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
may be involved. 
Fifthly, if a leader of a religious community is involved in the creation of laws 
by the national legislature, the members of that community may be more likely to 
comply with the laws of the State. This is not an argument that has been put forward 
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in the debates, in part because when used to defend the status quo it could be seen as 
carrying an implicit threat. It has, however, been touched on by the broader 
commentary. In considering the role of second chambers generally, Shell considered 
that: “[a] chamber that represents varied interests, either explicitly and formally, or 
implicitly and informally, may have a vital role in mobilising support”.716 Although 
this argument would seem to have strength in some contexts, given the position of the 
Manx Church, and Manx Christianity generally, it does not seem very powerful in the 
Manx context. Additionally, as Smith points out, to emphasise this as a justification 
for religious representation is not without danger. If the legislature has within it 
resources representing a particular religious or philosophical position, that legislature 
may prove confident enough to legislate for matters that would perhaps otherwise be 
seen as issues of individual conscience, with an adverse impact on individuals and on 
the distinction between law and morality.
717
 
Similarly, and finally, it may be argued that the place of the Bishop gives a 
minority ethnicity a voice in the legislature that would be unjustly silenced by simple 
territorial or indirect election. This can also be seen as a benefit for that ethnic 
community, but is a public benefit because the State benefits from its legislature being 
justly composed. As we have seen, however, the Manx Church, and Manx 
Christianity more generally, is represented by a significant number of legislators who 
have been prepared to draw upon their religious identity, and teachings from their 
traditions, within debate. 
(c) Community benefit arguments. 
A number of arguments are based upon benefit to the Manx Church, or to the 
Christian community in the Island more broadly.  
Firstly, the Bishop is entitled, as a Baron of the Island, to sit in the Council. 
Recognising this entitlement protects his proprietorial, and feudal, rights. As we have 
seen, the basis for membership of the Council has never been based on the property 
rights of the members, but rather upon officers, and later others, being called to assist 
the Lord. 
Secondly, the Bishop sits in the Council to represent the clergy of the Manx 
Church, who it will be recalled are unable to vote in elections to the Keys.
718
 Thus, he 
provides a benefit to those disenfranchised clergy. It is not clear that the relationship 
of the Bishop to these clergy is similar to that of electors to members of the House of 
Keys; or that these clergy have a strong role in appointing the Bishop. In that sense, 
the role of the Bishop may be a poor compensation for exclusion from involvement 
with the Keys. In any case, these are a tiny proportion of the electorate, and it could 
be argued that a more proportionate response to this problem would be to allow them 
to vote in elections to the House of Keys.  
Thirdly, the Bishop’s place in the Council gives the Manx Church, or Manx 
Christianity generally, a voice in the national legislature. As noted above, other 
members of Tynwald, in practice, can bring these voices into the debate. These voices 
do not, however, come from a religious leader speaking ex officio. In particular, we 
have seen how successive Bishops have taken their responsibility for representing the 
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range of Christian opinion seriously. Coupled with his position in the Manx Church, 
this gives the Bishop a distinctive voice in the legislative chamber. Although these 
views may happen to be in the chamber in any case, if this is seen as a priority, it may 
be unwise to leave it to what Archer described as “random selection” – the presence 
for other reasons of members of the chamber able to contribute that voice.
719
 
We have already discussed issues flowing from arguments based on the 
distinctiveness of the Bishop’s contribution. These are less powerful when we 
construct the voice as a benefit for the Manx Church and Manx Christianity, rather 
than the legislative process itself. To some extent if the Bishop is seen as a 
representative of Manx Christianity as a whole, then representing only this religious 
group is comparatively unproblematic – as we have discussed, non-Christian religious 
communities in the Island are very small. This leaves problems raised by the weak 
interdenominational nature of the Bishop’s representation however. If his place is 
justified as representing the broad Christian community, why is control of his 
appointment, and the power to dismiss, vested in one denomination? Although in the 
United Kingdom context the practical problems of extending religious representation 
led to the Government rejecting the proposal, a less ambitious extension of the 
appointment of a single religious representation to a body embracing Manx 
Christianity more broadly may be less impractical, especially considering the role that 
successive Bishops have already given to the Isle of Man Council of Churches. 
Fourthly, the Bishops place in the legislature allows him to exercise oversight 
over legislation affecting the Manx Church. As a matter of legal theory, Tynwald can 
legislate concerning the affairs of any religious organisation – as we can see by a 
number of Acts of Tynwald. In practice, however, the relationship of such 
organisations to the State, coupled with their legal status, makes legislation on internal 
affairs unlikely. The position of the Manx Church, with an ecclasiastical law forming 
part of national law, is very different. We can see concerns over the need for oversight 
over legislation affecting the Manx Church from the eighteenth century on. The 
radical changes to the procedure for ecclesiastical legislation at the end of the 
twentieth century have, however, weakened the strength of this justification. 
Fifthly, the place of the Bishop in the Council has contributed to the continued 
survival of the Diocese of Sodor and Man. The continued existence of the Diocese 
carries with it benefits for the Manx Church, in relation to autonomy and the number 
of clergy ministering to the Manx parishes. This has been a recurrent theme in the 
debates, and may have lead to a position where the Diocese exists because the Bishop 
sits in Council, and the Bishop sits in Council because the Diocese exists. The loss of 
the Diocese has, however, been seen as a price worth paying for reform of the Council 
by some contributors to debates. 
IV.4 Conclusions.  
Although this report is intended to contribute to the ongoing debate on the 
composition of the second chamber in the Manx Tynwald and the United Kingdom 
Parliament, we do not intend to conclude with a recommendation on the future of 
ecclesiastical representation in either chamber. Ultimately, within the very permissive 
framework of international law we have outlined, this is an issue for the 
representatives of the people of both territories – what form do they wish this key part 
of their polity to take? Nonetheless, a small number of key points can be drawn out 
from this study. 
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Firstly, if ex officio religious representation is desired, the current model is 
probably the simplest that can be envisaged. Although the choice between no 
representation and a system representing all shades of spiritual identity and religious 
opinion is too simplistic, extension of religious representation beyond a single, 
established, religious organisation with a developed hierarchy would be a complex 
task. 
Secondly, religious representation ex officio is not the only way in which 
religious voices are heard in the chamber. As we have seen, not only are non-
members of the Manx Church free to discuss their spiritual perspective in the 
chamber, but members of that Church can, and do, disagree with the Bishop over 
theological and moral issues. There is more to religious representation in the 
legislative process than ex officio representation. 
Thirdly, the Bishop is a special member of the chamber. Whatever the basis 
for his original inclusion in the Council, today he sits as a representative of the Manx 
Church, and of Manx Christianity more generally. He is looked to as a specialist on 
ecclesiastical and moral issues, expected to eschew party loyalties, and perhaps 
allowed a little more latitude when engaging in theological modes of argumentation. 
This is important to consider when evaluating plans for mixed second chambers with 
different modes of entry for different members. 
Fourthly, although the Bishop clearly does perform an interdenominational 
role, the evidence is against him performing an interreligious one. Although this may 
be more achievable by the Lords Spiritual, we remain sceptical as to whether it is 
possible for a religious professional of one tradition to fully represent the perspectives 
and needs of another. This problem becomes more serious the further apart the two 
traditions are in terms of practices and values. A Bishop may be committed enough, 
and to some extent knowledgeable enough, to representing Judaism, a monotheism 
perceived by Christians to have strong links with Christianity. The acid test is the 
quality of representation which would be received by Jains, Scientologists, Druids and 
– most difficult of all – Christian mythos Satanists. 
Fifthly, there are few limits under the ECHR on the model for a second 
chamber each state chooses to adopt. Religious representation is neither forbidden nor 
mandatory for any religious community, and it appears likely that representation of 
the national church only will be permitted. The specific limit on gender of the 
representative is, however, more problematic. It is not impossible that the Manx 
Church may be required to choose between allowing a female Bishop; losing ex 
officio representation on the Council; or allowing itself to be represented by an office 
open to either gender. 
Sixthly, there is no single justification for the place of the Bishop in Council 
which can be identified as the decisive one for the debate. It may be inappropriate, 
however, to rely upon each of these grounds in isolation. It may be that a number of 
justifications, none of them strong enough individually to justify his role, come 
together in the Bishop – and in the Bishop only – to do so. Evaluating the strength of 
this sort of melange will be a difficult process. 
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